Towards an Integrated Theory of Intellectual Property by Parchomovsky, Gideon & Siegelman, Peter
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
2002 
Towards an Integrated Theory of Intellectual Property 
Gideon Parchomovsky 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Peter Siegelman 
University of Connecticut School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Economic Theory Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons, Policy Design, Analysis, 
and Evaluation Commons, Science and Technology Policy Commons, and the Technology and Innovation 
Commons 
Repository Citation 
Parchomovsky, Gideon and Siegelman, Peter, "Towards an Integrated Theory of Intellectual Property" 
(2002). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 1364. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1364 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
VOLUME 88 NOVEMBER 2002 
A.ti?..TJCLE 
TOVv'ARDS AN INTEGRATED THEORY OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
Gideon Parchomovsky and Peter Siegelman''  
NUMBER 7 
lNTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1456 
I. THE INSULAR VIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1465 
A. The Theory . . . . . . . . . .. . .. ... . . . . ...... . . . . . . . . ..... .. . . . . . .. . . .. . . .... . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .  1465 
B. The Case Lcnv . . . . . . . ... . .... . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... .. . . .. .. . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1469 
ll. A SIMPLE MODEL OF PATENT/TRADEMARK LEVERAGE ....... 1473 
A. The Model ................................................................................. 1474 
B. Refinemenrs and Limitations .................................................. 1481 
1. Product Charocteristics . . . . . . . . . ..... . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1481 
2. Demand-Side Characteristics ........................................... 1482 
3. Rate of Technological Change ......................................... 1484 
4. Spillovers and Brand Equity . . . . . . . . . . . .. .... . .. .. . . . .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1484 
III. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF SYNERGIES ....................................... 1487 
A. Previous Empirical Work ........................................................ 1487 
B. Case Studies .............................................................................. 1489 
J. Roundup . . . . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1489 
Associate Professor. University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
Associate Professor, Fordham Law School. We are indebted to Michael Abramowicz, 
Ian Ayres, Avi Bell, Omri Ben-Shahar, Yochai Benkler, Rachel Brewster, Hanoch 
Dagan, Zohar Goshen, Doug Licthman, Kimberly Moore, Mark Patterson, Dan 
Richman, Alan Schwartz, Henry Smith. Steve The!, Paul Wolfson. Ben Zipursky, and 
seminar participants at Georgetown. George Mason, University of Pennsylvania, and 
Yale for helpful comments. We arc especially grateful to Walter Nicholson and Mark 
Lemley for insightful observation and criticism that substantially improved earlier 
drafts. Finally. we would like to than!\. Michael Pereira for excellent assistance, and 
Fordham Lmv School for generous financial support. 
1455 
1456 Virgin ia Lmv Review [\/(''! (')' -'· ! J.:::.� ' __ ) . _ u. L_ !...._}  
7 NurraSlVeer ....... ..................... . ...... . ........... ...... . . .. . . . ... . . . . . . . . .. 1490 
3. Tagan zer .............................................................................. 1491 
�- Zoviro:r ............................................................................... 1491 
J. Boyer Aspirin ..................................................................... l ��9.2 
I'V. ['\TENDING TilE ANALYSIS TO TR•\DF S[CRFCY \'iD 
Cc!PYRrcHT ........... ................... . . . ....... . . ...... . . . .. ......... . . .. . .. . . . ....... . ... . 14'-n 
/\. Trude 5'ecrecy ..................... . . ..... . . . .. . .. ... .. . .. . . . . ... . . . .......... . .... . ... 149� 
B. Copyright .................................................................................. 1497 
V. !L-v!PUCATIONS FOR LAW AND POLICY ................ . .. .... . ................ 1500 
A. Pitfol!s in the Supreme Court's ;\pprooclz ro Leverage ........ 1502 
B. Relaxing the Tradeoff Between Dynamic and Swric 
E!Jlciency ........... . ... . ........ . ...... . .................................................. 1504 
C. Tailoring ond Defaults .... ..... . ............................................ . ...... 1508 
VI. OBJECTIONS AND ADDITIONAL FACTORS .................... . . ...... . . . .. 15!0 
A. Advertising ................................................................................ 1511 
B. Discounting and Dynamic Issues .......................... .... . ....... . .... 1513 
C. Prices Rise on Expiration of the Parenr? ............... . ............... 1515 
D. Alternative Proposals . . .................................... . ..... ......... . . ........ 1517 
I. Compulsory Licensing ...................................................... 1518 
2. Probabilistic Enforcement ................................................ 1519 
CONCLUSION························································································· 1521 
APPENDIX: A DYNAMIC PRICING MODEL ........ . ............ ...... . . . . ..... . .. 1523 
INTRODUCTION 
According t o  a famous legend, six b lind persons once set  o u t  to 
discern the shape of an elephant . Unable to fol l ow all o f  its con­
tours, each observed only a single part of the majestic m ammal.  As 
a resul t, t h e  m en and women arrive d  at  six different pe rceptions of 
t h e  object of t heir study. Failing to synth esize their isol at e d  o bser­
vations, the six could not appreciate the true nature of  wha t  the y  
att e mpte d  t o  d escrib e .  The m o r a l  of t h e  story is that discr e t e  anal y­
sis of the parts, accurate though it may be. often distorts one's per­
ception of the wh ole.  The cur rent state of int e l lectual  property 
theory is a case in point . 
In recent years, the importance o f  intellectual propert y  hnv­
both as an academic discipline and as a real worl d phenomenon-
)I)(\) l _, .1� J Inregrmed Theory of Ime!lecruol Property 14)7 
he1s risen meteorically.; Oddly, however. then� exists a striking mis­
fit between the academic theory of intcllectu�t! property and its use 
in the real world. Economists and legal schul<"tr:s tend to tre�tt each 
of the constituent fields of intellectu<:tl propeny <ts discrete and in­
s ular.� 1}/u rs·..: \'Ct. the same insularity h�ts !"!<2�-,-�\clec.l the United - . - � I 
Sutcs Sunrcmc Court's intellectual DHJJ)<:rl\ iuri:-;pruckr\Ci:. rvrost l 1 ( - ·' ' 
rr:centlv. i!! TmjFi.� Devices v. !Vfurketin� f)isnf<ns. Ju::;tice Ken-
.., ' '- 1 • 
neely opincci that '" [trademark law] does not c\ist to n.::w<trc1 mC\nu-
facturers for their innovation in creatin£ a O<lrticular device: that is �� I 
the purpose of the patent law and its period of exclusivity.--' In this 
view, patents and copyrights offer limited protection to novel proc­
esses or intellectual products, while trademark law protects good­
will..) Those who actually use intellectual property protection. how­
ever, appreciate th8t its various modalities can be combined to 
yield important synergies: Patents can help create goodwill, and 
trademarks can be used to appropriate the gains from innovation.5 
1 See Drug Deve l opmen t :  In te l lec t ual  Property and Paten t Protection arc New 
Concerns. Biotech Wk . . May 16. 200!. at 10. 10 (reporting that <l survey of 2T!. seniur 
execu t ives i n  the pharmace u t i cal .  biotechnology. ami mccl ical  product ind u s t ries rc­
vcal ccl t ha t  " the de ve l opment and pro tection of i n t e llect ual propcrtv is seen as the 
most critic;-11 area. as near ly all the sen ior  execu tives surveve<.i i dcn t i fi,;cl an urge n t  
need t o  address issues such as pro t ec ting proprietary rL·scarch. valu in g intellectual 
pr(lperty. and extending  patent protection " ); Joff Wi ld. A Yawn i ng Gap Th<tl Tuo 
Many Companies Fail to Recogn ise :  Accou n ting for IP. Fin. Times. June 2!. 2001. at 
3. 3 ("There is a growing be l ief tha t. with the in creasing i n fl uence of the k nowkclge 
economy. directors cannot cleliver best  va lue t o  shareholders unless t hey know the 
true value or a company's intellectual property."). 
' See. e.g . . Richard A. Epstein, Intellectual Property: Old Boundaries and New Fron­
tiers. 76 Incl. L .J . 803, 804 (2001) (contending that ··intellectual property comprehends 
at leas t five or six separate areas"' and arguing that " [t ]he mere fact that in te l l ectual 
propertv law subsumes these six separate fields docs not guara n t ee that any proposi­
tion t hat holds good r·or one  of t hese areas wi l l n ecessar i ly c ct r-ry over to a second"'): 
Ruth Okediji. Givers. Takers and Other Kinds of Users : A fair Usc Doctrin e  !"or Cy­
berspace. 53 Fla .  L. Rev. 107, 141 (2001) (suggesting t hat "']c]ourts h ave ge nent l ly 
been careful to art icu late distinctions between patents and copyrig h ts"). 
'
532 U.S. 23.34 (2001). We wou ld l ike t o  note that our criticism is aclclressed t o  the 
Court's disregard of the important commonal i ties betwec:n pat e n t  and t rademark pro­
tc:ct ion . We agrc:e with the Court's r u ling i n  t h is case. Sec: discuss ion infra Section 
V.!\. 
'See Doris Estelle Long. First. --Let's Kil l  All the I n te lle c t ual  Property Lawy.�rs1'": 
Musings on the Dec l i ne ilncl Fal l  of the In t e l l ec tua l  Pmperty Empi re. 34 J. Marsha l l  L. 
Rev. 05!. 889 (20ClJ) (suggesting that " [t] he Tra[Fi.r case raises serious concerns about 
the future of traclc:rmtrk i n tersec t ions wi t h  both patents etml cupvright s"). 
'Sce Siegrun D. Kane. Trademark Law: A Practitioner·s Guide� I: 1.5[D]. :1t 1-7 
L458 \lir}!.i;zirt Lc1�.v Revie��v !Vol. ·1-455 
Tl1e COl1\'t:ntic;n.:Jl \lle\v ClChr�'nwleduerl tr'" -possih ilit',_/ ... . J .. . \l\.1 tJ "--" L !\..- . _ em-' . ' . l r . ,, I ptoymg z u ternattve moe cs o, 1nteuectua property to protect a 
uiven business asset-must nut�:blv. the availability of natent or .::;: _I ,./ 1 
<...: O D\_.rri9ht orui_,::�:tion so ,.., ,. P ut it i•::1" h··oeiv iuqorr"L-·p:cl t � 2 1 � \_.. . j . . 1. (.'" •J - � ,.. 1 0 ,_/ .... ; � 0 .i - ._. "-1 (. . .I ' � 
()CCaSi0r1(1tl\. "bility· of cc;I111J1nin� c\ift-;::r� nt 
uciJ li 
th\� t>lincl rscJns in the �.:le ant_ t�:dt�. existil1g ar1alysis ha�; Lt� 
rl)'<C:;i'C''I'n tl,JP in·lpnr!'·•pr c;>rP>-'J'Gi e c: ih;,·t F'tO'V t'roiTI ron1hl'r•i11lT '.• . .__ '.....- "- .c '--' l. f_f\__. 1 _ _ (_l. ;_ !,_ '-·) ... ! \.....- :=_·· ,_/ ;_i, .._.c .l J I ,.. .1 ,_. ./.\.. lJ �i.\� L:J 
morJeS o·t· n·r·ntPrt;')P l•1 ·thic J\ ''l]·C·[� 'Ye \�Vi]] rpQ]� t() ]-Pr-l('"' �· '11';c '-....  t__; \..__;t.v· ..,__�...l\.. .__l. 1 ll;.._J ��.1 � e, ·( .t J-_,Cl"'\.. l ........ {._j � .J�' t. .tl,) 
omission by exploring the consequences of comb ining various 
modes of intellectual property protection. We will focus on the 
possibility of combining patent and trademark protection by lever­
aging patents through trademarks, but we will also discuss the syn­
ergies between trademarks and both trade secrets and copyrights. 
The possibility of leveraging patents through trademarks calls 
into question the dominant paradigm in intellectual property. Al­
though patent, copyright, and trademark are the three principal 
subfielcls in the area of intellectual property, the first two are tradi­
tionally deemed to rest on a different economic foundation from 
the latter. From an economic st<:mdpoint , patents and copyrights 
embody a tradeoff between ex ante and ex post perspectives.' Ex 
ante. society seeks to encourage innovation and expressive creativ­
ity by <:!warding market exclusivity over the products that result 
from these activities.s The cost of copying innovative products and 
(3d eel. 2001) ("Trademarks. patents. and copyrights ... [a]!! .. . may apply to d �inglc 
product . " ). Empirically oriented economists have recognized that patents are nul the 
only or even the most important sources of appropriability. Sec discussion infra Sec­
tion liLA. 
"Sec, e.g., C raig Jovcc ct a! .. Cupyright LIW 174-75 (5th cd. 2001). 
7 Sec Wilii£1111 M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysi�; of Copvright 
Law. 18 J. Legal Stucl. 325. 326 ( 1989) ( e xp laining that "[s]triking the corr<:ct balance 
between access cl!ld incentives is the central problem in copyright law"); Mark A. 
Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in intellectual Property Law. 75 To;. L. 
Rev. l)89, l)l)() ( Jl)lJ7) (noting th<lt cxcessiw intellectual property protection deter:,; 
�:ubsequent inrwv<Jtion :1s it "frcczc [ s ] development at the first gcnerctlio n  ul' prud­
ucts"). 'Sec U.S. Cun�l. ;trl. L � S. cl. 0 (empowering Congress ''[t]o promote the� Prcgrc::s 
ul' Scir:rK<: ;mel usdul Arts. by s ec uring for limited Times to Authors ami Inventor:-; 
the '.exclusive Right to their J<:spcctiv:: Writings and Discoveries"); s<.:c al: ;o fv1azcr v. 
Stein. 3Ln U.S. 201.219 (1954) (explaining that "·[t]he copyright law. like the p;1tcnt 
statutes. make�; rcwctrd to the owner a secondary consideration.· ... The <:co1wmic 
philusophv hchinc! the cl<tusc <:mpnwcring Congre ss to gr<mt patents am! copvr i ghh is 
2002] !nregrmed Theory of !ntellecruol Property 
ongnul e\nressive vvorks is invariably lower than the cost of oro-,__� t "' l 
clueing th•:::rn initially.') and in a competitive market the price will be 
driven ciov.n tu the marginal cost of copying. 
Thus. un th,_:: on1:: hand. <.1bscnL exclusivity. inventors and <:<uthors 
'V J. I I ;,,. •;: • : . ; <,- · ;n ' \ n .�',.li!-J'·i ;[te lhr' h;!] � · y·i· 1 l '· i ' ·' ['l�-' nf ;-'1 c·i·· l'rn:-i ·•,,:-·o "� ,_ L .._.. �-� · '· '" '· · ' '- _ �v ( i' 1....11 . _. , _  • .- lll_,_. _ .._ . L .  · - '- ... - . L � � ( t L�"--' '-' '  '- \,.. ,1 ;-.J�-�.�._tt� ............ , 
ant! t�--;!_; iitt��-� innovati(1n i>: likely tC) restdt.1(! ()n the tiTher hancL 
nnep '11-: in·•,.,.JIJ·,,r, nr :-l C •i')\'riu]1tP(1 \"C.-.-1( h:1..: h"'e11 1'l· ' - ) (l1JCP<:1' ''C""i -..__. _, .. .._ ..... <.�.· - • ' - ' -"A <� _J.t �.._, .. o '-• t .,1 0 ._.. -· • ��llA " ·.�._) '• v t_/ \... t_. _,.._...._ ' ,) ,!•-A 
ety \vi:;;hc�; L� cabin the distortions c:lUsed by e'-:clusivitv bv 1imitim� 
th� ch..tL:\ti(>n of patents and copyrights.11 Tr�1demark p{-ot�ction. by 
contrast, is not us u al ly thought to embody a compar<lble tradeoff.1� 
Rather_ its purpose is to perm it firms to establish or maintain 
goodwill and to preserve their reputation among consumers.'·' 
Thus, trademark protection is, in principle, infinite in duration. 1.1 
the conviction th;Jt . .  [it] is the hcst way to advance public welfare through the tal­
ents or <:utlwr� ;:nd inventors in ·science and usdul Arts.'") (citation omitted) . 
. , Sec Carl Shapiro & Hal R. Varian. Information Rules: A Strategic Guide tu the 
Network Economy .1 ( 1999). Professors Shapiro ancl Varian observe that "production 
or an inrurmatiun guud involves lziglz fi-red cosrs but lo1v nwrginul cosrs." For example. 
-· 100-million dollar movies can be copied on videotape for a t'ew cents . .. ld. 
'"Or. as Judge Richard PcN1er succinctly explained the rationale underlving the 
patent system. "the manufacturer ... will not sow if he won't be able to reap." Rich­
ard A. Posner. Economic Analysis of Law� 3.3. <lt 43 (5th eel. 1998). 
"The limited duration is not clietatecl by economics alone, of course: it is mandated 
to some: dcgnx by the Intellectual Property C lause in the Constitution. s,�c U.S. 
Const. art. I.� 8. cl. 0. Even before the ratification of the Constitution ancl the adop­
tion of the U.S. patent and copyright laws. English jurists struggled to reconcile ex 
ante incentives and ex post distortions. See Cary v. Longman. !02 Eng. Rep . US. 14() 
n.(b) (!SUI) (Lurd Kenyon. C.J.) ('"The rule of ckcision in t his case is a maltcr of 
great consequence� to the country. In deciding it we must take care to gw1rd ag<:inst 
two extremes equally prejudicial: the one. that men of ability. who have cmplov·..:d 
their time i'or the service of the community. may not be deprived of their just merits. 
anci the reward or their ingenuity and labour : the other. that the worlclmay nut be de­
prived of impmve ments. nor the progress of the mts be retarded."') (quoting Sayre 1·. 
Murllt!. 102 Eng Rep. 139. 140 (1785) (Lord Mansfield. CJ.)). 
"i\ tradem�;rk docs not ·'Jcpend upon novelty. inventiou. discovery. or <1ny work ul' 
the br<Jin. it i·cquirc:' nu fancy or imagination, no genius, no laborious thoughi." 
Tr<llk-Mark C<N':;. 100 U.S. i)2.04 (11'79). "Rather. trademark protection is <lW<lrlkd 
merely to thus,_. who were the first tu u�c a di:,tinctive mark in commerce." Rubert P. 
Merges ei al., lntc!lcctual Pnmenv in the New Technological A ge 525 (1997). 
''Sec Wil li <lm �;!. Landes �� Richard A. Posner. Trc{demark Law: An Econumi': 
Pcrspccti\'•c·. 3() j_L. & Econ. 26:1.270 (Il)87) ("The value of a trademark is the Scl\ing 
in [C\l!lSUmc:rJ sc;m:h costs made possible bv the inl'urmation or r eputa t ion that lh·� 
trademark cunYeys ur embodies about the brand (or the firm that prnlluces the 
t-nancl."). Somt:. however, have criticized recent developments in trademark la\v ciS 
go1ng suhst<tnti;J!\v beyond this j:wrpose. allowing trademarks tu beco1ne an <lJHi-
1LJ.6() Virginio Low Revinv [Vol. 88 : 1455 
Despite the differen l e conomic and ! e g�1 l  the ories un derlying 
t h e m, h mvevc r.  we c o n t e n d  t h a t  both patents  a n d  trademarks  a l l ow 
fi rms t o  appropri a te the  b: ndits  o f  i n ve s t m e n t  i n  R e s e a rch a n d  
Development  ( "R&D" )  �m d p roduct q u �  l i t y . 1 5  ·while t h e  e ffect  o f  
c_J c\ t e nts  o n  i n  v e s  t rn  e n  t : n 1 <  TJ i s  ', . .. i l , . ., ' l' 'l o 11 i :," · c1 1 • •  t h , ,  c c· m  D I e-1 � • � ....... . - � - \ � .l . _  . ....... l �  � .- - , _  .. 1 
rn e n t a n  e ffec t  of tr8 c.l c m < t r k s  o n  i n n 0\ <1t i o n  h a s  re ce i ve d  \' i rt u ::l l l v 
n o  att;n t i o n . i i  C o m b i n i n g p i:l t e n t  a n d  t r a d e m a r k  p ro t e c t i o n  ca;1 
create two i mporta n t types o f  s y n e rgies  fur a fi r m .  F i rst .  t h e  exis­
t e n ce of a pa ten t can red u ce t h e  cost  of establ i s h i ng a strong 
trademark because the e x c l usivi ty gra n t e d  by tbe  patent m ay lower 
the advert is ing expe nditur e s  necessary to create a dominant bra n d . 1 �  
w mpcti t i ve force . Sec.  for C X < l m p l e .  M a rk A .  Lemley .  The Modern Lan h a m  A c t  a n d  
t h e  Death  o f  Common Sense.  1 08 Y a l e  L,J .  l o87 ( 1 999) .  which d raws heav i l y  on  i n ­
s ights  deve loped i n  Ra l ph S .  B rc lwn,  J r. .  A dve r t is i ng a n d  t h e  Publ ic  I n teres t :  Legal 
Protec t ion  o f  Trade Symbo ls, 57 Yale LJ . 1 1 65 ( 1 9'-1-8 ) .  
" See  Kane ,  supra note 5 . � l : L5 [ D j . a t  1-7 ( ' "Trademark l aw,  u n l i k e  p a t e n t  and  
copyri g h t  law. confe rs a perpetual  r igh t .  So long  as  t h e  trademark con t i n ues  t o  iden­
t i fy a s i ngle source , the  user o f  a cunfus i ngly s i mi l <l r mark is  l i a b le for trade mark  i n ­
fri n gemen t . " ) .  
' ' Se e Kenneth vV. D a m .  T h e  Ecu n u m i c  Underpi n n ings o f  Paten t  Law. 23( 1 )  J .  Le­
gal S t ud .  247 . 247-49 ( 1 994 ) .  P ru lcssur Dam n o t es t h at t h e  pa ten t  sys t em solves t h e  
- - a ppro pri a b i l i ty p rob lcm"-thc probl e m  t h a t  i n nuva t i o n  would  b e  in h i bi t ed  i f  a firm 
could not  recover the  costs ur i n ve n t i on-by crc<H ing property righ ts  i n  i n v e n t i ons .  
The so lu t ion .  however.  a lso en t <l i l s  t h ree secondary economic p rob lems: monopoly 
leading t o  a deadwe i g h t  loss, re nt -seek ing ,  and i n h i bi t ion or  fu t u re innova t i o n .  
' " For exa mple . the  lead i ng textbook on  i n d us tr ia l  organ izat ion descr ibes t h e  i n c e n -
t ive e ffects or p a t e n t s  as fol lows: 
The funds support i ng i n ve n t i on and the com me rci a l  developm e n t  of i n ve n t i ons  
are front-end '·sunk " "  i nvest ments :  once they have been spent ,  t hey  a re an  i rre­
t ri evable bygone.  To wa rran t  mak ing  such i nvestments ,  an i nd iv idua l  i n ven tor  
or corporat ion mus t  expect t ha t once  commerci a l iza t ion occurs, product p r ices 
can be held above post invcn t i o n  product ion and marke t i ng costs long enough 
so tha t  the  d i scounted prese n t  va l ue o f  the profits (01 more accura te ly .  q uasi  
ren ts)  wi l l  exceed the  value of t he  front -end i nves tment .  I n  other words,  the  i n ­
vestor m ust expect som e  degre e o f  protect ion from compe t i tion .  o r  some mo­
nopoly power. The patent  holder 's  r ight  to exclude i m i ta t ing  users i s  i n t e nded 
to create or s t rengt hen  t h at  ex pect a t i o n .  
F l\tl . Scherer & D avid Ross. I n dus t r i al M a r k e t  S truct ure and Economic Per formance 
622 (3d e eL 1 990) .  
, - Comme n t a t o rs .  however. h a ve recogn ized t h a t  t rademarks provide an  i n ce nt ive t o  
i n vest  i n  ,_::x is t i n g  goods. S e e  J .  Th u m <JS M c C a rt h y .  M cCart h y  on Trad e m mks  a n d  U n ­
f<l i r Compe t i t ion * 2:4, at  2-4 ( -l t h  c d .  200 2 )  ( n o t i n g  t h at  t rademarks "create  a n  i ncen­
t i ve t o  keep up a good reputa t ion  lu r a prcc! i c tab lc  q ua l i ty  or  goods' '  a n d  t h e reby '· fix 
respons ib i l i ty"  for low qual i ty p ro d ucts) .  
" Th e  re la t ionship between a d v e rt i s i ng a n d  m o n o p o l y  powe r i s  notor ious ly  com­
plex. b u t  any given amount  o r  adve rt is i ng bv Acme Widge t s  i s  l i k e l y  to he m o re sue-
) ()( \) _ -] _ _  u _ ln tegroted Theon· of lnrel!ecnwl Property l '-�6 1 
Establ ishing brand loyalty may be e a s i e r  u n d e r  c o n d i t i o n s  of exc l u ­
s i v i t Y  t h a n  w h e n  o n e  h a s  to fend o ff n u m e rous riva is . 1 <J  Xerox. fo r 
exa mple . s ucceeded i n  e s t ab l i s h i n g  such s trong branding for its 
p < l tented p h o t ocopy m ac h i n e s  t h a t  i ts m a rk has  become virtual l y  
s y n u n y m o u s  w i t h  the prod ucL :_tn c! <ll rnosr  fe l l  i nt o  the  publ ic  c! o­
nl ct i n  fc)r ger1e rici s n1 a ft e r  C l) n �� u n-i c.· �·s 1't: k!�i n t c) usc� - - �.; c rc)X � �  a s  � t  .__, "u '-\L: rb a n d  a noun. -
Cnnvcrsely ,  brand recogni t i o n  c a n  be used to  extend the  protec­
t ion 8 fforcl e cl by pate n t s  w e l l  beyo n d  the  l e gal  protect ion perio d .  
F or  example ,  cons u m e rs r e m a i n e d  l c'yal  to  B ayer Aspirin fo r dec­
ades after i t  went  o ff pat e n t ,  in s p i te o f  the existence of ident ica l  
ge n e ric drugs that  sold for  m uch l e ss and clespi �e t h e  fact t h a t  t h e  
· · Aspiri n "  m ark had b e e n  pron o u n ced ge neric . - 1  I t  i s  t h i s  t y p e  o f 
svnergv that  w i l l  be t h e  m a i n  focus of  t h is Article .  The h o l i stic view - - J  
o f  i n te l lectual  prope rty that  we w i l l  de ve l op i n  t h is Article enables  
u s  to  offer fou r  novel i n s ights a b o u t  the t h e ory and practical  use  of  
i n t e l l ectu al p roperty law.  
J n  Part  I ,  we wil l  observe t h a t  the existence o f  synergies  between 
patents  and tradem arks  chal lenges t h e  conve ntional  wisdom t h a t  
t h e  economic effect of a p at e n t  grant is  l i m ited t o  t h e  s t a t utory pro­
tection term of twenty years. Combi n i ng patent  and trademark 
cessful i n  a t t ract i ng customers if  i t  has 1 00 %  of t h e  m a r k e t  t h a n  i f  i t  s h ares t h e  m arket 
w i t h  other f irms whose advert is ing compe t es wi t h  o r  offsets i t s  own.  I n  t h i s  sense,  
compet i t ive advert is ing has aspects o f  the prisoner's d i l e mm a-each brand's adver­
t i s e m e n t s  may l a rgely serve to o ffse t  those o f  i ts  r ivals .  and al l  es tabl ished f irms m i g h t  
b e  be t ter  o ff i f  t h e y  could agree (wi tho u t  v io lat ing a n t i trust l aws) t o  advert ise l ess, or  
n o t  a t  a l l .  See Lemley,  supra note  13 .  a t  l 69J  n . 2 1 :  see a lso D o u g l as G .  Baird  e t  a ! . .  
G a m e  T h e o r y  a n d  t h e  L a w  ( 1 994) (expl a i n i n g  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  priso n e r ' s  el i ­
l e m m a .  e q u i l i b r i u m  solut ions .  a n d  g a m e  t heory gene ra l l y  t o  t r a d i t i o n a l  l e g a l  prob­
l e m s ) .  
T h e r e  are non-strategi c considerations t h a t  m a y  c u t  in the o t h e r  d i re c t i o n .  howeve r. 
a n d  l e ad a monopolis t ic  i n d u stry t o  a d v e r tise more ( pe r  dol lar  o f  s a l e s )  t h an a com­
pe t i t ive one. See Robert Dorfman & P . O .  S t e i n e r. O p t i m a l  A d v e r t i s i n g  and Optimal  
Qu,t ! i t y . 44 A m .  Econ.  Rev.  826 ( J  954 ) .  
, ., S e e  d i scuss i o n  i nfra S e c t i on III. B .  
:" See Pa u l Goldstei n .  Copyrigh t .  Pz1 t e n t .  Tra d e m a r k  a n d  R e l a t e d  S t a t e  Doctri n e s :  
Cases a n d  M a t e ri a l s  o n  t h e  L a w  or  I n t e l l e c t u a l  Property 2 3 0  ( re v .  3 d  e el .  1 993 ) ( rc l <1 t ­
i n g  t h e  s t o r y  of  t h e  ' 'Xe ro:..;'' t r a d e m a r k ' s  c l ose e n c o u n t e r  wi t h  t h e  publ ic  Jomain ) .  
" See B a y e r  C o .  v.  U n i t e d  D rug. 272 F. 505 ( S . D . N . Y .  1 92 1 )  ( f i n d i ng Aspi rin a ge ­
n eric m a r k  w i t h  respect t o  consumer. t h ough n o t  producer.  s a l e s ) :  s e c  <i lso Ch a r l es C. 
M a n n  & M ark L. P l u m m e r .  The Aspir in  Wars: Money,  Medici n e .  a n d  1 00 Yc<l rs o l  
R<tmpant  Compe t i t ion ( 1 99 1 )  ( re c o u n t ing t h e  i n t e i l e c t u a l  p rope r t y  h i story o f  i\spi­
r i  n ) . 
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p r o tect ion may afford pa tentees a considera b l y  lo nge r p e r i o d  o f  
n r o t e c t i o n  than i s  commonly assumed.  A n  i nmortan \  [ rn o i i cat i o n  o f  f - i J. 
th is observat ion is t h a t  i f  the present statutor y  p a t e n t  d u r a t i o n  w a s  
chosen t o  reflect  t h e  optim al  t ra d e o ff bet\VC!:: n  re\\'arcl i n g  innova­
t ion  <1 n ci l i m i t i n g  m o n opoly power. t h e n  p a t e n t ,..: ·_' :'; \'· l: o ;_:: x t e r: cl 
t h e i r  p :J t e n t  w i t h  <l s u ccessfu l  t r a d e m ark < l r t; c:ctu :.l i ! y  rece i vi n g  
rn o r c  m o n o p o l y  power t h a n  the  s t a t u t e  con tcm plct tt:: : ; . \\'..::: us.;_: t he 
t e r m  " t rademark l e ve rage ' '  t o  describe p a t e n t e e s '  2 bi ! i t y  t o  c h a rge 
supracom pcti t ive pri ces  even after  the pat e n t  has l c: psecl a n d  the 
i nv e n t i o n  i s  p rotected o n l y  by a trademark. 
In Part l L  we wil l  submit that,  counteri n t ui t ive l y ,  t h e  e n h a n ce d  
protect ion afford e d  by such l everaged pate nts is  actu a l l y  we l fare­
en hancing.  The reason is  that  leveraging pate n ts through t ra d e ­
m arks generates i n centives for pate ntees  to p r i c e  more compet i ­
t ively over  the patent l i fe ,  with o u t  adding m o n opol is t ic  cl i s tort i ons  
i n  t h e  trademark perio d .  I n  short , leverage a l l ows fo r a more fa­
vorable trade off betwe e n  incentives to innovate and monopol is t ic  
pricing than i s  tradi t ional ly  e nvis i o n e d .  
Economic a n a l ysis o f  patent l aw-trad i t i o n a l l y  conducted o n  a 
stand- alone basis-assumes that  the pate n t e e  wi l l  maxim ize h e r  
rents d uring the term of  protect ion by charging t h e  m o no p o l y  pric e  
for the  inve n t i o n . "2 Specifical ly,  the patentee wi l l  restrict  the q u a n­
t i ty  of output b e l o w  the competit ive leveL to the point at which i ts  
m arginal  revenue is  equal  to i ts  m argin a l  cost .  This  ge n e rates  a so­
cia l  deadweight loss,"� because some consumers wh o wo u l d  be wi l l ­
i ng to pay more for the product  t h a n  i ts  m a rginal  cost  are u n ab l e  to 
purchase i t  from t h e  monopolist ic  paten t e e :  the gains from trade 
that  would be avai lable  in  a competi t ive market  arc lost  as a r e s u l t  
of the patentee's monopoly .2-l 
The possi bi l i ty  of leve raging patents thro ugh t radema rks trans­
forms the analysis.  When patents  can he extended through cre a t i o n  
o f  brand loyalty, the patentee w i l l  strive to m a x i m ize her  rents not 
�� Rubert Cooter & T h o m a s  U lc n .  L a w  a n d  Econum ic� 1 2 :� ( .1 d  e d .  2000 ) .  
' ' Deadweight  loss �1rises fro m  t h e  fac t  t h at .  in  m a x i m i z i n g  p ruii ts .  a m o n opol is t  wi l l  
c u t  bc;ck C l n  t h e  q u a n t i ty i t  p ro d uces.  t h e reby rcfus in):': t u  se l l  t , ·, some c u n s u nH : rs w h u  
w o u l d  b e  \Vi l l i ng t o  p< �y m ure t h a n  t h e  cost of  producing t h e  g:t;ud i n  q u L·st ion.  The cl i f­
tc: r e n cc b e t w e e n  c o n s u m e r  v a l ua t i o n  a n d  prod u c e r  co� i .  i u r t h ese furegnne sales .  is  
the econom i s t ' s  m e a s ure o f  t he  deadwe ig h t  ioss of  m o n upol\ ' .  Sec G emgc J .  Stig ler. 
Th,: Thcurv u l  Pri ce 1 97 ( J cl e el .  1 966) .  
� '  ! d .  
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o v e r  t h e  twenty-ye a r  p a t e n t  term , but  rather over  t h e  corn b i n e d  
period o f  patent and t rademark protection .  He nce , a (, ! 1 ' \ \/ (� tcl ­
l o o k i mr vatentee  w i l l  consider  n o t  o n l y  c urrent  u ut o u t ,  b ut <1 tsC t h e:: 0 l � 1' 
- ' i·'fe c ' ·· �-, f '' L·. ,- , - ,o. n t  '' L'"'T"' l 't t  o ··1 f" t ·l"· (� d e l·n ·" n <'J (' q e r· l· ,.-> ·" ' .1 '· 1 '1 n •· (·, fi t . i_. l , __ l.) _) _ ...... ! l � \_- � • '- � 1 l '- !J _ 1 __ ,_�,. ._ • ·----- �: J. j ct _ ..... . .... .'} 1___ ..., ...... _ 1 1 \.. l l  l ) � '- . r-· , _ I , l � 
n ·1 �·1 x i rn l z i n g r)a t c n L e c  \V i i l  c h a rge l e ss t l1 a n  t 'he 111 ()11 (1-f>C) l y  fir i c: C  d u. r --
. , ,_ 
. ·, .: 
h � --' i l f-' 14 r;r n f j t <: r)\lf� f  t h e  i CJ ll O r n n  ,-r �l i \ S  V/t' ·r) ()S l t  1 h �rt e y e ·n 1) ;--·i t t · ; --d !.:' \ ··· \:� 
- � '· .:-::- .. ,_, � f- ·- .._� ·- ·-' '- . • ..... • � ...  - - \::) l -- i - . ..1 � - - • • . . - - 1 - . ' �  ·- -- .... � t- �- . .... ·'- - ... ,_, ... .  
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k rred upon them may pre fe r  n o t  to extract t h e  fu l l  m o n c p u i i s r rc  
. 1"" 1" 1 • • 1 - 1 - - ... rr.� m a r ro r u e o  to t n e m  o v l n e  natCi1 l  2 ra n t .  .; r ._. 
i n  Pa rt  1 I L  we w i ll d e m onstrate that  t h is pre d i ct ion is n o t  mere ly  
of the oretical  s i g n i ficance:  I t  fi nds  support in  com m erci a l  rea l ity .  
Evidence from various  industri e s  s ho ws that ,  in  s o m e  circumstances.  
oatentees  b e h ave i n  accordance wi th o ur anal vs is .  rais ing out Dut \ -' ;__. J 
ahove the monopo l i s t i c  level  ( an d  l owe ring prices) i n  order  t o  i n -
cre ase t h e i r  future  profi t s  t h ro ugh trade m a rk p rotect i o n .  
Crit ica l ly ,  t h e  we l fare ga in  from lower p ri ces i s  n o t  offset  by a 
correspon ding loss attr ibutable t o  a longer dura t i o n  o f  protect ion . 
Once t he patent  expires ,  t h e  former paten t e e ' s  loya l customers pay 
a h igher-than- market p r i ce for the  o ff-patent  product ,  but the  m a r­
ginal  ( n e w )  customers b uy from t h e  new e n trants ,  vvh o  ch arge t h e  
competi t ive price a n d  e li mi n ate a n y  de adweight l o s s .  I n  o t h e r  
words, the a b i i i t y  t o  combine p a te nts a n d  t rade m arks makes i t  pos­
s ib le  for the p atentee to s h i ft profi ts fro m  t h e  " clistortionary" pa t­
e n t  period to the competitive trademark period,  w h e re the pat­
entee can charge higher-tha n-�ompet i t ive prices without  reducing 
the overal l  quantity sup p l i e d .2� As a resul t  of t h i s  s h i ft ,  t he dead­
weight loss in  the patent  period i s  lowered,  wi thout  any accompa-
' ' Put a n o t h e r  wwv. t h e  palcn t e c ·s l o y a l  customers me s u b j e c t  t o  a k i n cl o l  r ri cc d t �;­
cri m i n at i o n .  a n d .  t h us .  ct re wo rs': o rr t h a n  t ht:y wo uld b·� i f  i he y  co u ki buv at t h e  com ­
pe t i t ive pr i ce . The h igher  prices t h c v  pay.  howe ver. <H•� a pure t ra nsfe r  to t h e  p<l t ­
L' ll t c e ,  w i t h  n o  e ffic ie ncy conse q ue nces. See R i c h ar d  i\. Po:;n•.: r .  /\ n t i t ru s t  Ltw 20.1--04 
( 2d eel .  200 1 ) ( cl i :;cussi n g  pr ice cl iscri m i n <1 t i u n  i n  t he l i c e n s i n g  u! p<tte n t s ) :  L u u i s  KC!p­
l o w .  The P a t e n t - A n t i t ru s t  i n t e rscct iun :  ,t., Re< tppraisa l . lJ7 } ·L t r v .  L .  R e \· .  � �� 1 3 . 1 S7J-­
;-; i ( l 9S4 ) ( d i scussi ng pr ice d iscr i m i n at i o n  a n d  p a te n t  l c, w ) :  d. M i c h �t c· l  J .  JVk u rc :.  
C()pyr ighl  Law <mci Pr i c·:: Discri m i n a t i o n .  2 3  Cardozo L. f�·:: v .  55 ( :2 00 ! ) ( d i se ussi n ;  
p rice d i scri m t n <"l t i o n  :1 n ci copyri g h t  l a w ) .  Readers of J h i s  A. r t i ck m ; t v  he part i c u L, r i y 
i n k ;·csted in Stan icy L i c bowitz ·s  l'i n cl i ngs on t h e  ro l e  u f  pri c�' cl t ;; cr i m i n a t l0; 1  i n  nnr­
kcts rur acaue m i c  j uu rn :t l s .  See S . J .  Liebow i t z .  Copyr i gh t L tw. P h otocopying.  <tn d 
Price D i scr i m i n a t i on . in S Rese a rch i n  Law a n c! Economic:;: Thc E c u n o m i co: ot P;, t­
•.: ! 1 h  a n d  Copyri g h t s  ! S l  ( .John Pc1 ! mc r  & R i ch<ml 0 .  Zerbe. J r. e els  . .  ! t);-)6 ) 
1 46.:.1. Viruirz i{! L o w  Revie 1v  ,., [\/ol  '��: - ' :.1 -=-) -::: • C '-..J • 1 r ._ _ _ )
n y i ng cost  i n  t h e sub s e q uent trade mark pe r iod.  Patent leve raging 
t h us i n c rc J s e s  \ve l fare . 
I n  Pdrt I V .  we \vi l l  de m o nstrate  t h a t  t h e  same w e ! fa re -e n h <mci ng 
e ffect  t :J r ises  from comb i n i n g  pate n t  a n d  trade m a rk !!ro t c c t i cw 
a i s n  iY:o.· : : r': -.vh c n  t rack :; •:: c r e t s  <m el tr <1 ck: m mks me cumbi n e d .  A l -
1 ' . l 
1 • 1 . l "  • . • • • 
t il l' Li g ! ·i ;_ -� · ;_ t l t � �· :.-\c crcc�,: c c; c s  nol n a ve : n n ,: rc n t  t ntlC n n1 1 t s �  1 t  l �t"ps� s  � 1  
t h e  p ;· n k c t ,_; c_l i n fo r n1 2 t i on fa l l s  into t h e  h a n ds o f  c o m p e t i t o rs .  e i -­
t h e r  t h ro u g h  a l1 reach o f  secrecy or th rough reverse - engi n e e ri n g . 
For t lv� p urpose o r  our ana l ysis. this  risk se rves t h e  s a m e  fu n c t i L) ll 
a s  L h e  t i rn t2  ! i m i t at i o n  on patt:nts: I t  m i tigct t e s  the i nc e n t i v e  o f  t h e  
trade s c c n; l  holde r  t o  price monopo l istical ly .  R eal i zing t h a t  t h e  
t rade se cre t may e xpire at  any given time,  a rational t r a d e  secret  
owner wil l  prefer  not to price m onopolistical ly during the trade se­
crecy period if  d oing so wil l  suffici ently increase t h e  l o n g  t e rm 
val ue o f  h e r  brand. I n  this case . too,  t h e  n e t  we l fare e ffect o f  com­
bining the two modes of protection may be positive .26 
We w i l l  examine in Part V how l e gal  policy sh ould take acc o u n t  
o f  t h e  possibil i ty  that pat e n t  and trademark protect ion can be 
combined .  We argue t hat the S upre m e  Court 's  fail ure t o  appreci­
ate t he posi tive syn ergies b e tween patents and trad e marks l e d  it 
bad ly astray i n  t h e  landmark case of Singer Manufacwring Co. v. 
June !V!anufactu ring Co. 27 In expressin g  its strong disapproval o f  
S inger 's  strategy of leveragin g  its patents through a trade mark, t h e  
Court concluded t hat the " coincidence betwee n  the e xpiratio n  o f  
the patents and t h e  appearance o f  t h e  trademark . . .  tends to create 
a strong i mpli cation that the company . . . [acted ] in order thereby t o  
re tai n . . .  t h e  real fruits o f  t h e  mon opoly when that m onopol y  had 
passe d :::nvay . ' ' 28 According t o  our analysis, t h e  Court e r r e d  in con­
de mning a practice t hat i ncreases we l fare. Thus, Singer and i ts 
oroge nv should be overt u r n e d .  l. .._., ..1 
lVIoreovcr. our ana lysis counterintuitively  suggests that effici ency-
minded pol icymakers would be justifi e d  in e ither  short e n ing or 
le ngtheni ng the patent term , or indeed leaving i t  at i ts present 
lengt h .  i\ny of th ese is a defensib l e  alte rnative because leverage 
-------- ----- --------------------------------------· 
'" ;-\ l t lwu�h t h e re m a y  be som e  i n s t a n c e s  i n  w h i ch copyr igh t and t ra d e m ar k  protec­
t ion CCI !l he <:o m hin ccl .  leverage does n o t  seem t o  apply to copyri ght  protec t i on gc n c r­
a l l v. Sec c! i � c u ss i o n  i n fra Sect ion I V .  B .  '' , ' • r· r ,  I · · c- -l l>.o U . :) 1 1)0 , 1 0 Jb ) .  
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creates botiz great e r  i n c e n t ives to i n n ovate and a lowe r stat ic  
deadweight  loss .  t h e reby ge n e rat ing a m ore favo rab l e  t rade off be­
twee n  these two goa l s .  \v h i c h  pol icymakers may wish to e -�r lo i t  in a 
vari e ty o f  \Vays. 
r PVc' j''l (J ( -' ,_, , , .., : l • ' '" • '. l i t  ; l-, .:; noss i t, i l i t\1 t'··oi1 t i' e•r· '> l i C'\V], n G  !-,n1 l' ''' '"l ' l l.· _ :L......o V ( -. 2 _.. �.1 '-• •J .I. � \..... �_ ) \ _ , ,_ , � ..._ ! l  1 J . •  _, l \.. - Ct J , , , �· � .l -' 1 \....- .� 1 { <... & '1.. 
d e s i r ;_ l ;_-�- L �� u c; t i c) n s .  In p ar t ic :. t l c·1 r .  \\',·-� rJ l.- � _) l.J-· c r< : · ; ·l S t " l f-c r�� '-\. ran �\.: ! ' � r ! '-' '- - .. 
se lect ion mechan i sm r h z: [  a l l ows society to  offe r paten tees  t h e s a m e  
l e v e l  o f  p r o fi ts a s  the  c ur r e n t  svstem a t  a l ower c o s t  i n  de aclwe i g:ht 
!oss . 2" Al te rnative l y .  p o l i cymake rs might opt for a h i g h e r  l e ve l� of 
profi ts for p a t e n t e ,:: s ,  w i t h  no i ncre ase in  deadweight  loss.  \Ve o ffe r  
a n  i l l ustrative exam ple  o f  h ow s u c h  pol ic ies  might be i mpl e mented .  
Fi nally , i n  Part  VL we w i l l  take on a ser ies  of  poss ib le  obje ctions 
to o ur argum e n t .  i n c luding t h e  presence of  advert is ing,  the exten­
s ion o f  the model  to a more real ist ic  m u l t i-period world with  d is­
count ing .  an d t h e  e mpiri cal fi nding that-at least for  some prod ­
ucts-prices r ise ,  rat h e r  than fal l ,  on e xpiration o f  a pat e n t. None 
o f  these , we show, requi re s substantial m o di fi cati o n  of our conclu­
siOns.  
I .  THE I NSULA R V I EW OF INTELLECTUAL P ROPE RTY 
A .  The Theory 
Intel lectual property l aw rests on an e legant m o d e l  t hat divides 
the field i nto th ree pri ncipal subfi e lds-copyrigh t ,  patent ,  and trade­
mark-each protect ing a dist inct subj ec t  matter  and prom oting a 
unique social goal. Copyright law pro tects expressive works;  patent 
law protects functional products, processes, and designs; and trade­
mark law protects informatio n  about t h e  source of goods and prod­
uct s .  The separation am ong these t h re e  subfields i s  re inforced b y  
the different prereq uisites to  securing each mode of protecti on .  
Copyright protection req uires works  to b e  o r iginal ,30 m i n i mal l y  
cre ative ,3 1  and fixed i n  a tangi b l e  medium o f  express i o n . ·': Patent 
'" See d i scuss ion i n l'ra Sect i o n  V.C 
' "  17  U S .C . � 102  ( 2000 ) .  
' ' Sec fc i:;t P ub l ' n :; <.' . R u ra l  T d  Serv.  C o  . .  499 U . S .  3-10. 345 ( 1 99 1 ) ( c x p L t i n i ng t h <t l  
" [ o] r ig i n e1 L  a s  t h e  t e rm i s  u�cd ! 11 copyrigh t .  means o n l y  thai  t he  work was i n depend­
cnt ly  crccl l c d  hy t l w  Ci U t lw r  . . .  C l tld tha t  i t  possesses at l e a s t  some m i n i m a l  degre e  o l  
creat ivitv ' ' ) .  
' '  1 7  Li.SC. � l 02 ( 20()( ; ) .  
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protection extends to inven t i ons t h a t  a r e  new, " useful,3� and 
n o n obvious':; to a oe rson skil l e d  in the  re l e vant a r t . '6 Tradem ark ' ·-. . 1 d 1 . . ' . I ' '  L" ' protection lS spar_ze JY t l1e use ot a i·n a n: rn tra ce . 1 u r t n e rmore , 
t h e  t h ree su bfie lcls  d i ffe r in t h e  d u ra t i Oi1 uf the pro t ection they 8f­
fo rd .  Convri Qh t  protect ion l ;.:t :; t s  fer t h ,.: l i f2 o f  t h e  author  p l us s e v ­
,_: n ;_ v vr..: <:i ;-:: . ·'·' �Pat e n t  p rotecti t ; n  ,:; x t ,.: n d :.:, [ \\ ' ·._' n t \· v e  ct r s  from the da k 
of fi t (ng for ut i l i t y  pcltents , ;·j cl n d  fourt,: e n  ::e :t �-::; o from t h e  date o f  is­
s u a n ce for des ign patents . .)( )  Tra d e m ark prot ect ion conti nue s poten­
t i a l l v  forever , as  l o n g  the mark i s  used in  t rack ."1 1  0 '-
The eco n o m i c  rationale fo r copyrig h t s  ci i id p a te n ts is also as-
sumed to be different from t h e  rat i o n a l e  fo r trademarks .  Copy­
rights and patents are pre d i cated on t he n e e d  to provide an eco­
nomic i ncentive for the creation of public goods such as inventions 
and e xoressive works.�c Since exoressive works and inventions con-' l 
,, 35 u.s.c. � 1 0 1  (2000). 
;.! l ei .  
, ,  f d .  � 1 03 .  
'" l ei . :  see Robert  P .  M e rge s & Ri ch a rd R. N e lson . O n  t h e  Co mp l ex Eco n o m i cs of  
Patent  Scope,  90 Co l um .  L Rev.  839, 844 ( 1 990) ( ' ' D u ri ng prosecut i on o f  a patent .  a 
Pa t en t O ffice examiner reviews an app l ica t ion t o  determine w h a t  is pate n t ab l e .  To be 
pa ten ta b le an i nven t i o n  must meet a l l  the s t a t u t or y  req u i rements  for p a t e n ta b i l i ty: 
nove l t y ,  u t i l i ty and n on-obvio usness ' " ) .  In add i t i on . " [ w ] h i l e  decis ions regard i ng w h a t  
(c l a ims ]  to  a l low a r e  constrai ned by a n umbe r o f  legal  pr i nc ip les . and b y  t h e  i n ven t i o n  
i tself .  i n  m a ny cases the Pa te n t O ffice has  consick rahk room for d iscre ti o n . "  I d .  a t  
840. 
" See. e .g . ,  J a n e  C. G ins b u rg ct a l . .  Tra d e m a r k  and U n fair Compe t i t i on Law 45 (3d 
eel. 200 1 )  ( " " S i m p l y by usi ng a m ark un or i n  connect ion w i t h  goods. or by d i s p l a y i n g  
t h e  m a rk i n  t h e  sa le or  advertising of  services.  you can a u tomat ica l ly acq u i re t ra de­
mark r ights  i n  t h e  geograph ic area of usc . " ) .  
" 1 7 u.s.c.  � 302 (2000).  
''1 35 u . s . c. � 1 54 (2000) . 
'" I d .  � l 73 .  
' 1  Se e , e .g . ,  G i nsb urg et  a l . ,  s u pr<l note  3 7 ,  e ll  46 ( n o t i ng t h a t  " [ t ] rademark r igh ts con­
t inue i ncle l'i n i t e l v ·· ) .  
': See .  e .g . .  Ken ne t h J.  Arro w,  Ecu numic  W e l fare <llld t h e  A l l oca t ion o f  Resou rces 
lor I n v e n t ion.  in The Rate  and D i rect ion oi I n ve n t i ve Ac t iv i t y : Econom ic and Soci a l  
Factors 609 ( 1 962): Robe r t  !VI .  Hurt  & R u b e rt ivl. S c h u ch m a n .  The Econom ic Rat ion­
a l e  o f  Copy r igh t . 56 Am. Econ . Rev . ( Papers & Proc . )  42 1 . 425 ( 1 966) ( ""Th e ge nera l 
we l fa re w i l l  . . . be ': nh an cc d by em: ct i ng cnpvright  l e gis l a t ion  wh ich enco urages t h e  
cre a t ion a n d  publ ic c1 t ion of nw n uscri pts t h a t  o t h e nY i se w o u l d  n o t  have come i n to ex­
iste nce. ' '): Lan des & Posn er. s u p rn note 7. a t  32G:  �ee <i l so R i c h ar d  P .  A d e ls t e i n & 
S t eve n l .  Pere t z .  Th e Compe t i t i o n  u i  Tech n o l og i e s  i n IV l <H k e t s  fo r I d e a s :  Copyr i g h t  
a n d  Fa i r  U s e  i n  Evol u t i o n ary Pe rspec t i ve .  5 I n t " l  R e v .  L.  & Eco n .  209.  2 1 8  ( 1 985 ) 
( d i scuss i ng t h e  si m i l ar i t ies  between i n t e l le c t u a l  goods a nd t radi tiona l publ ic  goocl s ) .  
B u t  s e e  Tom G .  P<i l mer.  l n t e l iecl u a l  Prope rt y:  A N o n - Posneri a n  L a w  �1 nd Econom ics 
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rain information-t he quintessent ia l publ i c  good-abse n t legal  
pro tecti o n .  competi t or s  "�Nould copy such works with o ut incur ring 
t il e i n i t i a l  costs of o r oduci n g_ then! .  U n ml thorize cl repro d uc t ion ' � 
WO " l d rj-.--; \"' d r" v n l l1 �' rn ::> rk -'- f ' ) j' ; (' P  t n  t h  . .> cnst  of ('opyi n a o r; a ; n a 1 . •.1 - \_ ._ 1 , <,,.,. V 'f - t l A .._. �'. \ • ._. .._  _i- � ,_.. ,__. l. \,J . > I '·• ·"" '--' � -./ 
- :::::;, , •..,_ l LJ i o l ( 1 
aut 1t c) rs :: .i n d  i nv c n t c)r :< V/C) t.d ci ru_>t l-H� :::1 b l c� t o  recover their e \: p e n cl i ­
t iJ r e s  o n  �-i L� �. h ·�_yi· sL i p  t.: ;-� ;J . d n r  ... ·� �  J :_� d i>: � u l t .  t o e) fc\v i n vent ions 
a n cl e xt)re s s i vc \Vt. )rks \\'Otl l(J  he cre at t: ci .  
' 
To make m a t ters worse , many o f  the i n ve n t ions  t h a t  wou ld n ot 
be orod uccd abse n t  i n t e l l e ctual prooert v  orctecti o n  are l i kely to be t • l ,.., _._ 
u f  gre at social  ·-i aluc . Socially import a n t  in vcn tions often impl icate 
not only large e xpenditures, but a l so a high level of ris k .  I nventors,  
who work under con dit i o n s  of extreme u n certain ty ,  do not know. 
ex ante,  whether the R&D process wil l  y ie ld  the  an t ic ipated res u l t .  
N o r  Jo they k now h o w  the i n ve n tion wil l  fare commercial ly. -1.' Sub­
s e q u e n t  copiers,  however, con front  no s i m i l ar r i sks s ince t he y  have 
the privi l ege of being a b l e  to reproduce . r isk-fr e e ,  on l y t h ose in ­
ventions with prove n com m e rcial  success. 
Copyright l aw and pate n t  law e l i m i n at e  t h e  in h er e n t  ad van tage 
of cop ie rs , and th erehy re store t h e  i ncent ive to i nnovat e .  By creat­
ing and e nforci ng e xclusi ve righ ts i n  i n te l l ec t u a l  goods,  copyr igh ts 
a n d  pate nts not only  st i fl e  unauthor ized copying, but  a lso enable  
authors and i nven tors t o  charge for the  usc  of their  work s .  In addi-
Approach . l 2  H a m !  i nc L .  R e v .  2 6 1 .  273-37 ( 1 939) ( argu i ng that  i n t e l l e c t ua l  works do 
not s h a re the dis t ingu ish ing a t t r i b u t e s  of publ ic  goo d s ) .  
P u b l i c  goods arc def ined by  two d i st i nct ive character is t ics :  n o n - ri va l ry in  consump­
t i o n  and non-e:.;c l ud a b i l i t y  of benefi ts .  See.  e.g . . Richa rd Cornes & Todd Sandler ,  The 
Theory ot Externa l i t ies.  Publ ic  Goods.  a n d  C l u b  Goods 6-7 ( 1 986) .  A good is non­
r i va l  i n  consum pt i o n  w h e n  cons u m ption b y  one person does n ot  d i m i n ish  the  con­
s u rnpt ion  oppo r t u n i t i e s  avc! i lab ic lo othe rs. Sec i cl .  a t  6.  
A good d i splays non-cxc! uc! a b k  be nefi ts  when i n d i v i d u a l s  who have not pai d  for i t  
can n o t  be preven ted l ru m  (IV<l i l i ng the mselves o r  i t s  lxn c fits.  See i d .  I t  should be 
n o ted t h at the impossi b i l i t v  or ,�:-;el us ion i s  h a rd l y  eve r abso l u te .  When exclus ion by 
contract i s  consick r c d .  ve r:y' l ew goocls .  ir any. J i sp lay  non -exc ludable  benefits i n  the  
s t r i c t  sense or  t h e  t e ni1 .  Thus.  i t  i s  more accurate to  describe goods as display i n g  n o n ­
•c: xc luclablc  benefits when i t  i s  pro h i bi t i v e ly c o s t l y  t o  bar n o n -p ayers from e n joying the  
g o o d .  Sec Patr ick Croskny. I n s t i t u t ional  U t i l i t a r i a n i s m  and  In te l lectual  Proper ty .  68 
C h i . - Kc n l  L. Re v .  63 1 .  632 ( ! ')l)3 ) .  The non-e"c lud�:b i l i t y  property of p ub l i c gOl)l!s 
i m pl ie :; t h a t  t h: y  \Vi i ]  he undc r--prnduced by t h e  mmk e t .  
" Se..:: L--:: rn l c v .  supra nutc 7 .  <� t 99-f ( n o t i ng t h a t  · · j i j nven t ion  a n cl creat ion  re q u ire the 
i nvest m e n t  n r  re: ;ources--t h·� l l m•� u l· c l ll  a u t h o r  or i n ve ntllr. a n d  often expe nd i t u res 
un fac i ! i t iec:. prutotyp::s. stq,pl ics. �m d t h e  ! i kc j .]" <lnd t h c n: rore . absent  i n te l lectual  
prope r ty protect i tln .  c re a l ur�; u r  i n v e ntors wo u l d  · · J ive [ ]  i n  cons t a n t  per i l  o f  discovery 
c: nd  Ll i <;clo::; u re .. ) . 
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t ion ,  copyright lavv and patent law provide the necessary founda­
t ion for market e xch ange between prov i de rs a n d  consumers of in­
te l lectua l  goods. The development  of a m arke t ,  i n  turn. produces 
two desirabl e  e ffe c t s :  It  increases the  r e t u r n  o n  authorsh ip  and i n ­
n ova t io n ,  and i t l e ts t h e  force :': o f  �;up ply c :md cle rn <:nd s e t  t h e  price 
of i n te l lcctual  g o o d s .  
I n  contras t . the economic j us t i ficat ion for trade m �nk protect ion 
is rather different .  U n like natent  and coovri ght orotect ion .  which ! !. .• \._ !. 
seek to spur t h e  cceat ion of i nv e n t i o n s  a n d  expressive vvorks, 
trad em ar k pro tect i o n p ur ports to e n hance com p•..: t i t ion a m o ng pro­
vide rs of goods and services :'.) By ident i fy ing t he s o urce of goods 
and services, tradem arks promote compet i t ion i n two re l ated ways.  
First ,  trademarks enab le  businesses to convey informat ion to con­
sumers about the  quality o f  products and services , reducing con­
sumers'  search costs .-\' This informational function of trademarks is 
especia l ly  va luable in the context  o f  "experience goocls"-products  
w hose attributes consumers cannot discern before purchasing 
them46-where consumers rely on prior experience in  d ecid ing 
among competing brands .  
Second, trademarks a l low consumers to associate product  and 
service attributes with certain firms and base the ir  consumption 
decis ions on th i s  associat ion .  For this reason ,  on the supply s ide ,  
trademark protection spurs firms to �naintain and improve the 
qua li ty of the ir  products and services . .) ' The avai l abi l i ty of trade-
J J  Se e S . Rep .  No.  79-1 333. at  3 ( 1 946): H . R. Rep. N o .  79-219 ,  at  2 ( 1 945) ("Trade ­
marks d e fe a t  monopoly by stim ul a t i n g  compe t i t i o n . ' ' ) .  For argumen t s  t h a t  excessi v e  
trad e m ark protect i on can h a v e  a n t i compe t i t ive e ffects. sec B rown . supra n o t e  1 3 ,  and 
Lemley, s upra n o t e  13 .  
J' Se e .  e .g . ,  Nicholas  Economides,  Trad e m a rks.  in  3 The New Palgrave D i ct ion ary o f  
Economics and the L a w  60 1 ,  602 (Peter N e w m a n  ed . .  ! 998) ( n oting t h at tradem arks 
·' fac i l i ta te  and e n h ance con s umer decis i o n s ' ' ) :  Wil l iam P. Krstzke .  Normative Eco­
nomic Analysis of Trademark Law, 2 1  M e m p h i s  St.  U. L. Rev .  1 99 .  2 1 4� 1 7  ( 1 99 1 ) ;  see 
also George Stigler,  T h e  Econom i cs o f  I n form a t i o n .  69 J .  Pol .  Eco n .  213.  224 ( 1 96 1 )  
(d iscussing re p u tat ion as a method of s a v i n g  on search cos t s ) .  
J n  Ph i l l i p  Ne lson,  A d v e rt ising as I n format i o n ,  82 J .  P o L  Econ.  729 . 730 ( 1 974) [ h ere­
i n a ft e r  Nelso n ,  Adve rt is ing as l n forma t ion J .  A "search guoc! . ' '  i n  contrast .  i s  one 
whose important  a tt r ibutes m3y be ascertained before p ur c h C�se or uc;c. . lcl .  The t erms 
' · e x per ie nce goo d "  and " search good" were origi n a l l y  coined by Pru fcssor Nelson i n  
1 970. Sec Phi l l i p  N e l s o n .  I n formation a n d  Consum,� r  Be havior, 78 J .  PoL Econ. 3 1 1 .  
3 1 9 ( 1 970 ) .  
·" Sec Lan d e s  & Posn e r.  supra note 1 3 . at  269�70. Landes ;mel Posn e r  note  t h a t  
trademarks h a v e  a s e l f- •.: n forc i n g  q u a l i t y  bccwsc · ' t h e y  ck note consi sl •.: n l  q ua l i ty ,  a n d  
){\(' 2 " 1 ... uJ ' Integrnted Theory of lnte!!ectua! Prop crr_v 1 469 
m ark protection protects ti nns  ag�1 i ns t  fre e - riding by compe titors,  
enab l ing them to reap  the fru i ts of their investm e n t  in superior 
" ''l'(i l t"'L' '' " n d SC 't'Y" J' c c.s FLl'' t [l <"rn1 ' ) j'l ' ' l r · l rl e J11 ' l l+ Pl"O' t e> c t ;  ') P P '" I'J Vl. •1 r• c t.J 1 J � F ....., ,:, a .L.. ....._. . � 1 � -_, ... • • .._ ...... � L- .._ L- -� c t"- ..  L 1 - , 1 i .... --1 ......., .J 
f i 'T' <:: \VJ. th '1 \' i n ( " 71 f J. V e  t O r • <: l ; l h l i s l·l \-r· ·• q (]  1"F' i ' () CT ]l i t i op 'lJ1 !j' "j l ' ' '"t l tv . .  1 . 1 1 . , , ct . L ... .�. . ......... ... _ .._ -...... J • • . •  _ l � .. . .. l c . �  __ 1 ._, .., _ :::- · � -' . i  c . _ v _:-r c . ./ 
:_ -}y . .. .  �clucat ing �· cc; n s u n1 c :·s �J ;·> .. � u � t h e  v i l- t lie >� of t h e i r  IJrc) cl u c t s .  
, ·i ... , ,  . .  f >· '1 '1 " l··-1 " r ' ·· s ('( ) " S 1 J· ·r
L
l' t · ·· . .,., . , ; " .. ·,-· c•·· 1 · • •"t ., . .  ; .. , . . , .l 'l "" ' l .. ! ;: '". l " 1 rt· 1 1 1 l-' l. l " l  - : I L·. :'l .  '_ _t ( . -._.t -._.. t (L j·, ,_ -� - ! l  ...... . � .. --.. ;> _ ; \ ! , : i �.' . \ •. Cd 1• \� : : c t l .o. .� . ... . � 1 --� 1... ! i.  1 L!. 1 - (� -
r ] ·y: bct\veen fi rms ancl c o n :.; u t · ·� ,� rs . \V i l l i  t h e  ::t t t e n cl a n t  l w i n  e !Tech 
r. " �;l .<> l iV "' ' l. ll O t h P forn·1{' j' 't (' j , -, , nrn ve !' h P (! l [ r,[ l i tly' of •L !l C !· l. nrorJ Ll rt c \.J t 1 : J. \. I _ -� (..l L b - � .1. ._ ,__ ...._ , � I  -< l .i: - .._ ·' • ._,. ._ t .o. • ..._... ._t L 1 • .._ ....___ J. _t-/ .o. ... t. .._. .J 
cm d services, and  e nabli ng t h e  l c: t t c r  to  d i ffere n t i a t e  among various 
products on the m ar k e t .  
Law and Economics scholars have l arge ly ignored the existence 
o f  synergies among t h e  various types of in te l lectua l  property p ro­
t e ct i o n .�� For example ,  the  l e 8 cl i n g  Law and Economics text sug­
gests that t he  economic j ust i ficat ion  for patents is tha t  they are 
' · temporary monopol[ ies] tha t  reward i nven tion . "�� By  contrast ,  
trademarks are designed to " lower consumer search costs <1nd cre­
a te an incentive for producers to  supply goods of high qua l ity . "'n 
B. Th e C{!se La l\J 
The insu lar  view of in te l l ectua l  property has  a l so been a persis­
tent theme in  the Supreme Court ' s  in te l lectua l  property  j urispru­
dence .  The tone was set in t h ree class ic decis ions .  In Baker v.  Sel­
den , the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the 
respondent ,  Selde n ,  cou l d obta in  copyright protection for <1 system 
of bookkeeping by means of a book in which t he system was ex­
plained.' 1  Pointing to the differen t  subj ect m atters of copyright and 
patent protect ion,  and the d i ffe r e n t  requirements  for each,  the 
a firm has  a n  ince n t i ve t o  develop a t r a d e m ar k  o n l y  i f  i t  i s  a b l e  t o  m a i n t a i n  consiste n t  
q u a l i ty . . .  ! d .  a t  270. 
'·' There h as .  however. been some a p p reci a t io n  o r  t hese synerg i es i n  t h e  m a i n st re a m  
,;r�onornics l i te ra t ure.  See d iscuss i o n  i n t'r:.t P<t rt I l l .  
"" Coo t e r  & U l e n .  supra no te 22 . at  1 :2�; The a u t h o rs a l s o  n o t e  t h a t  ' · t he  p ri ce f o r  a 
paten ted gooc! J  f a l l s  ancl the  q ua n t i t v  i n creases us s o o n  os rlz c parenr expires . · ·  l ei .  ( e m ­
phasis  adde d ) .  
' "  I d .  at \ 37 .  S i m i lar ly .  < t  r e c e n t  survey a rt i c l e  notes t h a t .  "' [ u] n l ik e  p a t e n t s  a n d  copy­
r i CJ: h t s  . . .  t rademark protect ion d i d  nnt , ·,r i � i n a t e  <l S an  i n ce n t i ve ror i n nova t i o n  or 
::;: a t i v i ty . . .  f J n steacl·. t j h e  p r i m mv iunc t i O !; o f  t ra d e m a rks is  tO prov i d e  rules of or­
cl er lv  marke t i n �  . . .  _ . ,  S t a n le v  i\il .  Bcsen & Leo J .  Rask i nd . An I n t ro d u c t i o n  to the  
La,,; a n c! Econc;m i cs of I n t e l le c t u a l  Prope rty .  5 J .  Eco n .  ?er:::p .  3.  20-:2 1 (1 99 1 ) . 
"' 1 0 1  C . S .  99 ( 1 S79 ) .  
1 470 l fl":·· az·J·') [·(.[ f f'll 'v' j''} p L' i r' 1 1  ' }I 0 , -• • .I ) -'- '- �· , , , , 1 /o-
C.cYur t  re fuse rj t o  a l lo\v copyrigh t fYro tect i c.: n  fc1 r p D ten t a tj l e  sub.i ect  
rn a t te rs .  re p e a t e d l y  e m p h a s i z i n g  the  n c c cl � o  k e e p  t h e  pro v i n ce cA 
copyright  se parate fro m  that  of patents . ·� ·r t  c o i1c l uded t h at to cio 
c t h e rv, i :-; c  \VO u l d  amount to  ' · a  fra u  upon t h e� D!.lbl i c . " ' '  
\ : .. � · · , . ,  c ., . , 1 "'  � t- ·[""� 0 . ,.l ·> r l · ·t'� · t J·· ·>: •-l bL--. ..-.... � ,  , , ,-. ....... ,i : .. 1 .-. r--. :..,. �, r-. r + .  '""' " 1  ..- u ; + 1  .... , ,  '-._/ u 1gc ' \\ d ., ·,\ 1 1 1.....- t j •_, l c I11 u J\ .. 1 1 d  1 u 1....l ......._ ...... i t  u .:-. ; .. ., ''--( .! 1  � -�.J t d it.:.. ..._ L l lJ l . (,.·, .;. L i t '-'· 
pate n t e d  s u b j ect  matter becom e s  gener i c a t  the  e x p i r a t i o n  o f  the  
pate n t . :" 'vVhii e t h e  Court stoppe d �10rt d n.d ing that cmy rnark a s ­
soc ia ted with a p a tented p r o d uct fal ls  i n t o  th :::: publ ic domain when 
the parent expires ,  i t  establ ished that t h ,; ex is tence o f  a previ ous 
p atent i s  a factor t o  be wei ghed in d e t e rmining the validity o f  a 
mark.  Spe c i fi ca l ly ,  the Court r u l e d  that  t h e  · ' S i n ge r "  mark fel l  i n t o  
t h e  publ ic  d o m a i n  at  the expirat ion of t h e  pate nts o n  t h e  se\v i n g  
machines . 51; 
Cr i t ical to t h i s  find ing was the  Court 's  strong disapproval of 
Singer 's  atte mpt to leverage its p a tents t h ro ugh tradem arks by es­
tab l i sh ing t h e  name " S inger" and the s h a pe o r  its mach i n es as 
trade marks in the years preceding the exp iration o J  i ts  patents.  The 
prox i m i ty i n  t ime be tween the appearance of the trademark o n  the 
m ach i ne s  and th e impe nd ing expi ration of i ts  paten ts  implied to 
the Court that  S inger had sought to extend the benefits of i ts mo­
nopoly beyond t he p atent protection p e r i o d . '7 Reph rased in eco­
nomic terms, the Court act e d  t o  bar Singer from enjoying monopo­
l i s t ic  rents-what  the Court call e d  " the real fru its of: t h e  
monopoly"5''-in t h e  post- patent period.  
Nearly  four decades l ater .  the S upreme Court  further sol id i fied 
t h e  concep tual  separation betwe e n  patents and trademarks in Ke!-
----- ---------- --------.- -·-----·--
'' I cL a t  l 04-05 .  
' ' ! d .  <J t 1 02 .  
·' '  1 63 U . S .  1 69 ( 1 895) .  
'' l d .  a t  l i\4-85 .  
'" l ei .  at 1 86 .  The opera t i ve res u l t  of  t h i s  fi n d i ng W < i :i ! o  ;d \ u w  the ck !'er: li <u l l  t o  a fl i :; 
t h e  ' · S i nger " "  m a r k  to i t s  products .  so l o n g  as i t  c l e a r l y  i n cl i cl t ccl that  i t .  n o t  S i n g,::·. was 
the m < t n u f< � c t u rer  o f  the: m a ch i n e .  For a case �;uggest i ng t h <� t t h e  · · s 1 nger" "  m cn'k was 
s ubseq uen tly res u rrect e d .  see S i nger M fg. Co . v. Red l i c h .  l 09 F. Supp.  623 (S .D .  CaL 
1 952) .  
" Singer. 1 63 U . S .  at  1 8 1 .  
'' l ei .  
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·q lcwr:. · Co. v. Natioua!  Biscu it Co. )  In J<el!o r.:;? . . _ the  Court \V� lS  give n L )  .._� l_l t J  ._., 
a n  ODjJOrtunitv  to revis i t  i ts rulinoa i n  Sin r;:er \rvhen K e l i o Q.g brought � � L; ...__ ........ '--' 
" ·t ·· · ·  ,··1' (' 'll r\ r 'K- I. n ·f,· l· "I' 0 �--' Dl "  I '  t S l l l. t 0 r l S t -p"  r e·· p t e x n ]· "!" ''\ ·/· !· (1 ,._ , ,  Cf '"l l. '1 " t N '0 -Ll l u '-.. ..._., L C - l 1 1 ,:::)'-' '- "-' I  .._ , 1. \_ U l  . J. L  -' - t ' •- l d l �  u .::J C 1 .) 0. 
h 1· ,.)- c n i"n r l "· i n o- 1 h e ;--.l 8 r l( ' 'Shrcclcler1 VVh •"' : l " f>· r'; : · ,- , i r' u  <:: j q opr _ ....__.. ...._; � .... 1.-J b l . ·......- ! , t l � � ... ,.,.., f. ,  _ . ....__ -.. .• ... ,_ 1.. t .._,_ . .\ 2:' o.....J .  I t- l) ....._ l-) 1·r--1 .--. F1 1[ ' :  t ! l ,:..' 1'(-) l : ! · 7 - ·· n l ' P r>i ·- � ·i e f'i f ll � t- ; 1 T-;f } t�l .;-- �-l r_' , \ ·i.� ?·-:. l i · · -1 1 � � -. -.--, , -._ f ' l  r� n ·•l' f' ll t !. l l  \_ t � "-" -� -.. ... : • .... ..._ !... :.. ' 1• \� 1 ;  .. 1. • .1 ·..., ..:_ . ,_ • .. ::. ·. 1  C. L •. t f  -. .. ; t . . . .  � ..._,. , \ ! : � �  1, , :._ !_ -. : l ,  '•. 1 :. �. i-'<- i  � .. . l 
· · t l1 r2 rc t.Jas�;c ] S J1 t c) t h e  r' u b l i c  . . . n cJ t  C)n l v  t h e  r l � h t  T C:  rn � l - t h e  �rr t l -
1 ._ .. � ·-
c !t:  c-\:; i L  w :\ s  m <Kk d '.! r i n g  t h e  patent  pe r i o d ,  b u t  <l b u  t ' : • : r i g h t  t u  
?nph· t h ereto the  n a m e  lw which i t  h a d  become k tLWin .  ' ' '" E ffe c-' 0 0 
ti\ ·c ly ,  th e Court's decis ion may be read t o  h ave c s L1 b ! i s bcd 8 per  
se r u l e  that  a m a r k  d e s i g n a ting a pa ten te d product becomes ge ­
neric at the e n d  o f  t h e  patent  term.6 1 
These cases prom oted some l e ad i n g i n tc l l ec t Lw l  oro oe r t v  sch o l -
.1 � l L J 
ars to s uggest t h a t  " t h e  federa l regim es are pre e m ptive o f  each 
o t h e r-that the same in novat ion c8nnot be protected hy both pat­
ent and copyrigh t l aw,  or by both patent and trademark law. 
"112 
Subseq uent decis ions  by lower courts ,  however,  repucl i 8t e d  the 
preemp t i o n  t h e ory 8S between copyright and patent.  In App lication 
of Y{!rd!ey , the U n ited S t ates Pate n t  a n d  Trade mark Office 
( ' 'PTO" )  refused to i ssue a design patent  on an o rn a m e n t a l  wrist­
w atch on the grou n d  that the S p iro Agnew cari c a t ure fe atured o n  
t h e  watch f8ce h a d  been registered i n de pe n d e n t l y  i n  the  U n i ted 
Sta tes Copyright Office .1'' In  revers i n g  the PTO, the Uni ted States 
Court  o f  Customs and Patent  Appe 8ls  exp l a i n e d  th8t  Congress in­
tended there to be a degree o f  subject  matter overlap between the 
p rotect ion a fforded by design patents a n d  that  gra n ted by copy-
''' 305 U . S . l l l  ( 1 938) .  
''" l ei .  a t  1 1 8 .  
" ' T h i s  e x t r e me v i e w .  art i c u l ated i n  G o l d s t ei n ,  su pra n o t e  2 0 .  a t  232-3 3 .  w o u l d sug­
gest  t h a t  wh e n  the p a t e n t  on Prozac expired in A ugust  o f  200 1 ,  n e w  prod u ce rs could  
markt:t  the i r  c h e m i ca l l y  i d e n t ica l  product  ( tl u oxe t i n c )  as ·· P rozac. · ' 1 n  o t h e r  words .  E l i  
Li! l v " s  exc lusive ri \!ht  to  use t h e  brand n a m e  Prozac w o u l d  vanish with the expira t i on 
or its p a te n t .  The cfac t  t h a t  n o  ge n e r i c  e n t ra n t s  ever  m ar k e t  t he i r  product  u n d e r  th e 
o r i g i n a l  t ra d e  n ame s uggests  that  P ro fe ssor G o l d s t e i n  nny n o t  be correct (or t h a t  
prod uce rs a re a l l  t o o  r isk-a verse to fi nd out) .  I t  i s  poss ib le .  howeve r.  t h a t  t he Kellog 
Co u r t ' s broad r u l e  s t e ms from t h e  fact  t h at t h e  m a r k  ' · S h re d d e d  Wheat · ·  was descrip­
t ive ,  i f  n o t  ge n e ric. from the begin n i ng.  
''' Roch e l l e  Cooper D r e y fuss & Robert a  R ose n t h a l  Kw<d l .  I n t e i k c t u c1 1  Property:  
Tr,: de m a r k .  Coryright  : t n d  Patent Law g48 ( 1 996): se•c ahu iVJ ichael  J.  K l i n e .  R e q u i r­
i n g  a n  E l e c t i o n  of P ro tec t ion for P a t e n t a bl e/Copyr ightabk C o m p u t e r  P rograms ( Part  
I ) .  6 7  J. Pat .  & Tradem ark O tT Soc'y 280 ( 1 985) ( < t rguing t h a t a n  e lect ion a ba n d o n i n g  
copyrigh t prote c t i o n  shou ld  b e  m ad e  u p o n  the iss u a n ce o r  cl pate n t ) .  
'' ' 493 F.2d l 38LJ.  l 3 9 1 -92 ( C . C. P . A .  l tJ74) .  
1 472 Virgin io Lm v Revie1 v 
. 1 (·J • ! . l . 1 l l 1 ' I . ,. ng,l t .  · Accorc mg y ,  t 11 e  c o u rt  nu e c t 1 at t .1e  · · e  e ct10n o r  p r oL�c-
t i o n "' d octri n e .  o n  vvh ic h  the PTO rel i e d  i n  d e n y i n g the p a le n t.  is  
" i n  d i rect  con fl ict  w· i t h  t h e  clear i n t e n t  of Congress. · · "=' 
Over t w o  decades  l a t e r.  i n  1 9 9 5 .  the Copyri g h t  Office ti n �l l l y  fo ! -
1 ' I DT �-) . . . I . l 1 • I 1 .t C) \\'" C d  t � ! ;.? 1· 1 \..__, a n ei Cl rl rl t) U i 1CCC1 t .l fJ t  1 l  \V '-1 S  CL JZl il Cl C) Ii 1 r1 ��  l (l �..? .. . t: ! C t�'--
t i o n  o f  p rulcc t i n n " d oc t r i n e .  unc_k r  which  i t  had re fused fu r m �n� ;, · 
vc a rs l l ;  r e � i s t c r  c u p v r i 0 h l  c l c1 i m s  o v e r  u i c t u r i a L  grap h i c .  a n d  sc u l n­
tura l des i'!;S  fo r whi�h �l cs i Q: n Dr- cl t e n t s  had b e e n  i ss u e d . ()" These D�l � � j 
icy c h anges h ave opened t h e  way for concurre n t  copyr ig h t  and pat -
e n t  protect ion for the same su bj e ct m atter ,  an d have prov e n  t o  be 
o f  great  s ign i ficance i n  t h e  con te xt o f  computer softwarc . ()7 
I m po r t a n t l y ,  t h e  S upre m e  Court's  ruli ngs i n  Singer a n d  Kellogg, 
as t o  t he i l legi t i m acy o f  l ev e raging patents t h rough t r a d e m a rks,  
have n o t  been revi s i ted .  Thus.  whi le  busi nesses can c hoose be­
t we e n  trademark and pat e n t  protect io n ,  a n d  whi le  they m a y  be 
a b l e  to sec ure concurrent tradem ark a n d  patent  p rotection for 
funct iona l  designs,  t h e y  l i k e l y  c a n n o t  combi n e  trad e m ar k  and pat­
e n t  protect ion seque n t i a l l y  t o  leve rage their  pate nts .  Attempts to  
leverage patents  t hrough trademarks wi l l  be frowned u p o n  by the 
courts . ' '� 
I n  sum,  the S upre me Court 's  i n tel lectual  property j urisprud e n ce 
suffers from three prin c i p a l  d e fects .  First , t h e  i ns istence o n  viewing 
copyright .  pate n t ,  and tradem arks as protecting dist i n ct social  
goals-a posi t i o n  shar e d  by many Law a n d  Econ omics scholars-is 
i n  many cases s imply wron g .  As we w i l l  show, tradem a r k  protec­
t i o n  also s p urs  i n n ovation a n d  c a n  complement  the i n c e ntive pro­
vided by patents  to expe n d  resou rces on R&D. 
Second,  the Court ' s  e m p h asis  on protect io n ,  rat h e r  than on 
value ,  h as driven a wedge b e tw e e n  the legal system 's a pproach to 
"' ld .  <l l J 3l)4 ( c i t i n g  i'VIu ::er v .  Stein . 347 U . S .  201 ( 1 954) ) .  
,,, l ei .  
''" Registra t i o n  o f  Cla i ms to  Copy righ t ,  37 C . F . R .  � 202. 1 0  (2002 ) :  s e c  Doug l a s  R .  
Wol f. The Doc t ri ne of Elections: Has t h e  Need to Choose Been Lost ') . 9 Cmd uzo 
Arts & E n t .  L .J .  439. 463-64 ( l LJ9 l )  ( d i scussi ng t h e  Copyr ight  Office ' s  accc pt a n c,_; or 
t h e  . .  e lect ion uf pru te c t i o n  . .  doct r i n e  as of 1 99 1 ) . 
''' See Mark A .  Lemlev  c t  a \ . .  S o ft w a re and I n t e r n e t  Law 38-45 (2UOO) ( e x p i :J i n i n g  
t h a t  va ri(lUS su bst a n t ive areas of l aw may be employed to protect com p u t e r  software .  
i n c l u d i n g  trc1dc s e c r e t  l aw.  copy r i g h t  lmv. p a t e n t  l a w. t rademark l a w. s u i  gcn,; r i s  Ll\vs. 
a n cl con t r� 1 ct l aw ) .  
"' Sec d i :�cu�s i o n  i n fra Sect ion  V . A .  
2002] lnregrured Theory of !n re!!ectuol Pro perry l L.!-73 
inte l lectui.1 l  property and that  of the business con1m unity .  S p e <1 k i n g  
t o  m a n a ge r:.; o f  i nte l lect u a l  propert v. Profe ssors Carl  S h �miro c1 ncl ...___. - ..' L 
Hai  VariJ n a d v i s e  t h a l .  · · y o ur  gmll s h o u l d  he t o  choose t he t e r m s  
and c o n d i t i o n : ;  t h at nu :-: i m izc t h e vo!ue o f  v c u r  i n telkc t u <d D n! n -.... t t--' 
r" r l '\1 Jli ll i < i ] ' '  ·L- ' ' ; ' Jr! \ ' \ 1 1 ( 1 cnrt rl i t i O P S L r' · \ 1- iY! ' "( i l-'i : '.' (-" r 1t ' f' 1� -�- r' ' !' i' ! ; ,-, p , . . ,. , _, .. .._ - � ..._ 1 . .._ . ..._ ·-� _ . . .  __ (. . ! ' , • I -l , l .  l ( '" . • .  ( t . ! . t 1. •. •  _. � 1 �..- f )  , .J f • . _. ••. • t • . .  - . .  l , 
l n s t e acL ct J U t" i. �< h c i \ · t� \\· r r. ' n � ] y  c tc l( ) }) tcd rules t h dt d rt:.; l1CJst l 1 t: � :_�, \'(d u� 
m a x i m  i z <l t i '  ; r; _ 
Th i rd _  <1 n cl m o s t  i nl p o rt <m t l y, t h e  j u c\ i c i <t l  t r c :J t m e n t o f  i n t e l l e c-­
t u a l  p ropcny i '; n o t  h e l p fu l  for p o l i cy a n a lysi s .  The S upreme 
Court ' s form<l l is t ic  approach b a s  p re v e n ted i t  fro m e v a l u i:l t i n g  t h e  
we lfare i mp l i ca t i o n s  o r  com b i n i ng diffe r e n t  m odes o f  i n t e l l e c t u a l  
p roperty rrotcct ion . 'vVe \Ni l !  dem o n s trate t h a t  c om b in i ng d iffere n t  
m odes o f  protect i o n  m a y  give r i s e  to  i m p ort a n t  syn e rgies  t h a t  h ave 
s o  far gone u nr e cogn ize d .  These synergies ,  cont rary t o  t h e  prevai l ­
i n g  view. enh ance soci al  w e l fare . 
II .  A S r M PLE MO D EL O F  PATENT/TRA D E tvl A R K  LEVERACJ [ 
The combi n at ion o f  p a t e n t  a n d  tradem ark p ro t e c t i on generates 
two comp l em e n tary advan tages for the i n t e l lectual  p ropert y  h o l de r. 
First , t h e  l i m i t e d  m o n o p o l y  afforded by p a t e n t  protect ion may fa­
c i l i tate  t h e  establ i s h m e n t  of brand l oy a l t y  d u r i n g  t h e  p a t e n t  l i fe .  
Thus,  patent  protect ion e n ha nces t h e  value o f  t h e  company's  m<u-k .  
Second.  bran d l oyal ty e n ables  p a t e n t e e s  t o  preserve s o m e  of t h e i r  
m a rket s h are after t h e  p a t e n t  p ro tection expires .  Thi s  i m plies  that 
trademark protection can s u pp l e m e n t  patent  protect i o n .  The n e t  
e ffect of com b i n i n g  p a t e n ts a n d  trademarks is stronger p rotecT ion 
t h a n  that  afforded by e i ther  a lone .  Surpris ingly,  h owever. we dem­
o nstrate t h a t  despi te t h i s  s tronge r  protect ion fo r p a t e ntees .  l ever­
aged pate nts  arc actual ly we lfare- e nh a n ci n g. s ince t hey mit i gate 
pate n te e s '  dispos i t i o n  t o  price m o n o p o l i st ical ly .  
To see why trade m a rk protection l essens t h e  i n cen t ive to price 
m onopol ist ical ly,  i m agine a worl d w i t hout any tradema rk s  at a l l .  I n  
s uch a worl d ,  whe n t h e  p a t e nt o n  a n  i nve n t i o n  expire s ,  anyone can 
produce ancl market  i t  under t h e  patentee ·s  mark.  To take a con­
crete hypothet ica l  exam p l e ,  when Prozac went off patenL a n y  
pharmace u t i c a l  company vvo ul cl h a v e  b e e n  able to prod uce t h e  
d r u g  and m a r k d  i t  u n d e r  E l i  Lilly's  " Proz ac' '  m a rk :  no ge :1 crics 
" ' S hapiro ,_� V <t r i � m .  supra n o t e  l)_ a t  5 .  
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\V\ :s u i d  ex 1s t .  The absence � 
two ways . FirsL patentees would t a k e  full  advan t age 
-� h o  [) 'lt f' l} i  ()T'l  .  ! l t  h• :  ,., .. ; C ; i.' U iYl n n t ·. o�,ro ] i c.: > ; [' ' l j' h : \:\/l·J i ]e' t n' = • ;  \'· ' i" l'o \, 1 1 \.._.. .l C ._, _ !..- .::::;,J._ (  ..__ }- }- ! l .L l t:::' d. : \...l l .t "- l l-''··-' -��-J l .l _.-(_( -t} � '- "--- ) t 'l  __. � ....... 
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q u a l i ty t h e i r  
'\ r "  ' ; "' ��--"'1 t-:.::::. .-� "l ; """"' U j -� '.;:' .- .  [ l l  1 ._. t l  l ·-.- ( , _!_ � l i t 0 ! C . l .') .  
t': �-- 1", 1_ ·_rC';(l1 'Llr.� l �. (Ill Ll, r �- l. (_1 c n: .:_ l ;_·_·; r t_- ) ]_· :_' 1_' :_ i ( ': n . ' '',-" I e 11 r·1 � l' c• l;p ''0 n .--1 � - h p _ _ ...._ _ _  .. , \... \..... " c. "-" 1  _ \ .. 1 !  ! 6  L '-' ..! ! ! \._!. t 1  t v  
t e n t  '1 ; fe <ompJpre l)' t r c1 n c: f" r nl (' t l, n  :• n c> : ,.rc- 1· ,� B ' '  "' n ;; h ] in u  " C' Il ' J>' ' -·� '---' � � �- i ..._ ,__ - t _, L  _ .._ .._ , ,._ ..:.. �J -� '1... .· < ,_ , , .._) ,_ _t , ..,_- .__� l J L� l j ...._l ...._, • . ) \....- l. - + -- . J. :::::::; v ._! J. lt-' '-� 
n i e s  t o  create brand l o y a l t y ,  t r a ck m ark pro-tection not o n l y  m a k e s  
i t  rat ion<l l  for t h e m  to i n vest  i n  t h e u u a l i tv of t h e i r  oro d ucts , b u t  ' _; 1 
also puts pressure o n  t h e m  to i ncre ase t h e  n u m ber of s ales during 
the  patent term t o  broade n their  loyal  customer base for the post­
pacent period.  Th us , trademark protect ion m ay reduce t h e  social  
d e a dweight  loss ge nerated by p a t e n t  protec t i o n .  I n  this  Part ,  we 
present a for m a l  model  t h e1 t  s h ows h o w  l everaging patents  t hrough 
trademarks may i mprove soci a l  we l fare . 'Ne t h e n  support o u r  t he o ­
retical resul ts w i t h  empiri cal  e v i dence fro m  var i o us so urces.  Fi­
m1 l ly ,  we discuss h ow various factors s uch as adverti s i ng and a 
n1ore soph ist icated dynamic model  a ffect our fi ndings .  
A .  The Model 
To i l lustrate t h e  effect of trad e m arks  on patents,  we construc t  a 
s tyl ized two- period model . 7 1 1  I n  t he first per iod,  the firm c a n  use 
pate n t  protection t o  select  the  fe asible price-qu antity combi n a t i o n  
t h a t  maximizes i ts  profits .  I n  the second peri o d ,  the  p a t e n t  protec­
t ion lapses,  and the fir m  m ust re ly exclusively o n  bra n d  l oy a l t y  cre­
ated earlier,  plus trademark protection,  to secure supracompetitive 
proht. 7 1  We show that  the exi stence of tra d e mark protection does 
-- ---------- · ------------------
' f o1 t h e  :,akc ut si mplici t y .  vv c condense t h e  twcn ty-ycctr  �ldt u tory penod o l  p a te nt 
pro t e c t i o n  i n t o  a sin g l e p e riod and ignore iss ues o f  d i sco u n ti ng, w h i c h  are pe ri p he r a l  
to o ur  b as i c i nsig h t .  l n  the Appe n d i x ,  we o t'fe i· a dynam i c m u l ti �per iod m o d e l  i n which 
\Vc c o n s i d e r  each year o f  pa ten t p ro t e c t i o n  separate l y .  and a l l ow the m o n o p o l i st to  
choo:;c op t i ma l q ua n t i ty over  t ime.  a l l ow i ng for  d isco u n t i ng.  Our dyna mic mo d e l 
cir.:: munstrates esse n t i a l ly  t h e  same re:;u l t  ciS a bo v e ,  a l t lw u g h  the  assum pt i on o f  long�  
! i vccl consumers i s i n tens i on with the e x i :; t L: tl Ct�  1 1 i  brand loya l ty .  See i n fra A p pe n d i x .  
" ' A l t h o ugh t h e  p a t e n tee i s assumed t u  be furwar d - l o o k i n g .  con s u m ers <I re n o t .  
H e 1 1 ce .  w e  clo n o t  model  consu n 1 c L'  a s  c h u os i n g  between b uy ing t o d ay versus b u y i n g  
n e x t  p e r i o d .  S uch con su mer ' 'myop i a "  i �; d s ta n d ard assu m p t i o n i n  t hese co n tex t s-se e 
P a u l  K l e mper e r ,  Ma rkets wi t h  Consu m e r  Switch i n g  Costs,  1 02 Q..J .  Eco n .  3 7 5  ( 1 98 7 ) ;  
.l ean Ci ;1 hszewicz c t  a ! . .  Se q u<.:: n t i a l  E n t n  w i t h  B rand Loya l t y  Caused by Consu m e r  
lnre c.:rmed Theorv ,?/· Jmelfe.::ruo! Pro uertv (.__.; • .• ! p" 
. , ..... protectlo n . · -
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f�·:.. s s u n-1 �? t h a t  the  cle rn a n ci fc)r the  �Ja t e n t �. >J � n "'·/t� n t 1 011 i s  clescribccl 
� ·1 l i 1;_ �� ;_t!· ( _; i ; '.; !- 2 :�se )  rJ,= n� (·t n cl : __ , u rv c �  
' '· ··� �-· 1·n {:-' i ..:: "! h e  1"'"'\ "" ·e v ·l il i p �J- " :· 1 r{':l (f ; c  t h { - . (1 1 l f 1 1"'d- ; t "' .' f' }1 r:. c o t1 }-;v t ]1 r-• � 1 1 � __. : '>...- I l .__' '1.- .:. i .._. 1: .1 1 (. .. .1 l ,::, t./ 1 1 ..__ ._. . _:_ � �.J ·. � • .._.. .... 1 .. i l < ! J '- .t L) ....... . .._/ .._J \...., 1 ..__/_'! ..._ ...,., 
patente e .  o i s  t h e  maximum price the  pate n t e e  C Zl n  charge ( at Q=U) ,  
cl !Kl - h  i s  t h e  s l ope o f  t h e  d e rn and c urv e . f-\ssume furt her  t h a t  t h e  
patentee produc�s at  constant  margi na l  cos t .  c . 7_; S i n ce the pate ntee 
i s  a mo nopolist while the pate n t  is  in e ffe c t .  in a s i ngl e period 
mod e l  with patent  protect ion she wou l d  m axim ize her profi ts ,  as 
represented by 
( 2 )  II =  (a - !JQ )xQ .  
To accom pl ish this ,  s h e  w i ll ch o ose the q ua n tity, Q ,  t h a t  sol ves 
(3)  c1IT!c1Q = a - 2 b Q  = 0. 
This impl ies  that Q ''', the profi t m a xi m iZing q u a n t i ty for the pat­
e ntee,  is o/2!J.  J n t uitively,  the monopol i s t  sets margina l revenue 
equal  to margina l cost ( here .  0)  in ord e r  to max i m ize p rofits .  Note, 
L e a rn i ng- by- Usi ng.  40 J. f ncl us .  Eco n .  397 ( 1 9lJ2)-a n d  �eems i n t u i t ive l y  p l a usi b l e .  
" We stress th a t w e  a r e  f a r  from t h e  first to  po i n t  u u t  t h a t  a m o n o p o l i s t  wh o c o n s i d ­
ers  the  long run w i i l  h ave re ason s for sc l l 1 11 g  more t h a n  ( a mi pr ic ing below) t h e  si ngk­
peri(Jci m on opo l y  opt i m u m .  For e x a m p l e .  Pro fessor Dar i us Gaski n s  showed how a 
i'orwarci - lo o k i ng monopo l i st wou l d  lower prices over t i m e  i n  orde r to deter  e n t ry.  
Dmius 'vV. Gaskins .  Jr.,  Dyn am i c Lim i t P r i c i n g :  O p t i m a l  Pr ic ing u nder Th reat o r  E n ­
t r y .  3 J .  Eco n .  Th eory 306 ( 1 97 1 ) . Professor K l c m p e rc r' s  m o d e l  of  swi tch ing cos t s  
yie lds  t h e  s a m e  i n sight-o l i gopol i s t ic  fi rms may price <l l l e ss t h a n  t h e  s t a t i c  o l igopo ly  
o p t i m u m in  order to a t t ract l oyal  u s e rs .  See l<. l e m pcrer .  supra note 7 i .  a t  375-79 . 
Other  reasons for prici ng below t h e  s t a t i c  monopoly op t i m u m i ncl ude n e t work exter­
mi \ i t i e s  <mel ' " l e a rn ing-by-doing· '  (dynamic scale e c o n o m ies ) .  Sec G a bsze w i cz ct  < t l  . .  
s up ra note  7 1 .  
O u r  •; tmy ! s  rcl ct t e d  to the ' ·Coase Co n j e c t ure '" about  t h e  i n a b i l i ty of a m o n o pol is t  
nrotl uci n n  a d u rable �ood to e x t ract m onopo l v o ro l'i i over t ime.  See R. J---1 . Coas·� - D u ­
:-a h i l i lv Cl�d Mon o ro(v .  1 5  J . L. & Eco n .  1 -Li ( 1�972 ) .  Prn t'c:;scn Coasc ' s  i n s i g h t  w a s  t h a t  
t h e  mon opn l i st ·s pot e n t i al f u t u re o u t p u t  m C�y com pete w i t h  her o w n  prese n t  o u t p u t .  
� o  t h a t  con s u m e rs might  ra t i o n a l l v \\'� t i t  u n t i l  n e x t  yeC � r  l l) b u y  i f  t h e  p r i ce t h i s  year  i s  
tno h i g h .  W h i l e  t h ne a rc som e p ma i l c i s .  t h e  l a rge a n d  complex l i tera t u re spawned by 
Co:1 se 's i ns igh t docs n o t  bear cl i re c t l v  o n  our mod e l .  
' '  \V i t h o u t  lo:;s o l' genera l i tv .  w e  <;s s u m e  c i s e q u a l  t o  /ero.  
Virginia L mv Revie1v  f V n J' ;-:; �' · 1 Ll.).-)-L � • L L) . � ' 
h owever. th2t  (/"' is onlv hal f of the social lv o ot irn a l c utnut .  r e o r e -
-; ,---- .I -' j_ • .l 
s e nt e d  by olb . · 
Assume .  JW \V .  that  i ns t e a d  o f  a s ingle  pe riod of pa t e nt protec­
l_ i oJL patentees  can also t a k e  adva n t age o f  tradem ark proknion a t  
_, ,., ' "' ··· · ... , , ,. : , l 'i' ,-, F t \1 "' !--, r\ ·t �· �·, :  Tl " ' l' l '' l l C l 1; S ·t ll , -. ,. , , ,-ll 1 ' . , ,. ; ,, " C " , > : ' � ' '  f ·: '-�_ ! ! �-- �- - ·, i ( l l t \. - · \.) I 1.. 1 . 1 ..... .t ) (  !,. l_  , ,_ _ _l___..,.- \_.- I ( t • .  l --- , ' < l l  -- ( � ._) 1 1 1  1- • i :... � (-� i. l \ I J. ! \ � i 
1 ! '  -�_--; ·,· - � .;-_-� ·_:_. ;_, ,-., , l �·, .  C :- ' Jl (.)\V r � , ) rJ c: i (l i=:-• -;· It"' ()',--\/ l h j '-' (' h ;l �1 o p �� "f h t -� ; ··, ;· I ·i - �· �; ·! r ·. , -.. � ....: _ _ "- ....__ , - - \_ , . , _) _ .. ,.., 1 I '- > � , • � • , .,., - -·· l :::::0 -' •- \. •-' t' • ' ._ ·.- 1 " '· ' · ,_. '--' 
>, ,_ .. �j ,. . . : ,--. ,- ,-J , ,- 1· '1 0  t l1 o 1 i j'(•t ; ,. ,., o o· f t it .' ' ' 1) ' 1 t C !l t  J\ v \ 'C' sh ' ' '"  "' h "' '"_- . , ,., ;-� , \. .... � � Ll \-" J '�.' _:._ •-1 \ . ..!. J i � . !. 1_. 1 .  ._, l 1  .i 1 1_, l. I '-'  f ( l l ,  l � · )  - � 1 \..l \ )  � � _:.c ..,_ ··- .·•. (.l � •. 
" -rr., f'-c o ·'· ·t ·· ·-, c1 "' ·-" 'l '· j,- pr· n t e � t : ' -) 11 ' 1 e pe nd ·· O l' !' 0 '\' t l1 "' f-'; .. ,..., , ' "  ,-J�c·-· ._. .._ ! \� ._.. t ·-.. 1 1 <.1 \..... i l l ( .t ..... v \... !. \._ \....l _ J I . � � 1....- ·. l i t ! ! .) } i -
,_: x o i r a t i o n  sales i n fl uence i ts  profitabi l i ty  in t h e  seconcl o c: r i od o n c e  -� -" I 
t h e  patent  has lapsed .  
T o  start  with t h e  s i mplest  c ase , suppose t h e  pate n t ee c a n n o t  t a k e  
a d van t age o f  trademark protection aft e r  t h e  patent  e x p i re s .  T h i s  
might  occur i f  Singer a nd Kellog are r e a d  to ban t rademark p rotec­
t ion for previously p a t e n t e d  products ,  or i f  t h e  characterist ics  of 
the product make development  of brand loyal ty  i mpossib l e . 75 I n  
t h i s  situat ion . o nce t h e  product goes off pat e n t ,  anyone can p ro­
duce i t ,  ;:m d  t h e  p rice w i l l  fal l  to  t h e  com pe t i tive l eve l .  S i nce t h e  
origi n a l  p ro duct i s  i nd ist inguish able  from the vers i o n  produced b y  
t h e  e nt rants, t h e  l a w  of o n e  p r i ce requi res t h a t  t h e  previously pat­
e n t e d  and new versi ons  must sell  a t  the same price. As long as  e n ­
try i s  poss i b l e ,  price wil l  be  d riven d own t o  marg i n a l  cosL with zero 
oro fit .·(, 1 
I f  the  pate n tee expects i n  Per iod 1 t h a t  t h e  market  wi l l  be com ­
petitive i n  Period 2 ,  she wil l  m aximize p rofits i n  Per iod ' 1 by charg­
ing the monopoly p rice. Since nothing she does in Period 1 affe c t s  
h e r  profits i n  P e r i o d  2 ,  she faces t h e  monopo l i s t ' s  o ne - p e r i o d  
maximization problem a n d  b e h aves accordingly .77 Th i s is  the  stan-
'" ln  a compe t i t i ve market . pr ice equa ls  m argi n a l  cos t .  With  m a rg i n a l  cost  e y Lta l  to 
;,; ro and a l i n e a r  d e m a n d  cu rve . t h i s  requires  0 = a - bQ. wh i ch i m p l i es Q = alb . . , ·we fo u n d  seve red i n s t a n ces i n  w h i c h  m o re t h a n  one e n t i ty h as t h e  same name o r  
produces t h e  s a m e  product .  The b e s t  exam p l e  i s  t h e  t rade name " B ayer Asp i r i n . ·· 
W h e n  B aye r  l os t  i t s  U . S .  p l a n t  to a n  A me ri c a n  fi rm dur ing  World W a r  ! .  i t  a lso lost  
t h e  Bayer name and the company 's trade mark, t he Bayer  Cross. As a resu l t .  bot h 
companies  sold Bayer Asp i r i n .  Th a t  i s .  ' · two d i ffe re n t ,  compe t i n g  e n t e rprises used a n  
i d en t i ca l  n a m e  t o  s e l l  <l l1 i d e n t ica l  pro d u c t , "  and t he " t wu B a y e r  asp i ri n s  fought each 
u t h e t· for  mure t h <tn seve n t y  years. " J'vl a n n  & P l u m m e r, supr<i note 2 1 .  a t 1 5 .  
' ' T h is cl�sum es t h a t  t h e re are n o  f ixed costs.  w h i ch we h a ve  <l i re< tdv fac tor,:d o u t o r  
t h e  p ro b l e m .  We me a l so ass u m i ng t h a t  product  q ua l i t v  is e xugen o usly fi x e d .  so t h a t  
i n  t h e  absence o f  trademark protec t i o n .  f i rms would n o t  r u n -down t he q u<l l i t y  o f  t h e i r  
products .  
' fonmd l y .  n = P,Q,  + P Q,, w h e re P, i s  t h e compe t i t ive pncc.  In  th i�  C <I S e .  the sec-
j ( l • ' ') l - Ut k j  !n tegmred Theory of !nr e!lecruul Properr_v 
clare! acco u n t  of h o w  patentees b e h ave .'� A s  we w i l l  shovv ,  however. 
t h e  conv e n t i o n a l  v i ew i s  m e rely a spe c ia l  C8Se o f  a m o rr..: g'.: n cr<1 i  
modeL w h i c h  a l lows fo r t h e  patentee t o  re t a i n  �; o m c  rn a r k c t  powe r 
in Pr; r i u d  2 by establis h i ng bra nd loya l t :; among h e r  P c r i od - l c u s -- . .  
C \Cl :y.; C!. rn o n opoi ist  wh i l e she can d o  so ( in .PI:': ri o cl l ) . O n ce 1.ve c o n ­
s i d e r  1'Jr (t n d  l oya l ty m a de poss i b l e  by t r a d e m a r k  protec t i o n .  how­
ever. i t  becomes cle a r  that  t he p a tentee m a :v· prefer n o t  to c h a rge 
the fuJ i rn u n opoly price . 'vVc suggest t h a t  a patcnteG  who can cul t i ­
vate brand l oy a l t y  whi le  the patent  is  in  e ffect wi l l  pre fer to forego 
some reve n ues i n  t h e  p a t e n t  period in order to obtain  higher prof­
its a fter t h e  patent l apses .  We use the  term ' · t radem ark leverage ' '  
to d escribe patentees'  abi l i ty to  charge supracom p e t i t ive prices 
eve n after the  pate n t  has l apsed and the invention i s  protected o n l y  
so 
by a trademark. '  
I n herent i n  t h e  defi ni t i o n  of brand loyalty is  the  notion of prior 
use . Indeed,  i t  would be o d d  for consumers to be l oy a l  t o  a product 
they h ave never tri e d .  Hence , t h e  number of sales made while the 
pat e n t  is  i n  e ffect wil l  affect  the paten t e e ' s  l oyal  customer base in  
Period 2.  Crit ical ly,  this  means that  i ncreasing sales i n  Period 1 en­
ables patentees to charge s upracompetit ive prices to m ore custom­
ers i n  Period 2 th an would o t herwise b e  poss i b l e .  
Formal l y ,  we m o d e l  t h is effect a s  a switching cost,  so t h a t  a n y  
consumer w h o  tries t h e  product i n  Period 1 i ncurs a cost,  5 > 0 ,  t o  
purchase a different b r a n d  i n  Period 2 .'� 1  The i n troduct i o n  of 
oncl - p e rioc! pro fi t is zero. so the pa tent e e docs not care wha t q u a nt i t y  it se l ls i n  P·�riocl 
2. o n l v  in Per iod 1. 
'' S�c Coot e r  & Ulen .  s upra note 22. a t  1 28. 
'" The e x istence o f  t rade m a rk makes i t  possi b l e for consumers t o  iden t i fv t h e  o utout 
of e ach f irm, a ncl this mi gh t  be tho ught t o  make e ach firm l ess than lX: r fec.t ly comp� t i ­
t i ve w i t h  i ts rivals.  Should the  behavior in  Period 2 t h e n  b e  moclc l eJ as monopol is t ic  
cump c t i t io n '1 J ean Ti ro lc suggests  not,  argu i ng t h a t  · ' [ t j h c  point  o f  m o n o p o l i s t i c  cum­
pc l J t iun [ t heory] is . . .  not  to study s trategic aspects be t we e n pro d ucts ( such clS prod­
uct pusi t i un i ng and price compe t i t ion) ,  b u t  .-ather t o  <1 bstrc;ct from t h ·� m  to si m p l i  ry 
t h ·c: a n a l vsis  :: mel studv ot he r i ssues .  su ch as t h e  n um b e r  o r  prod ucts ofkrccl bv a mar­
ket  ccoJ{umv · · J e: a n  T i ro l <:: .  The Theory o f  I n c! u s t r i a i  Orga 1i!za t i on  288 ( 1 98S ) .-
, .. \Vc s t ress t h at t he existence of ' · leverage'' clepcncl s  on t h e  ch ; ! rac t crist i c:; or i !i e  
p r u d u c t  be i ng  s o l d .  Fur a cl i�cussion o f  factors t h a t  c n h <i l1C•c ur l i m i t  t li <:: cl c \' c l opl11 C n t  
o !  brancl lo\':i l t v .  s e: c  i n fra t e x t  accompanying n ot es 85-9l) . 
,; Th i s  pl;c n c;m e n u n  c a n  occur for a n u m be r  o f  reasons .  m a n v  o i· w h ich Cel l' be cap-
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swi tch ing costs dri ves a \.vedge between t he  price t h e  patentee can 
che:: rge her l o y a l  c ustom e rs and the price new entrants  c a n  charge 
this group .  in o t h e r  words.  consumers who buy trom the l·'aten tcc 
in the  firs t  period \v ill be wi l l i n g  t o  pay a premium of S fo r t h t� p r e ­
'/i () U S l  y r; ;j l C  i 1  ted  1Jrt)d U :: t .  �.:.\ ·e i 1  \V h C 1 l  i cJc  11t ica !  }Jr(1Cl ·uct ��. ;_-i r:.� (1 'V t1 i l -
, - l i·- -! w .--.. {- •") 1 r ,_ � : - . •  � - r� r · . " · :· � -: · ! ,  _ _  , --- , \ i ·o -� · -� i � .r 1l'' ( ' 'l ,_ ill ·:-. l-. .- 1 +- > p 1· F' "'.- , - � � � - : · ' :  , . ·: : ( :  ' ' i � '" u l.J l \..,.. ci L u -' ' . ... \ ·, .._ � \., '..._) :) l • .'i ! l l,., ! \,.... t 1 c , ' I,  1 ... l - l t: t; L .. L �-- . j t '- .- \. t I i i 'F ,_, '. .: i I '- '  \._, - I J. 
drives the  orice clm\ �1 to t h e  competi t ive leveL t h e  pri (:�:; t h : t t  rc \ 1: ­
entees can charge ! o v a l  customers in Period 2 ,  P ,  is P +S .  '----- - . - ( 
Th e paten tee vvo u l cl n e v e r  fi nd i t  i n  h er in terest to  ch<1rgc l e ss 
than P, (wh i ch  w u u l d  e a d1 negat ive profi t ) ,  and i f  she >V,.: h.:: t o  
charge mor e  than P, + S, she would lose a l l  her  cus tomers .  Hence.  
the patentee wi l l  a lways choose the price in  Period 2 .  P:. . to be P, + 
S.'c 
t u red u n d e r  the rubric of . .  swi t c h i ng costs . . -ck rinecl as a cos t t h a t  a con s u m e r m u s t  
p a y  t o  cha nge brands .  For  ex�1 mp le . consumers may  learn  how to usc  a product  by  
consuming  i t .  F o r  examp l e . Zl regu l a r a i r l i ne  trZ!ve ler  who hZls  l e arned h o w  t o  fi nd h e r  
way around  Un i ted 's term i n a l  may then  prefe r to  fly U n i t ed  rather t h <l n  i\ m e ri ca n .  
even i f  Amc rie<m offe re d an id e n t i ca l ! l igh t  a t  a l ower cost .  Sheer force o r  h a b i t , or 
u ncer ta in ty  about  produc t qua l i tv . may a lso l ead some consumers t o con t i n ue buy i ng 
brands they have purchased i n  t h e  pas t .  even when lower-priced subst i t u tes exist .  
The re has  bcc: n  a substa n t i cd body o f  work in t h is ve i n .  l a rgely focus i n g  o n  t h e  co n ­
sequences o r  s w i t c h i n g  costs for eq u i l i bri um i n  game- theor e t i c  m od e ls or o l igupo ! i s t i c  
markets .  The p ioneer ing work tha t  offers a typology o f  swi tch i ng costs and  a soph i s t i ­
cated an a l ys i s o f  t he i r  e ffe cts  i s by Pau l  K lempe rer .  Sec Klempcrer ,  supra n o t e  7 1 .  
The work most s im i l a r  i n  spir i t  t o  our s  i s  t ha t  o f  Professors Gabszewicz. P e p a l l .  ancl 
Th isse . G a bszcwicz c t  a l . .  s upra note  7 1 .  They model  a two-period game .  w i t h  a mo­
n opo l is t ic i n c u m b e n t  prod uc i ng a n e w  prod uc t i n  t h e  first per iod and t h e n  faci ng a n  
o l igopo l is t i c  r i \·a l i n  t h e  secon d .  Consumers learn about  t h •.:: p ro d uct by consumi ng i t .  
an d  t hi s  crea t es brand l oya l ty i n  Pe r iod 2 for  t hose who t r i ed  the i ncumben t 's pwcl uct  
in  Pe r i od 1 .  The i r mZl i n  r e s u l t  i s  s im i l <n to  o urs-t he incumbent  wi l l  expand i t s  cus­
tomer base in  Pe riod I by produc ing more ancl charg ing l ess than  the  one-period mo­
nopoly o p t 1 m u m .  Th i s  sacr i fice o f  pro fi t s  i n  Per iod 1 is  a form o f  i n ve stm e n t i n  brcmcl ­
loya l t y :  i ts  r e t u r n  c o m e s  because lower  p rices a n d  more custome rs toci a y  a l l o w  the  
fi rm to keep prices a bove the compet i t i ve kve l  for loya l  customers tomorrow.  Al­
t hough i t  duc�s n o t  d i scuss e i the r t r a d e ma rks o r  pa ten ts . t h e  pape r i �; importan t  he­
cause i t d e m o n s t ra t•;s t h a t  our basic i ns i gh t does not clepencl on our a cl rn i t �ec ! iy  e x ­
treme ass u m p t i o n  t h a t  t h e  marke t  i s  perfect ly competit ive i n  t he  secon d period ( ; l i':. cr  
t h e  paten t  i c1 pse� ) .  
·
'' The pcl tentee nu l o nge r  i<l ccs a down ward -s lop ing clemancl curve o n c e  t h e: p a c •; iH 
cxpirt?s .  J -kr !oya i  custo m e rs w i ! i  purch <1sc exact ly the same qua n t i ty they bough t l < 1 s l  
period at < inv  pr ice h e l u w  1', + S .  and  w i l l  pu rch ase not h i ng at  a! l  a t  a n v  p r i c<.: < lbuvc 
this leve l .  ] -knee . t h e re i :-; no price -quan t i ty  t r a d e o ff u n t i l  the pa ten tee 's  p r i ce •: xct: ·� c b  
t h e  compet i t i ve pr i ce h v  n1urc t h a n  t h e  swi t c h i ng cost .  S. 
l ·-·.;. 
/\t price P, + S. t h e  p a t e ntee ·wi l l  se l l  the s a m e  quant i ty i n  th�  
<e , � (' ]' ('1 po 1"!, nrt' ,, �· s·· l'l (-'• C1l i ( t' 1 'l l t ] ·, (' rl' '-j r<; 'I T--1 e� I1Ce . ·tl1 r- T) .-, L' "-' ll 't F' ( '  ' r;· 0 _. \,.... j .: _!. \....- t \..._; ·.._. L<.V .._ .. .._, ! ..._ • '- � .t .. .- .l "' '-- · • Jl l � - f {. .. lw- ... ,._... '._, ._ \  
pt!riod opt i mizat ion p r o b l e m  ��e::ccm,.;s :  
r i.!. \ lVl(i ,- ·rr -=--= r� (1 -1- ( r) -r--\ ' J ' - • - - ..... l. -� .I _.:::_, ! \ - r 
,
r·) {_./ 
t l  v o -
\\' h e f t�  f-)1 � S  lhe  J)T ice: c h c-1. rge r_j l il t ; : {t ten i' r� eri C )Ci i-'( l �  l_ ! t £. i ' ,� � · 1 r · � :  
e h a r o r• r] bv t iV' q; rn r'� C f i t i vc C J' i i· ,-, r, 1 ·� ;' n d  S' i s thP  S Wi t r· ll tf' U • ' < ) " 1 i :n ._-l 1 L ;::, •__, L .. j _ _ _  ...._, � J .  _t ./ - - •  · ..- . t ;,. ... � .  �· ·--' • _ ._ - l. ._, .1. v .J . 1 /::::' "-· '· V t. ! ..__' .!.  
( 5 )  aii/aQI = (i - 2/JQ1 + s = 0. 
which imp l i e s  
(6)  Q .  = ( o + S)/2h = Q . + S/2b .  
The first t h i ng to n o te i s  t h a t  the  patentee ' s  optimal q u a n t i t y  
choice wi th  t rade m ark leverage is the same as  i t s  choice w i t h out 
leverage , p lus the  posit ive term S/2b .  Hence ,  t he optimum q u a n t i ty 
under a leveraged paten t  i s  a lvvays larger than wi thout  l e verage 
( Q'" = Q ' + S/2b > Q} 
The reason for t h is resu l t  is s imple .  For a l everaged patentee.  a n  
increase i n  first period q uzm tity has two effects .  On th e  one h a. n cl .  
expanding output above t he  s ingl e-period monopoly level reduces 
current profi ts .  O n  the other hand , more output today means m ore 
loyal customers a n d  higher profi ts  next period, an effect that is 
made poss ib le by trademark leverage. A firm t hat takes  leverage 
into  account wi l l  opt imal ly produce more t h an  one tha t  does not 
because the leveraged fir m ' s  m a rginal revenue i s  always Lnger �1 t 
any given quan ti ty.  
The welfare conse quences of patent  leve rage follow from i ts  ef­
fect on  Period- 1 output .  The m ore the patentee produces in P e r i od 
1 ,  the lower the price is. and the smsl ler  the monopolistic distortinn 
or deadweight loss . W h i l e  the patentee charges i ts  loyal cus t o in e rs 
a h igher-th an-competit ive price i n  Period 2 ,  th i s  h as no effect u n  
the quan tity dernancled t�r:::causc the marginal (inexperie nced ) p1_�;- -
c hasers can buy ell t h e  competitive price i n  this period. <� 
ciency consequences result  frmn those who do buy from the  fo rn; e r  
pate ntee in Period 2 pay ing rn m e  t h an the compet i t ive price .  since 
the 1n argin o! tmycrs pay the appropriate price and e veryon.c who 
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val ues the  product more t h a n  i ts  cost is able t o  buy i t .  O f  course,  
the h igher price paid by loya l  buyers gene rates h igher prof i ts  for 
the former p a t e n t e e ,  b u t  t h is has 1; urely d i s t ribut io n a l  e ffects .  
H igh e r  consumer pr ices t rans l a t e  cl i rc: c t l v i n t o higher profi ts for t h e  
. . I . ' . ' '  d 1 • • 1 IJCt tc n T t:� � �  \\' i t tt r: (; cp .I <:1 n t 1 Ly r e c1 u c t 1 C) n  :.nl u n e n ce n o  e8.Cl'vVt:i g .l 1 t  1 0 S S .  
Fin :.d l y .  n o t e  tlEiL l h ·: l ·:: ·v cTJg� i.:: tl<:: c t  i s  d i rectly proportiunal  tu 
the s i ;:e n f  the c o n s u m e r  S\vitching cos t .  anci. negat ive ly  r e l 8 t e d  to 
the  s lope or e l a s t i c i t y  o f  the  de mand curve . The fi rst r e l at ionship 
s h o u l d  he o bvi o u s .  H ighe r  swi t c h i n g  cos t s  m a k e  c o n s u m e rs l ess 
l i k e l y  t o  svv i tc h ,  vvhi le  m a k i n g  t h e  c Cl p l uri n g  o f  consumers rn o r(� 
va l uab le . H e n c e ,  as S i ncreases.  e ac h  d o l l a r  o f  lower p r o fi t  from 
o u tput expansion i n  Period 1 is  traded off  against  h ig h e r  p rofits in  
Period 2 .  which e ncourages addit ional  product ion i n  the  firs t  pe­
riod.  
As t h e  s l ope parameter ,  - b ,  gets l a rger and t h e  d e m a n d  curve 
gets steeper, the l everage e ffect  becomes weaker .  The r e a s o n  i s  t h e  
converse o f  t h e  one give n above.  The more price-sen s itive con­
sumer demand is  i n  Period 1 ,  t h e  gre ater  t h e  fa l l  i n  P e r i o d  1 pr i ce 
for any given quant i ty i ncrease . Hence,  i n e l as t ic  d e m a n d  imposes  
on the  patentee a larger burden i n  foregone p rofits  i n  Period 1 for 
e ach additi o n a l  Period-2 customer i t  seeks t o  reta in .  
Table 1 provides a numerical  i l l ustration of o u r  results usi n g  t h e  
paramete rs l i sted below. 
Table l :  Profits and Wef{a re Over  Two Periods, 
Wi!h and With out Tradcnzork Leverage·" 
Patent  
Only J I I P a t e n t  + Trad e m a r k  Abso lute Change Pe rce n t  � � Ch ange i 
Patentee's  Pro ri ts  2500.0 3025 u 525.0 , j( ) I 
Consum e r  Surplus  6250 ( )  5962.5 -287.5 --+ . 6  I 
8750.0 8987 .5 237.5 
87 .5  S9.':J 
The Table cle rnonstrates that t h e  addi t ion of even a re l a tive ly  
rnodcst switch ing cost ( equal  t o  one- fi ftb of the monopoly price ) 
·' '  Calcu l a t e c \  ha�ccl on p�1ra m e t e r  v�t l ues :  u = l C JO .  h = I . S = 1 0 . c = 0 .  
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can have s ignifi c a n t  e ffe c t s :  The p at ent e e ' s  profi ts are 2 1 %  h igher,  
and i n  spi te  o f  t h i s .  t o t a l  s t a t ic we l fare is nearly 3 °1<) h igher with 
l e verage t h an without i t . ·'-� 
I t  is i m port an t t o  s t ress t h a t  t h e  clyn<1 m i c--or l o n g  run-we l fare 
g a i n from l e ve raged p a t e n t s  i s  p o t e n t i a l l y  s u b s um ti <! l l y  l arge r than 
t h e  s t<Hi c  2 .JD/c, l i s t e d  i n  Tab l e  L. T h e  rcasun i s  t h a t  t h e  Tab l e  co u n ts 
as t h e  w e l fare g<t i n  frllm l e ve r�1 ge o n l y  t h e reduct ion i n  s t a t i c  
dead weigh t l oss ( m o n opo l ist i c q u a n t i t y  distort ion ) wh i l e  t h e  p a te n t  
is i n  e ffect .  I n  add i t i o n  t o  reducing deadweight  l o s s ,  h owever,  t h e  
a b i l i ty to l e verage patent  protect ion t h rough tradem ar k s  a n d  brand 
loyalty also ra ises  the  p a t e n t e e ' s  profi ts-in our  example ,  by a 
h efty 2 1 % .  This i n  t u rn  creates a l arger i n ce n t i ve for R&D expen­
d itures on the part of future patentees,  s ince any i nnovat ion is  
worth 2 0 %  more wi t h  l everage than without .  Hence,  w e  expect  
t h a t  l everage should give rise to  add i t i o n al i n nova t i o n s  that  w i l l  
y i e l d  further  welfare g a i n s  o v e r  t h e  l o n g  r u n .  T h e  2.7 % welfare 
gai n should thus be s e e n  as a l ower bound.  
B.  Refinements and Limitations 
The foregoing a n a lysis  has i mp l i c i t l y  taken the poss i b i l i t y  of l ev­
erage as a g iven.  We h ave assumed t h a t  custome rs a lways exhibi t  
b rand loyal ty ,  which p a t e n tees can cul t ivate b y  l owerin g  prices,  re­
gardless of the character is t ics of the product o r  i ndustry.  In re a l i ty ,  
h owever, the  possi b i l i t y  and magn itude of trademark l everage de­
pend on various factors,  such as product character ist ics ,  demand­
side characterist ics ,  and the existence of i ntra-brand spi l l overs .  
1 .  Product Characteristics 
The economics l i terature draws a d is t inct ion between search and 
experience ch aracterist ics of products .85 Search characterist ics are 
"' The explanat ion for th is  resu l t  is t h a t  le verage creates t h ree e ffects:  
1 .  The pa t e n tee i n cre< Jscs Period- 1 o u t p u t ,  which l owe rs her profits  and ra ises 
consu mer wel fa r e .  Consumers gain m ore than t h e  paten tee l oses .  h owever,  ow­
i ng to the reduct iun in d e a d we i g h t  los� :  
2 .  Loyal  cust omer� pay m o re i n  Period 2 t h a n  t h ey o t h e rwise wo u l d :  a n d  
3 .  This ra ises monopolv  prof i t  ( b y  mo re t h a n  i t  fe l l  i n  Period l ) , but docs n ot 
create a ny dead we igh t  l oss bc:cause i t  rcprc:se n t s  a p ure t ra nsfer  fro m consum­
e rs to  t h e  ( former) pa t e n t e e .  
'' Sec Ne l son . A dvert is ing �1s I n form a t i o n .  su pra note  4 6 .  a t  730. 
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those " tha t  the consumer can de term ine by inspec t ion prior to  pur­
c h ase of the  brand . . ,% Experience c h ar a c t e r i s t i cs are t h ose t h a t  can 
on ly  be asce rta i n ed b y  a c t u a l  cons u m p t i o n  o f  t h e  pro duct . �7 Al ­
t h o u g h  i t  i s  con ven i ent  to  soe a k  o f  sea rch o r  C \: o e r i e n ce goods,  in  � I I � 
re a l i t y  v i rt ua l l y  <I l l  gouc. ls  cxh i b i t  a m i x turc \ , r  � t� d  t-ch a n d  e x p e r i -
e n ce c h �1 ractc r ist ics .  C o n s i d e r  c l o t he s .  t y p i  ... · :_ t ! i v  c u n s i d e r c d  <: i  search  
good . fo r e x a m ]l k .  E v e n  th o ugh con s u nH.: rs c d n  ubsc rvc t h e  design 
and color of c loth ing without pur c h as i ng i t .  t h ere arc s t i l l  i mportant 
at tr ibutes t hat may only be learned t hro ugh l o n g - t e rm use ,  i nc lud­
i n g  d u ra b i l i t y . comfort ,  and co m p a t i b i l i t y  with  other c lothes .  Once 
such factors are taken in to account .  i t  becom es c lear tha t  there are 
very few, i f  any .  pure search goods .  
B rand loyal ty i s  eas ier to cu l t ivate for he terogeneous products 
with important experience characterist ics .  Heterogeneous products 
a l low consumers to have prefe rences across d i fferent brands a long 
one or more d imensions .  In the  con text of cars , for examp le ,  t hese 
m igh t  inc lude status ,  safety, gas m i leage, and service . The more 
heterogeneous the  product, t he  greater the  potent ia l  for b rand  l oy­
alty .  In addi t ion, i f  such character is tics must be exper ienced to be 
appreci ated, consumers w i l l  be less w i l l i ng to switch brands once 
they have found one t hey l ike.ss Even for goods whose characteri s ti cs 
can be evaluated wi thout  actua l ly  purchasing them,  h igher  search 
costs should a lso promote brand loyalty .  Thus, more complex 
products wi th important  experience characteristics should be more 
amenable to the exercise of l everage . 
2. Demand-Side Characteristics 
In addit ion to product attr ibutes .  brand loya l ty may a l so  be  af­
fected by the attr ibutes of the consumers who purchase t h e  prod­
uct .  For example ,  e lder ly consumers are l i ke ly  to be m ore brand 
"' I d .  
" I c! .  
" Ce rt a i n  d rugs a re an apparent excep t ion :  Some consu mers w i l l  pay s u bsta n t i al ly 
m o re !"or branded A clv i l  o r  Tyle n o l .  e v e n  t h ough ge n e ri c i b u p ro fe n  or ace t a m i n o p h e n  
arc . by l a w ,  c h e m i ca l l y  i d e n t i ca l .  T h e  p re m i u m  c o m nl<tn d e cl by B a y e r  A s p i r i n  l ong 
a ft e r  the  id e n t ica l product  was avcl i l abk fro m compet i t o rs a t  drama t i ca l l y  l ower p rices 
i s  a n o t h e r  exam p l e  of t h e  same p h c n u m c n u n .  Presu m�1 h l y .  prod uc e rs h ave s uccec cl ecl 
i n  cre a t ing ;ut i fic ia l  d i s t i nct ions i n  t h e  m i nd u f  consu m er s  even t h o ug h  the  u n d e r l y i n g  
physical  p rod u cts t hem�e lvcs arc  not  appreci cth lv  cl i l c rc n l .  
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l oyal  to products such as pharmaceuticals out of fear tha t a l ternate 
d rugs w i l l  not  work as wel l.'Y This aversion to try ing n e w  drugs is  
reasonable as long as e lderly consumers are sat i sfied wi t h their  cur­
re n t  medic ines .  s i nce e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n  w i t h  n c \v ones subj e c t s  them 
t ' 1  somt.:: r i sk o f  harm. M o re o ve r. swi tc h i ng t o  n c: w  p ro d ucts .  e ve n  
:·; u p c r i o r  o n e s .  i s  l e s s  vct l U �l h k  T u r  e l d c: r ! y  c o n s u nH� rs beca use t h e  
cost o f  s e a rc h i n g  wi l l  b e  a m o r t i i:�: d o v e r  a sm a l l e r  n urn hr� r  o f  re­
mai n i ng purchC\ses .  Con ve rse ly . tee n ctge rs'  consumption p a t t e r n s  are 
st rongly  affected by soc ia l  pressures to confo rm with what  peers 
a re buying, and t hus they exh ib i t  more brand loya l ty .')() 
Another source of brand l oya l ty is  the degree to  which consum­
ers fa i l  to t ake their own future consumpt ion in to account when 
making presen t  consumpt ion choices .  Searching for an a l ternat ive 
product is m ore  attract ive if a superior product ,  once d i scovered, 
wi l l  be purchased repeatedly ,  s imply because the gains per pur­
chase are m ult ip l ied by a l arger number of purchases .  If consumers 
ignore t he fact t ha t  they wi l l  purchase the product repeatedly, they 
wil l  thus be more l ike ly  to  st ick with their curren t  choice rather 
than search for an al terna tive product .  
B rand loyal ty is also plaus ibly infl uenced by consumers '  tastes 
for variety. Consumers who prefer  va riety wi l l  be  predisposed to 
switch among b rands i n  order to e nrich the ir  consumption experi­
ence. By contrast, if consumer preferences are subject to habit forma­
tion, so that repeated consumption a l te rs the consumer 's  underly ing 
ut i l i ty  function  i n  favor of the product consumed,  brand loyalty wi l l  
be correspondingly enhanced . 
Many prescr ipt ion drugs are covered by hea l th  insurance, and 
are o ften provided by HMOs. These inst i tu t ions are un l ike ly  to de­
velop the same kind of  loyalty to a branded drug that  i ndividuals 
have, and i nstead are l ike ly to make decisions about which drugs to 
cover based l arge ly  on price . When a gener ic version of  Prozac be-
,., See James L. D e t tore et  a l . ,  B r a n d i n g  Lessons from Cons u m e r  M �1 rk c t i ng .  P h a r­
m a c e u t ica l  Execu tive ,  May 1 ,  20Cll .  at 48 ( ' ' Loya l ty is an e x t re m e ly i mp mt a n t  p a r t  o r  
pha rmace u t i c a l  bra n d i ng. Con s u m e rs w h o  h a ve used a medica t i o n  f or  a l u n g  t i m e o f­
t e n  b a l k  when t h e i r  i n s u rance com panies  n o  l o nger cove r t h a t  brand.  They go to gre a t  
l e ngths  t o  get  t h e i r  favo r i t e  product� .  'uch r 1 s  ca l l i ng o r  wri t i n g  l e t t e rs t o  i n s u rance 
companies and doctors.  B ra n d  loyaltv bene fi t s  arc long term. Con su me rs fi l l  ce r t a i n  
p rescri p t ions  cont i n u a l ly for years-so m e t i m e s  fu r t he i r  e n t i r e  l i ves. " ) .  
"" S e c  Eric ;\ . Posner .  L a w  a n d  t he E m o t ions .  8 lJ  G c o .  L..T .  1 97 7 ,  l 98G-8K (20ll l )  
(discw;si ng, genera l ly. t he consumpt ion o f  · · e m o t i o n - re l e v a n t " " goods) .  
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c o m e s  ava l l a b l e ,  for exam p l e ,  one w o u l d  e x pect m a n y  Hi\!f O s  n ot 
t o  C l ) v e r  P rozac i t s e l f, and pay o n l y  for i t s  ge n e r i c  s u bs t i t u t e .  Th i s  
m ay kt ve t h e  e ffect  o f  r e du c i n g  brand l oy a l t y  i n  t h e  m a r k e t  fo r 
prescr i 1; t i o n  d ru gs . alth ough o ur s t o ry wou l d  p r e s u m a b l y  s t i l l  apply 
in  n t l1<..: r m �t r k e t s  (su ch as o v e r - t h e -c o u n t e r  d ru gs ) .  M o re o v e r .  
H M O� I ll d \' re s p o n d  b o t h  t o  m a r k e t i n g  c: llor t s  by prod uce rs a n d  t o  
c c! J1 S l l i 11 L T  cl c m a n cl fo r b r a n d e d  prod u c t � :  t h c i  r dec i s i ons m a y  b e  
gove rn e d  by s o m e  d egree of brand l o y <1 l t y a fter  a l l .  
3 .  Rote uf Tcclznologicol Change 
Another  factor t h at a ffects t h e  degree of trade mark l e v e ra ge i s  
t h e  ra te o f  technol ogical  i n novat ion.  For t r a d e m ar k  leverage t o  b e  
v a l u a b l e  for patentees ,  t h e  patented product m u s t  rem ai n o f  com­
m e rci a l  val ue a t  t h e  e n d  of the  patent  l i fe .  The rate of i n n o v a t i o n  
t h e re fore sets  a c e i l i ng on t h e  va lue o f  patent  p r o tect i o n ,  s i nce sub­
s e q u e n t  technology may render a p ri o r  i n n ovat ion obso l e te even 
b e fo re i ts patent  expires .  For  examp l e ,  the advent  of D VD tech­
n o logy m ight  make a patent  o n  a VCR value less before s i gn i fi c a n t  
9 1  brand loya l ty  h as a chance t o  develo p .  
I n  an e m p i r i c a l  s tudy,  Mark Schan kerman fou n d  t h a t  t h e  rate  at  
which patents  d e p reciate varies by i ndustry . '12 For exam p l e ,  p h a r­
m aceut ica l  and chemical patents were e s t i m ated to  depreci ate  a t  a 
r a t e  o f  5 %  per year ,  whereas mechanica l  a n d  e lectron i c  p a t e n ts 
depreciated m ore rapidly,  at  a r a te o f  1 0-1 5 %  per yea r . 93 T h i s  sug­
gests t h a t  t h e  valu e  o f  trademark leverage w i l l  b e  h igher  for certa i n 
patentees t h a n  for  others .  The s l ower t h e  rate  o f  patent  deprecia­
t i o n ,  the easier  i t  i s  to  establ i sh brand l oyal ty .  
4.  Spillovers and Brand Equity 
Under most  branding regimes,94 brand l oya l ty  m a y  s p i l l  over 
across products because customers m ay general ize from o n e  prod-
· > � T h i s  s tate m e n t  s h o u l d  b e  qual i fied given t h e  a n a l ysis  o r  s p i l lo vers across prod u cts .  
Sec i n fra Sect ion I I . B .4  . 
. ,, Sec M a rk S c h a n ke rrn a n ,  How V a l u ab l e  is Pa t e n t  Pro t e c t i o n ?  Est i m a t e s  by Tec h ­
nology Fie ld .  29 RAND J .  Econ . 77 ( 1998) . 
. ,, l ei .  at 92. 
• q  There arc m a ny branding s tructure a l t e r m t t i v c s .  f\ l e ad i ng m a r k e t i n g  tex tbook 
l ists fo ur :  
l .  I n d i v i d u a l  b ra n d  n a mes: Gen e ra l  M i l l s .  for example,  produces each prod uct  
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uct t o  another made by the same firm.  For e x ample , i f  a consumer 
h ;;1 �:; a positive experience with h e r  fi rst type of Kel iogg cereal  o r  
Ford ca r.. she may be more l ike ly tu t ry a second product made by 
i, T f' b 1 , . ,.. , 1 J � b t h e  :; a r n e  manu acturer.  .t ot 1 OI <.l r tnl1 s Dra n e. s a r e  pro tecteo y 
· · 1 1 ' J j l ' 1 ' I '  1 1 · ''<' : ·: a L� n t � .  t i1 c n  mtra - o r a n o  s-�-n ,  o v e :· s :' l i 'Y� l c .  m a K e  1 t tt : e  c l i i C re n ce to 
t..J ! .. : C l  ;J. n_d CJllCli1 t i ty clecis i o n s .  E� u t  ;::. u pp ( ) ::;> .. : t h �t l  }J fCJcl u ct fi i �  IJ a t ­
:: n : ·: d ,  \vh i l e  product B is  prot e c t e d  n n 1 ;,· by <.l t r:: t cl e m a r k .  I n  th i s  
c a s e ,  consumers who purchase product  A m a y  be induced to buy 
product B a s  'vVe l l . This, i n  turn.  i ncreases t h e  patentee ' s  ince n tive 
t u  Lnvcr the price of product A .  A cut  i n  the price of product A will  
not only increase demand for that  product , but wil l  ind irect l y  raise 
d e m and for product B as well ,  as consumers t ransfer their favor­
able experiences wi th A to other goods made by the same firm_ ')) 
Therefore ,  spillovers across products of the same firm or brand 
a re l ikely to  further  the import ance of trademark l everage, j ust as 
spillovers of brand loyalty across pre- and post-expirat ion demand 
for the same product do.% One can thus think of cross-product spi l l ­
overs a s  the cross-sectional  ana log to  t ime-series brand loya l ty ,  with 
esse ntially the same consequences-fi rms wil l be led to l ower 
prices on monopolist ic (patented) goods in  order to  i ncrease de­
mand for competitive (unpatented) goods in the s ame  family of 
brands. 
( B is q u ic k  and Bet ty Crocker) under  a separa t e  l a beL 
2 .  B lanket  fam i ly name for al l  products :  a s trategy fol l owed by. for example .  
G e n e ra l  Electr ic .  
3 .  Separate fam i ly n ames for a l l  products :  a s tra tegy fol l owed by.  for example .  
Scars ( Ke n more app l iances,  Craftsman tools .  e t c . ) .  
-L  Company t rade name p l u s  incl i vicl u a l  prod uct name:  examples i n cl ude Ford 
( Forcl Taurus. Fore! Escort ) _  or  K e l l ogg ( Ke l logg's Rice Krispies ,  Ke l logg's 
Corn Flakes) .  
Sec P h i l i p  Kotler. M arket ing Managemen t :  A na lys is .  P l ann ing .  Implementa t ion .  and 
Con trol  �50 (9 th  cd .  1 997 ) .  
''' Product:> A ancl B are t hus techn ica l l y  economic complemen ts_  s ince  dQ)dP" < 0. 
The rat iom1 le  here has  no th ing to do wi t h  t h e  s tancl <t rcl s tory ar is ing from u t i l i ty 
ma�-; i m izat ion subject  to a budget constra i n t .  however. I ns t ead .  opera t ing  in t he  back­
gruund. there is  uncert a in ty  about prcJduct q ua l i ty.  in the face  o f  wh ich  consume rs 
n::: l v  on t h e  ii r m ' :,; name t o  draw i n ference� � i b u u t  t h e  q u a l i ty o f  prospect ive  purchases . 
. ,; O f  c o u rs e .  the  decis ion about  which hnmd n<l l l l i n g  s t ra tegy to adopt  is not exogc­
n u u :> .  A company t h a t  m a kes fert i l izer and pa ncake  mix w i l l  be more l i ke ly  to  fol low 
tbe fi rst s t ra tegy ra ther than second or  i'our t h .  precise l y  to avo i d  ' "co n t a m i n :n i ng" one 
o r  i ts  brcmd n a m e :' w i t h  assoc iat ions  from t he o t h e r. 
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\rVh i l e  a comple t e  theory of bran d loyal ty 1 s  we l l  beyond t h e  
scope o r  th is  paper ,  Tab l e  2 provi des a s u m m ary of s o m e  o f  the  
re leva nt fac tors that d eterm i n e  t he extent  to \Nbich consum e rs wi l l  
p e rs is t e n t l y  buy the  same brand,  even w lll.': : ;  s imi lar  alternatives s e l l  
fc)r 1 c :·� �) . 
Ta ble  2 :  Focrors Pronw ring ur Rc::runliug S m i i d  L o\'(f/ry 
-
r= [ }, lad.:et or Prod uct t l 
. -
!Effl�·<:t on Brand loyalty 
J C !J;.Jracteristic ll ' I -Homogen eous or  L i t t l e  ra t ion a l e fo r h r<t n ci loya l ty i f  al l  prod ucts  arc 
S im p le Prod uct s imi lar-for c:.:ampk. nai i s .  gaso l i ne . paper. 
Products wh ose key a t t r i b u t e s  a ce we l l - described 
" S e a rch . . A t t r i b u tes prior to  purch ase are c a �y t u  compare: co nsu m e rs 
lmpu rt a n t should be wil l i ng  t o  s w i t c h  to a n o t h e r  brand i f  specif ica-
t ions (or pri ce) a rc s u p e r i o r  to  usual  choice . t)i 
Con s u m e rs h ave more or b e t ter i n form a t i o n  a b o u t  
I n fo rmat ion  Costs 
products they have a l ready p urchased .'" M ore in forma-
t ion about riva l  p roducts (ror e x a m p l e ,  vi a Consume r 
Reports) yie lds less loya l ty .  
H abi t -Forming Prod ucts t ha t  change t astes of co nsume rs generate 
Prod uct h igher brand loya l t y .  
Consumers d o  n o t  fi nd i t  worthwh i l e  t o  sa mp l e 
Low Price Product widely as long as c urre n t  brand seems sat i sfac tory. be-
Re l a t i ve t o  Se a rch Cost cause l i t t l e  price o r  u t i l i t y  gai n --for examp l e . t o o t h -
p aste .  
Product Appeals t o  Particul a r  types of p roduc ts-for example ,  l i fe i n -
Esp e c i a l l v  H a b i t - Prone surance ( for the r isk-averse)  and a rth r i t is m e d i c i n e  ( fo r  
Customers the elderl y ) .  i n crease brand l oya l t y .  
I f  on e-t i m e S\vi tch i n g  cos t amort ized o v e r  l arge 
Fr <:q ue n t Purchase + n umber o f  fut ure p u rchases.  consu me rs shou ld  b e  w i l l -
i Consumer Myopia  i n g  to  swi t c h  b r<l n ds eve n i f  p rice d i ffere n ce i s  sm�l i l  
L rel a t ive t o  t h e switching cost ."'' 
"· l'le l son . Ad v e rt is ing as I n format i o n .  supra n o t e  -�6 .  < l i  730. 
"'  Nickulay lvl oshkin & Ron S h ach ar . Swi t c h i ng Cosis o r  Search Costs·)  3 (Jan.  1 3 . 
2000 ) ( u npubl i shed  wor k i n g  paper, Te l Aviv U n ive rs i t y ) (on  ti l e  w i t h  t h e  Virg i n i a  
Lav; R e v i e w  A ssoci at ion ) .  
"" See i n fr<t A ppt:ncl i :.: . 
l I 'r' ' c I II I D 1 megroteD 1 neory OJ r z re ecrum 1 ropeny 
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\ . -� 1 j' • • l J '  . . \ rt i C l C  .. ct n u m o e r  m empinCal stuct J e s  s upport  o r  a.rc c o n s i st e n t  
o ol: d s v n. c rgi c .s  bet\veer i  o a tc nts an_d trrl c1e rn arks i n  �-n t tch t h e  \Vay l ..; 0 � _, 
\) U i" the ory pr;:: d icts .  
A .  Pre vious Ernp irical Work 
The re is a substant ia l  empirical  l i tera ture docum e n t ing the exis­
tence of brand loyalty. 1 0° For examp l e ,  a rece nt study by A ndre a 
Cosce l l i  fi nds loyalty i s  prevalent among consumers,  e v e n  for drug 
brands t h a t ,  b y  l aw, are chemica l i y  ident ica l .  and even after con­
tro l l ing for the prescrib i ng b e havior of  phys ic ians . 1 1 1 1  Professors 
Greg A l l e n b y  and Peter Lenk also fi nd pers is tence i n  buying pat­
terns ove r time , using supermarket sca n n e r  data on a vari ety of con­
sumer purchase s . 1 1 12 A l t ho ugh their focus i s  on se l l e rs '  price and cost 
margins rath e r  than on consumer be h avi or per se, Pro fessors B ar­
sky, B erge n .  D utta ,  and Levy u ncover l arge p rice premia for name 
brands over essentially ident ica l  house bra nds across a wide range 
of  consumer products-a finding consistent  w i t h  the i mp ortance of 
, 1 I 1 J o '  oran o  oya1ty.  · 
' ' " ' S e e .  e .g  . . Kotler ,  supra note 94. at 444 (descr i b i ng t h e  i mporta nce o f  hran cl l oyal ty 
for m arke t i ng manageme n t ) .  
' " 1  Andrea Coscc l l i .  The I m portance o f  Doctors·  a n d Pat ients '  P r e ferences i n  t h e  
Prescri ption Decision .  48 J .  Indus. Econ.  349. 367-68 (2000) .  
'"' G reg i\1 . A l lenby & P e t e r  J .  Lenk. Reassess i n g B ra nd Loya l t y . Price Sens i t i v i ty.  
and i'v! e rch ancl is i n g  E ffects on Consu mer B ran d Choice.  13 J .  B us.  & Eco n .  Stat . 28 1 
( 1 99:'i ) .  
' " ' See Robert B arsky e t  a l . .  W h a t  Can the Price G a p B e tween Branded and Pr ivate 
Label  Products T d l  Us About M arkups') (Na t ' !  B u reau o f  Eco n .  Researc h .  Wo rk ing 
Pc1per  N o .  8426. 20U l ) .  Si nce t h e  a uthors clo n o t  track i n d i v i d u a l  consumers·  purchases 
u v e r  t i m e .  their work cl ot' S  not actu a l ly clcmo n�; trate bra nd l oya l ly .  But without s uch 
luva l l v .  : t  would hard to unclersia n cl how . for cx< �m plt: .  !\d\· i l  or Mutr in  could s e l l  for 
su.llst <; n t ia ! i v  m o re t h a n  t h e  h o use brand of i b upn;.len . which is  c h e m i ca l l y  ident i ca l .  
T h i :; � t u dv (s n o t a b k  !'or its scr u p u lous care i n  e l i m i n a t i n g  p rod uct  t y p e s  ro;· w h i c h  t h e  
h n u:;e br;inci might b e  o f  lower physica l q ua l ity t h a n  t h e  n a m e  bra n d .  such a s  toi let  
t i ssue and soft d rinks .  l ei .  at 1 2- 1 6 .  Profe s�;ors R:1 j S e t h ur m n a n  an d Catherine Cole 
u:;e survey cl a t a t o  d emonstrate t ha t  many con s u m e rs have strong pre fere nces for na­
t i o m i i  ov,_; ;· h o use hr;m ds.  even when t h e y  acknol·>' i cdgc: t h : l t  t h e  h i g h e r  prices c h a rged 
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B e yond the existence of brand loyalty, there are scattered refe r ­
ences  in  the  empirical  l iterature to synergies between l tJ)' cl lty a n d  
p <1 t e n l s .  For i nstance,  writ ing in 1 980, Professor F . M .  Scherer, a u -
, ... , 1 1 .  1 , • r , · , 0 · · ; tn < )r  LJt t n e  t e ac. i n g  t e xtoooJ:-: 1n i i1Ci Llstrl a l  rganiz a t HJrL ·n crt e c1 :  
{,.- , -. --,- ,-) . --,_ ·} � t �- r • -.l -- - • --., �1 1 '  ct C1 ; f'f _:.··• -. -.... L� '' ··- � n ]l '' ll (� -- t " ·)· 1 1 1 ' ("\ � 1 t"l , � --, ; �-· ' - , -- 1" 1 \  ••• •• • \._ () } 1 1 }- r_.. L i ;_  \ ..h . _  IJ i 1  ... Jl  j t L i  L L 1 t.. J. ; L ! ct l .1 ..._, � (t .J. J 1 � d t d ll' .. : ,  ! ..:. .:;�� t l i � ....; _L r. i. :.. � . l_ : 
fo r tYt . . .  i ncc nti ·v·�s  for in·vestrn e n t  in re �) C Clrci! L�nd irtrl D v �·t t i c� n  
frc q u c: n t ly .  a company's  im age i s  e n hanced by being fi rs t o n  the  
rn a rket  vvi th  a n e w  product.  and through th is  produc!. cliffe: ren � i ;:, 
t i on advantage i t m<1 y be able to m aintain a favorab le p rice d i f­
fe rent i8l o r  reta in  a sufficiently l a rge share of the m ark et to e a. rn 
supranormal profits for some time . . . .  ' " '  
Similar conclusions were reached by Professor Levin and others 
i n  a study of the factors that a llow firms to appropriate the benefi ts  
of innovations . 1 1 15 Using survey data from interviews with high- level  
R& D executives ,  these authors conclude that i n  many industries ,  
patents are re lative ly unimportant i n  protecting firms '  R& D e x ­
pendi tures ,  in part  because "investments to  establish the brand 
�arne of a patented product may outlive the patent itself. " 1 0() 
After surveying the empirical l i te rature on the causes and c o n ­
sequences of being the first firm to enter a market, Professors Rob­
inson, Kalyanaram, and Urban conclude that " [f] irst-mover advan­
t ages . . .  are important in  . . . [several] industries .  The sources of 
these first -mover advantages are varied ,  but customer farni l iarity 
and brand loyalty are important .  Overa l l ,  a m arket pioneer's e n -
b y  th e former do not  refl e ct q u a l i ty differences.  S e c  Raj Seth uraman & Crt h c r i ne 
C u k .  Why do Consu me rs P ay More for N a t i o n a l  B ra n ds t h a n  t'or S t o re Brands ' )  35 
(Mktg. Science l nst . ,  Report 97- 1 26 . 1 99 7 ) .  
' " '  f . M .  Scherer,  I n cl us t r i ai Market S tr u c t u re and Econ o m i c Perfo r m a n ce 4 4 5  (2d 
e d .  1 980 ) .  O n l v  one study was offe ree! as evidence for  t h i s  proposi t ion.  i d .  at -fL�5 n . :=5.  
h owever. Sec Ronald  B o n d  & D a v i e! Lean . Fe d .  Tracie Com rn · n _  Sales.  Prom o t i u n .  
ancl Procl u c t  D i fferen t iat ion i n  Two Prescript ion Drug Markets l l-79 (Staff Repo rt .  
Feb. 1 97 7 ) .  Moreover. ne i t he r s t udy d ra ws t he connect ion between tradcm<Hks- �:nd 
b r a n cl l ovaltv.  
'"5  Ri cl�arci C .  Levi n et  a 1 . .  Appropr i a t i n g  t h e  Re t urn s  from I n cl ustria i  R c�sca rch and 
D c v t: lopnh� n t .  3 Brookings Papers on Econ.  Activity 783 ( 1 987 ) .  
' ' " l ei .  el l 78-L 'vVhi lc ciownpiaying t h e  i mp o rt ance o f  pate n ts gencra1L· .  t h e  s l udv by 
Levin  a n d  h i s  c o l l eagues conc l u d e s  t h a t  patents  a rc cr uc i a l tc proh;c t ing i n t r; l k c t u a l  
p rn p e r t y  i n  s o m e  i n d ustr ies  ( fo r  example .  the d rug ancl che m i c a l  i n cl ustr i ,� s ) .  Aml 
whe re t rack secre t s .  rather  t h an p a t e n t s .  are t h e  means of pro te c t i o n .  our :c n a i y s i s  re ­
!ll < i ins  vcd i d .  Sec discussi o n  i n fra Sect ion I V . A .  
l 4S9 
CF ] i r:s "t - ir£ !  _ _  :· \:�:: r :-� d v c1n t 8 ges deve lc)pecl in  th �.� rn �-1 rke-rp l ac�  a rc typ i -­
c � J l ! \ (:-� \_-.! � - ·� n �_. r :_1 � a n d  long - l as t ing  t h a n  prudut� �  -p �· t i <: �rt protec­
t l o n  . . . .  ! i n  < 1'- ici l -c i un . i  t he e m pir ica l  re s u l ts i n d ic ; \ l •.: tha i  l rc tde­
,_y, . .  r 1 ·  . -, · .· · t " ('"·- ; c) 'l ot· t l'1�'-' rJ iOil e e r " " bl- ' l il d  11 " 111e 1. "' () �-,. e-' Il ; " ·lpL-- l ·I- ·L- '' I 1 't � t  � ! _ t\. }J ._ i..J ._ y _. t .t -.. l ·  ..... f - J ( - .  (1 .. , l l  1 1 1  (l . .  
\V hen c:onS UJTH.? rs relv o n  the  known and fam i l i a r  r1 ioneer in g 0 t-" � 
:E l m e .  g.0i �-� � n g  t rial  can be especia l ly  d iffi c u l t  for l a ter e n tra n t s .  
St rong b r a n d  n ames are often  m a i nta ined for l i teral ly ge nera­
t ions.  For example,  1 9  of the top 25 consumer bra nd na me s in 
1 923 \N ere sti ll market leaders in 1983 . 1 ' '� 
I n  sum.  the academic  l iterature offers support for our vie·w t hat 
brand loyalty i s  an i mporta n t phenomenon and that  i t  can be used 
in combination with patent protection to  generate supracompeti­
t ive rates o f  ret urn to firms with new products .  
B. Case Studies 
In this  Section, we offer several  examples of how patented prod­
ucts are marketed with an  eye towards the expirat ion of the patent .  
In e a c h  inst ance,  t h e  patentees have adopted a strategy of  bui lding 
market share and brand loyalty for the period after the patent  ex­
pires. Although the examples do not offer ful l sets o f  t ime-series 
data on pricing and output decisions, patentees do seem to  be cut­
ting pr i ces and increasing output, and for precisely the reasons 
predicted by our mode l . 
1 .  R o u n dup 
One of the  clearest examples of using a brand name to leverage 
one ·s patent protection is Roundup (chemical name, glyphosate ) , 
an herbicide patented by Monsanto in  1 980. 1 09 "Roundup is  the 
best -sel ling agricult ura l chemical product ever,  with $2.8 bi l l ion of 
'"' Wi l i i <nr, !- _ Rohi n:-;on e t  a l . .  First - !Vl nver AJva ntages from P i o n e e r i ng j\ ,:_: '.v rvl ar,  
:,c ts :  A Sun ·-: �· o !  E m p i rical  Evidence.  9 Rev.  J n cl u s .  Org. 1 .  6 ( 1 99-l ) .  
' "' l c!.  a t  l 7- l ;:-; _  
' '"' Sec  Robert Ste y•: r .  Monsanto Re ports Success for New R o u n d u p .  S t .  Louis  Post,  
Dispatch . Dec.  2::: . l \)C)(1_ a t  1 E .  
1490 c d .  
, r ·  7 0nr)�1 •  : ] ' 1 , • , ••• , " ' ! ' '  � . s a t e s  Lm _ u�... 1 ,  t t  o u tse ; �; UlJJ er  c n ermcais  nve L O  o n e .  U e s pl t e  
l . � . . i\ - 1 . • t 1 c m o n o p o j y  conterrec! 1 t s  paten t .  J V1 o n s a nto oegcm c m t m g  
prices on Roundup i n  t h e  m i cl - l 9ROs.  i n  o r d e r  to deve l o p  <H l <td d i -
t ioi1 Cl l  c u s t o 1T1 e r  1Jasc . 1 1 ; c :.�CHTr p�i. n�/ 1 cr�;ve.cl-· 
[ a  J bri l l i c1 n t  �) t r � ;  c) f r ·._ i t s  ct rs �:d- ·.: 
e x p i rat i c) n  . . . . " ' I L  Yv ct ::� a (.' L ; � �) j c  p r i c i n g  �) t r a tegy� · "  . . .  
case . E verv 1 p e rcen t nricc cl rc;'",,J led  t o  a 2 . 5  or 3 ocrc�  . .:: n t  incr (� c1se - " l l 
in vo l ume . "  . . . Eve'1 nwrc . fe w compet i tors are wi l ling to pro-
cluce a ge n e r i c  '/crs iz;n u [  �P.,.ounclup . . . because i\!Ion�c1 n tc) h a��: 
protected i ts  m <:�rk e t  d o m i n ance by cuti ing the price vvhi le  fi n d ing 
new uses.  This bui l t  loy a l t y  whi le  reducing the profit that  poten­
t ial competi tors could reap by trying to l ure away customers. 1 1 ,  
The company cont inued t o  drop prices as the date of t h e  p a t e n t  
expiration neare d . ' �
� 
2. NutraSweer 
Patented by Searle in 1 ()72, the artificial sweete n e r  aspartame 
was not introduced on t he market u n t i l  ten years later under t h e  
d N " 1 1 -1 L' h 1 . • h bran name utra0wee t .  r ' rom t e oegmnmg, t c company ap-
parently focused o n  b u i lding brand l oyalty for  t h e  period after  the 
1 1 " David Barboza, The Power o f  R o u n d u p ,  N.Y.  Times ,  A ug. 2.  20U l . al C l .  
1 1 1  S teyer.  supra n o t e  1 09 . a t  1 E .  
' " B arboza , supra note 1 1 0 . a t  C l , C G .  I I .' The ret a i l  p rice o r  Roundup fe l l  from "about  $44 a gal l o n  i n  1 997 t o  $34 in  1 999 
to about  $28 [ i n  2000 ] . "  I d .  at C6. 
As b o t h  of the previous a r t i c l e s  m a k e  c l e a r, the company also a d o p t t: d  n u m e ro u s  
o t h er tact ics t o  fore s t a l l  compe t i t i o n  b e s i d e s  c u t t i ng prices to  b u i l d  bra nd l uy<l i ty .  For 
e x a m p l e .  M o n san t o  macl c  tech n i ca l  m o d i f icat ions to the c h e m i ca l  in re s p o n se t o  con­
s u m e r  clemancl ,  and in  a n  at tempt  t o  receive a n e w  p a te n t .  The company a l so bu i l t  
subs t a n t i a l  prod uct ion ca pacity i n  advance o f  d e m a n d  i n  ord e r  t o  fore stal l e n t ry by 
c o m p e t i t ors. A n d  it agre e d  t o  l i c e n se i t s  p ro d uct  t o  compet i t o rs o n ce t h e  p a t e n t  cx­
p i recL making i t  un a t t ract i ve for  c o m p e t i t o rs t o  produce g lyphosate themse lves.  F i ­
n a l l y ,  Monsa n to c r e a t e d  crops t h a t  we re g e n e t i c a l l y-enginee red to be to le r �m t t u  
R o u n d up. so t h a t  t h e  h e rb i c i d e  c o u l d  [) ,� sprayed d i re c t l y  o n  t h e  fi e l ds ,  k i l l i n g  \\· ',' C cb 
b u t  not  the crops. Con s u m e rs w h u  used M o n s a n t o ' s  g e n e t i c a l ly-mocl i ficcl ( " R o u n d u p ­
R e a d y " )  sceds hacl t c  s i g n  �111 C�gre e m e n t  pro m i s i n g  to u s c  o n ly Monscm t o \  h e rbici d e -; 
r a t h e r  than gener ic  g lyphosa t e .  Se'e Steyer. s u p ra n o t e  109. a t  I E . 
"" Nancy M i l l m a n ,  K i n g  o f  t h e  Ta b l e to p :  N u t raSweel Pours on Loyal ty E ffort , C h i .  
Tri L  S e p t .  1 7 . 1 995 ,  at 2 .  
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p a t e n t  expired.  I n i t i a l ly .  NutraSwset  \vas a va i l able only to produc­
e rs .  n o t  to the p u b l i c  at  a l l .  and sold  fo r $90 per pound . 1 1 5 
l n  L 984. as Coctt-Cola Co .  <:i tHl Pe psiCo were reform u l a t i n g  the i r  
n t ' \V l \, h " l- '' "' LI I -l i l ' " rj i ; > t (YJ h s  f, · , ;n �  :>c1 CC 't 1 c'l J" ii', ·l.l. ',· e nc) '· to c' ' '� P c' lrl c'1 't ', ', C .:. _1 ._.  1 • ...._. Lt � '-- _ . 12:'- ._ , ._.. - "- 1 ( •, ..._ · ' '-- - ' ·  ... _ J _ :t v _ 
. . . n \  .. u :_; c o  I t s  gr\.)\VJ n g  C C ) I1 S l t iTt c· r  
l c)y c.-d L y b�ts·� L \ )  n � gu t i  a t e  rn c; r c  t� :� p\JS urc fo r i t s  brand .  i·-J u -· 
tr a S we d  c u t  t h e  S\vecte nc r' :-;  pr ic �.:: tu curn p a n ics t h a t  fe a t ured l lh.: 
n e w  · · J OO l'e rce n t  l'Ju traSwe e l  . .  t r �1ci e m ark swir l  on t h e i r  pack -
- J I ' .  t.. ' . d . age s .  ancl :Jcstowec, even O l !!. Q. C r  , ; JT <:! K S  tor a campa!gns  m e n -
t ion ing t h e  reform u l a t i on. " '' - � 
� 
As the el ate o f  the  pat e n t 's expiration neared ,  NutraSweet " s t a rt e d  
droppin g  i t s  prices . . . .  I n  1 989,  prices were cut  b y  3 percent ,  a n d  
a n o t h e r  6 p e rcen t  w a s  l o pped o ff i n  1 990 . . . .  I n  1 99 1 ,  . . . t h e  com­
pany cut prices by 1 0  p e rce n t .  and it  did so again in 1 992 . . . . The 
next y e ar prices dropped by a n o t h e r  25 p e rc e n t  . . . . " 1 1 7 
3. Tagamer 
I n  1 993, SmithKi ine  Beecham announ ce d  a d irect-to-the-customer 
re bate of $ 1 0  per m o n t h  o n  the u lcer medicat ion Tagamet ,  for a $20 
per m o n t h  savings over archriva l  7 a nt ac. 1 1 s  This  was appare n t l y  the 
first t ime that price cuts or re bates to consum ers had e ve r  been 
used to  bols ter  sales o f  a prescript i o n  drug. 1 1 0  Analysts l i nked the 
price drop to  the fact  t h a t  Tagam e t  was going o ff-patent  in  May of 
1 994, a n d  t h e  desire to  bui ld  brand loyalty before t h e  advent  o f  ge-
. . . 1 20 nenc competi t ion .  
4. Zo virax 
An antiviral  cream made for cold  sores,  Zovirax was i ni tial ly  
avai lable only by prescri ption. In 1 992, i t s  man ufacturer, B urroughs­
vVellcome, attempted to  get approval for over-the-counter sales ( a t  
a substant ia l ly  lower price ) because t h e  patent  w a s  d u e  t o  expire i n  
I I .< ! d .  
" ' '  I d .  
" '  Id .  
' ' ·' M i l t  frc u d c n h c i m .  A Drug P ro m o t i o n  Based o n  Price Breaks t h e  Prescri p t ion 
Tra d i t ion,  N.Y. Times.  N ov. 9, 1 993 . a t  A l .  
, , . , See i d .  a t  02. 
' �" Sec i d .  
1 492 Virgin io Low Revie 1 v  rv 0>1., o\.' 8' · 1 4 .::; .::; L � .  ' · � J -� 
1 995 . 1 2 1 ' 'Switching to se l l ing over the  c o u n t e r  �::; o n e  o f  the strate� 
gies vVellcome i s  u s ing t o  protect  i t s ren: n u e  frorn Zovirax. It  
h op e s  to be able t o  bui ld  bra n cl - l o y· a l t y  among c c m u m e r s ,  s o  en :::­
b l i n g  it to m a i n t c1 i n  sa le�,'-vhen i t s  p a t c m  r u n �; (lll ' <.t nd compe t i tor:; 
c n n 1 c  i n  to  the  rn cl r k c t . " 1 --
5. Bayer A spirin 
' 1 ·  " r 1 '' [  • • •  1 • · . .  r A • • h.ccorung to n11 ct n n  a n c1 1- u tnm,_: r  s c a rc 1 U J m :s Lory 0 1  ,�L s p 1 r m ,  
t h e  o r i g i n a t o r  o f  t h e  drug-Ge rm a n v ·s B aver  Co .--e x pl i c i t l Y  t o o k  <....-- ....______ • • _._ .) 
steps to leverage i ts  patent protect ion through t rade mark after the 
• 1 l 7 -� 
patent exptreo . -
To cou n t e r  the loss of i ts [Am erican] patent ,  the fi rm t u r n e d  to 
i ts  trademark.  B ayer  would try to make consumers so t horoughly 
i d e n t ify headache and fever rel ief  with  B ayer Asp ir in that  i t s  r i ­
vals  would h ave n o  chance . . . .  [ B ayer  decided]  to boost the U.S.  
p rod uction of Aspirin i n  tablet  form . E ach tablet  w a s  stamped 
w i t h  t h e  B ay e r  Cross ,  [ the com p an y ' s  trademark, ]  and the tablets  
were put  in  B ayer  packages,  which for th e first t ime let consum­
ers see the name of the company t h a t  c ur e d  t h e i r  h e ad aches . 1 24 
Again ,  we see a fami l iar story of t rademark leverage-an at tempt 
to  extend patent protection by means of t rademark and brand loy­
alty, and an expansion of  output whi le  the product i s  s t i l l  under 
patent  in order to i ncrease t h e  number of  loyal custome rs .  
What these cases show is  t hat ,  especia l ly  near the end of a pat ­
en t ' s  l i fe (but sometimes much ear l ier )  some fi rms do i mplement a 
1 2 1  Sec H e a t h e r  Connon,  P h a r m a c e u t ica l  a n d  Medica l  Sa les :  Companies  Keen to 
S w i t c h .  The I ncle p e n cl c n t  ( London ) .  J ul y  22.  1 992.  a t  1 4 . 
i CC l ei .  
" ' M a n n  & P l um m e r. supra n o te 2 1 . a t  37 .  
"" l ei .  T h e  react ion of  t h e  A m e r i ca n l'vl e cl i c a l  Associ a t i o n  t o  t h i :s e ffort was strongly 
negat ive .  A n  e d i t o r i a l  i n  t h e  Associ a t i on ' s  J o u rn a l  echoed the i ns u l a r  v iew o f  i n t e l l ec­
t u a l  p roperty often expressed today.  n o t i n g  t h a t-
[fjor s e v e n t e e n  years . . . .  i t  h a s  been i mpossi b l e  i n  t h i s  c o u n t ry fo r a n ybody ex­
cep t  the B ayer  Company t o  man u fact ure o r  sell  acety l s a l i cy l i c  a c i d  . . . .  N e e d ­
less  t o  s a y .  t h e  A me ri can people  have b e e n  made to pav cxorbitan t l v f o r  t h e  
monopoly o ur p a t e n t  office gran t e e\ t h i s  fi rm . . . .  N ( l t  con t ,_: n t  w i t h  t he  i ro n ­
bound monopoly which i t  h acl b e e n  gnm t e d  t h rough c u r  paU :: n t  l aws. t he com­
pany a t t e m p te d  fur t h e r  t o  c l i n c h  i ts excl u s i ve r ights  by g i v i ng the p r e p a r a t i o n  a 
fa ncv n am e .  " a s p i rin . ' '  a n d  ge t t i n g  a t r a d e m ark on t h i s  n am e .  
l ei .  at 38 ( q u o t i n g  J A IV! A .  J a n .  2 0 .  1 9 1 7 . a l  20 1 --02 . ) .  
r ' �r I I '  � 'I ' • '  1 n regrateo 1 r z eory o r  i n tei ectu n!  !jrnp err_v 1. 493 
�;uategy precise ly  l i ke the one predic ted i n  0 1J r  m ode l .  In a r: e ffort 
to survive aft er t h e  expira t i o n  of t h e  pate n t  rn a k e s  generic  com pe­
t i t i o n  i n e vitab l e ,  fi rms incre a s ,� o u t p u t  a mi c u t  prices.  ( O f cou rse , 
m ;:m y  o t h e r  tact ics are o ft e n  p u rs u e d  s im u l t cm c ously  <:'ts \Ve l ! . )  This 
i s  dcscr i becl c-1 :, <m e ffo n ' ( '  h u i ! d  brd n d  l u y<d �y--;rn ; < k ; n pt to 
: ; ·: cd.: l�  t h e  prod uct  cl i s t i ;H.: [ i v ,_: l \• � ' t tract i v ,�· lei t2 '. l lh U l·!i ,; ; :c, \\ \V i l l  
\(}t) Jl  ilC faced \Vi t h  Cl c h c a rJc' i" ge n e r i c  ;_ \ l t e r n :.:1 tiv12 .  \'/ b el t  i s  n { ) l  
s tr e s s e d  i n  the re port s  o n  w h i c h  t h <:se  c ;:t s e  �; t ud i es :m� b:-' s e d  i s  t h <:l t  
the  e ffor t  t o  develop and m a i n t a i n  brand loya l ty also s e rves to i n ­
crease overall  effici ency. 
IV. EXTEN D ING T H E  A N A LYS I S  TO T R A D E  SECRECY A N D  
CO PYR I G HT 
In th is  Part , we examine t h e  appl ica b i l i ty o f  our f in d i ngs to  trC\de 
secrecy and copyright protect i o n .  vVc posi t that despite the  fund a­
mental d i fferences be tween trade secrecy and pate n t s ,  the  combi­
n a t i on of trade secrecy and trademark prot e c t ion gene rates t he 
s ame effic i ency effects we i dentif ied with respect to  patents in 
cases in which trade se crecy creates marke t monopolies .  In fact,  
the uncertain, or probabi list ic .  nature of trade secre cy-the fact 
that trade secrets may become public at any t ime-imp l i e s  that t h e  
posit ive i mpact o f  tradem arks i n  th is  con te xt may be greater than 
i n  the conte xt o f  pat ents. 
We also predict that  combining copyright w i t h  trad emark yie l ds 
much sm a l l e r  e ffici ency e ffects re l at ive to those we i dentifi e d  for 
patents and t rade secrets. This difference is  pre d o minantl y  clue to  
the  fact that  copyright protect ion is  long enough to  m a k e  t he pos­
si bility of a d ditional trade mark protect ion in the post-copyright pe­
riod of very l imited value for c opyright owners .  Thus, vve expect  
the avail abi l i ty  o f  trademark protect ion to  have an i nconse q ue n ti al 
e ffect o n  the pricing decis ions of copyright owners. 
A. Trode Secrecy 
Originating in the m iddle o r  t h e  nineteenth century , 1 c' trade se­
cret  law protects any inform a t ion t h a t  derives ind e p e n d e n t  e c o -
1 25 
See Robert G. Bone.  A N e w  Luok a t  Tr<lck Secret  LCl w: Doctr in(' i n  Search o r  
J u:; t i ti c a t i o n .  8 6  C a l .  L .  Rev .  24 ! .  2-17 ( 1 99�·)) ( d l�Cussing t h e  o r i gi n u l  t rade sccrcl !a.,v ) .  
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n o n1 1e  /rJ ! u c  Yrorn be ing disclosed vvhen th a t  i n formation is  sut) i ec t  
• • • : ·)() -.., • 0 i t o  rc a s u n al1 i l� se cre cy precau t ions .  - l n  pnnc1 p ! c .  t rac,e  secret law 
' l l l  l l . .. . J --1 r ;_rop i ic s  to u n p d t c n t u ole  as we . as patentao , _:  m rorma t 1on.  - �. - o n -
iJen t l ·/ .  
j () r l .  
i n r·(Jrlrl at iC) 11 t ltat  fa i l s  t c )  rn �"�� t� t r ile  -c c n t �j- ! i l 'v' 
�· ) L �t n  r\_-i ( l. (: t �� k  () r n Ci \/e l ty , tlsefu_ l ness .. (_) r rl () (l :, ) r / '-/ 1 (i �L-.:. n \.: S :3 .  L> a 
r:n t e n t  protect ion , trade s e c rccv ' ' . n t s  1J tl s i 11esses  
\vi th  a c h o i ce be twe e n  Datent  and trade s e cre t r;rotect ion.  V/hi le  , I 
firm'i c a n  e lect  e it h e r  option.  they cannot  c rn p l o y  both m odes to 
protect  t h e  s a m e  i n for m at ion .  The subj ect m atter ove rl ap is  evi ­
dent  in  t rade secret l i t igation .  As one commentator reported,  most 
trade secret cases ' ' i n volve t e c h n o logical  subj ect matter-s u c h  as 
the form u l a  for Coca- C o l a ,  a process for m a k i n g  me thano l ,  or  the 
dimensions of a robot-operated m a ch i n e . " 1 "'J 
Notwithstan ding the extensive subj ect matter  overlap,  patent 
and trade secret protect ion diffe r i n  three i mport a n t  respec t s .  Firs t ,  
paten t protect ion is  condit ione d on fu ll d isclosure; trade secrecy 
rests on non-disclosure . In  the c o ntext of pate n t ,  i t  i s  the discl osure 
o f  v a l uable inform ation that  j us tifies  the soci al  cost associ ated vvi th  
the legal monopoly . 1 'n In  contrast,  secrecy is  the touch sto ne of tra d e  
secret la-.,v. 
"" Se c t i o n  1 ( 4) o f  the U n iform Trade Secrets A c t ,  adopted wi t h  �om e  m i n or c h anges 
bv ove r for tv- t h ree states,  d e fi nes ' " trade secre t " '  as:  -
i n fo n{w t i o n . i nc l u d i n g  a form u l a ,  p a t tern , com p i l a t i o n ,  progr a m ,  d e vice ,  
m c t h u d ,  tech n i q u e .  or process.  t h a t :  ( i )  d e rives i n cl e pc ncl e n t  eco n o m i c  va lue ,  ac­
t ua l  o r  po t en t i a l .  from n o t  b e i n g  gen e ra l l y  k nown t o ,  <mel n o t  b e i n g  read i l y  as­
certa inabk by proper means by,  other  persons who e< tn  o b t a i n  econ o m i c  v a l u e  
from i t s  d isc l os ure o r  u s e ,  a n d  ( i i )  i s  t h e  s u b j e c t  of  efforts t h a t  a re r e asonable 
u nder t h e  c i rcumstances  to m a i n t a i n  i t s  secrecy. 
U n i f. Trade Secrets Act � 1 (4 )  ( a m e n d e d  1 985 ) .  
S e c  2 Roger M .  M i lgri m ,  M i lgr im o n  Trade S e cre t s  � ::l .D2 [5 ]  (2002 ) ;  s e e  a l so 
B o n e ,  supra n o t e  1 25 .  a t  248 ( " " [A] I m o s t  anyth i ng can q ua l i fy as a t ra d e  secre t ,  pro­
v ided i t  has the  po t en t i a l t o  generate commercial  value . ' - ) -
1 ,, l d .  ( " ' Un l i k e p a t e n t  l aw, w h i c h  o n l y  protects i nvent ions  t ha t  arc · n onubvi o us , '  
t r : 1dc secret  l aw protects al l  i nv e n t i o n s  t ha t  con fe r  a compe t i l t v c  <Jd v a n t agc.  e v e n  ones 
t h ttt ;_t rt' not  cspcc i ;. t ! l y  n c \v ." ) .  
1 cl 
T h i �; foun ci :t t i ona i  e x c h a nge- t h e  gra n t  of  a temporary m u n u poly  i n  excha nge lor 
d i s c l os u re-is it l ong-s t a n d i n g  p r i n c i p a l  o f  p a t e n t  l aw.  e . g . ,  G ra n t  v _  
RayrnoncL 3 1  US (6  Pe t . )  2 1 8, 247 ( 1 83 2 )  (not ing t h a t  a n  e n a b l i n g d i sc l osure '" i s  ncc­
cssmv i n  urd c r  to give t h e  publ ic ,  a ft e r  t h e  p r i v i lege sha l l  expire ,  t h e  a d va n tage for  
wh ich t h e  p r i v i l ege i s  a l l owed ,  <; n d  i s  t he fo u n d a t ion o r  t h tc power t o  issue t h e p a t -
{ ; ) iPO •·,-; •,,, ,f --rj·J eQ/")1 ''j, . ft l t'ofjur{l L' (/ f p , . r > il (� ; ·t l ...' .f t � ·� {) / . •  t '- r_ , 1 1- { / -' •._.. - L- L  · · '· J I ,__� j-' _ , � - •  
Se ;�oncL th ·� n rot t:�ction bestowed bv o a t e n t  l 8 w  i s  s i gn i fican t l v  . J. ' ,.) l ,___. -
" �" r n ·· ·�·e ·j.· n·· · p·l t h : > t  ' 'OJl fP rred b v  t rade SP c r·e t 1 '.1 \V P •;J t c-' n t pro· t P C'L· l· iJ 'l . _  . .... .. ..... . 1 � 0  _.. .._ l ( l l  L • i  .... t • .._ A _L ._,  ...� - ._.. l t.. l . ..... (. t  �_ .._ ..... 1 _ J  ._, . ... 1 
bars o t h tT) frorn m<m ufactur i ng,  us ing ,  se l l i ng.  and i m porting t he 
; '1 V •·' '' ., j ' ' ' '  ., , , h .!· ] �-"  ; i i c· ''Cl teJl tcrd 1 'l h ct ·t jo '" ··;· ,.,., j � r-.-l· ; '  \ ]' ; · �  ' ,.. , 1--; ,- , ., . , r {  _: i ;  .' "· . . -J 1 i. . '-..J .i .l : 'l ! l t -.... 1 .  - �) _i -' (  _ ..  . _a._ l _  (_ \, �  l '- .t ! .._j _ \  ..... -..... i. l •. • . {  ! •. . ) \ !  l.._ . :. -.. J ( t '�-� 
n .j '[ __ ./ C: r!  1 f  ;�� C C: ;·: r t _--, :..: t i l cr c  (J.rr ive :-; ::·r t t h e  ri (�. t �=· n t c :J � ;�; �,'" ·.:; n t i c, ·;-1 1 rt C ! ·:� -
n :--_l e i-: 1. 1 y J ::'. l t::..· rn p t s  to 1Tt a r k c r  i t ,  s h r� \Vi ll  ��. t i ! �  :?<� � i � l 1) > :.: ! �l -
-;-' � - �  ; !  L-, u p·: t-=-·· r: I ·  i r� t L · r1f-; n ( i  r-� n !' r l e vt .":l l  OjJ ll"'! e r� t cl ()e S ll ,-� ! --� h : -· l ·; ,_ , -; · �- ) r : , · i n :..; ·t_ J. _._ 1 .1 • �' \.� .. J • •• , • • • t ·- _, �- f '-• 1 •. '-� �:;·� - �  ._.,. - • 'I - .._ I J -. • • • . 1 • •  '"'., • - • . • �--
? 11 i n fr i r1gc rn c �1 L �:-: :..1 1 ! .  1 11e �;rotcct 1on ;JCC!.) �:d c ci !.Jv t r�lr_L: se cret 
l cnv .  in con t rc:st .  i:;  much m ore l i m i t e d .  Trade �sc cr c 1:  law Drotcct:;  
! 
iht:: in t"o rrn ::-1tion h o l d e r  o n l v  a g: a i ns t i mpron,. c r  ;·r·,lnrcmr i a t i o n  hv 
,.1 '--' - ..  i. -' 
o t hers .  L iabi l i ty  u n d e r  t rade secret l a w  req u i res a shcnving o f  
· · o r e a. c h  o f  c o n t r a c t .  v i o l ation o f  a confid e n t i a l  re l at ion ship,  the ft .  
bri bery. m i srepresen t a t i o n ,  a n d  o th e r  wrongs.  · · 1 3: Trade se�rc t l a w  
does n o t  pro h i bi t copyi n g  o f  publicly avai l ab l e  pro cl u c ts , 1 ' ' n o r  does 
. . j . j . , I ·� i t  t or o JC. reverse - e ngme e n ng.  · 
Third, trade secret protect i o n  h as no bui l t - in  t im e l i mi t .  U n i i k e  
patent protect ion,  w h i c h  e n d ures for a u n i form period o f  twe nty  
years ,  trade secret protect ion lasts  as  long as  a reasonable e ffort is 
made to keep the i n fo r m ation secre t ,  and no competi tor succeeds 
in appropriat ing the i n formation by legit i m ate mea ns-usually by 
reverse -engi neeri ng. Thus,  in pr inciple ,  trade secrecy m ay last in 
p e rpe t u i ty. 
On fi rst im press i o n ,  t h e  poten ti al ly infi n i t e  d ur a t i o n  o f  trade se­
cret protection seems to s ugges t  t h a t  trademark protection i s  use­
less for trade secret h o lders.  A c l oser examinat ion.  h owever,  re­
veals t ha t  t h is conclus ion is  unwarrant e d .  By its very n at ur e ,  trade 
secret protection is u ncertain. Compet i tors of the trade secret holde r 
may, at  any time ,  s uccessfu l l y  overcome the secrecy legi t i mately 
and appropriate the  protected informat ion .  Altern a t ively,  they may 
c n t " ) :  Ed m un d W .  K i t ch . The N a t ure a n d  Funct ion o l· t h e:  P<t t e n l  Sys t e m .  20 .l . L . & 
Econ.  265 ( 1 977 ) (suggest i n g  t h a t  an i mp o r t an t aspect of p a t e n t s  is t h eir  i n t l u c n cc . 
t h ru ugh di:;c lusmc or n e w  t e c h n o l og ies ,  on fut u re R&D.  n o t  t h e i r  i m pact on n a nt e  
i nc e n t ives t o  i n n ovc! t C ) .  
' 1 s,: ,,· . c . �  . . Kewanee O i l  Cu. v .  B icron Corp . . 4 16 U . S  . .+70 . .f7g ( ! 97-f ) ( h o ld i n �  t h c; t  u n k n o w i n g� ctnd u n i n l e n l i u md d up l i c a t i o n  o f  a p <t t e n l e d  i nv e n t i u n  i ,; :;t i l l  i n f;i ngc-
!llt.: !l t  ) . 
' '' Sec  G o n 1: ,  supn: n o t e  1 25 .  a t  25(). 
1 ' ' Sec Rcstakment (Th i rd ) of U n fa i r  Compet i t ion � 43 ( l <J95 ):  U n i t. Tr;:dc :'.\ecre ts Act 
·� I (4 ) ( i )  (IllS) ) .  ' "  S•.?C i ci .  
I I 
I 
1 496 Virgini(/ Lmv Revie 1v  
a rnve J t  the  prote<.: tcd in form;J t ion independent ly . In other  worcl s .  
the  successful  con t i n u a t i o n  of t r a d e  secrecy is  probab i l i s t i c:: . The 
orotect i o n  n un· l ast  foreve r. or end a t  any give n momen t .  T a b l e  ?> -', . . '-
',! ' "> \: t h '- ' ("\ tJP C I < · ( l  l i fr-' c) f �' t ,· ·.·� c l ·" · · r:cre t  o-iven ' I Zt r i o l ' '. :'1 IH1 l l �• l  ,� J" ( lh-, �,... .) ·- · � ·- -- · · t ...... · --- -- � . - -- "- '-... t.. 1 t.. . .  ,l_. ..) .., • b l  '. ( . _ t ._J ·- - - - . · · - f ) � " "  
2(-,·d i t � :� ::; � h :.r:_ t h ��  S C !.: r•:: t \\"i l l  L; :� ( l iS(O\ierecl . l .�_;; ror �l n  (.l J1 i� lJ �d ·d�l -
--d- � i ! ·! :· �,_' t c ;: t -t !Jil c, f :Z .) (�lc_) t h c ! r a  cle secrc t � s e XIJe ct r�; cl h \ i �� 
t\YC l\ ' :::; �-'t2 �1rs .. r1s1ng t c; t \ve nt\' -sevcn years for � 1n annual  c1 � t ::�ct i c; :·; 
r � rte: :J f 1 7 . 5  
Table 3 :  Ecpfcred Lifi: of u Trud':' Sfcrer, for Vurious A nn 1 ut !  Pmhuh i!irin 
of · 'Disco very "  by Rivals 
Aru1u<il Probahil itv of Discovery 0.75 o.5b o 25 1 0.20 - �;J 
Expc:ctccl Life .  i n  Years 0.44 2 .00 1 2.0 ! 20 ( )  lJ_� 
For our purposes ,  this  fact  makes t rade secrecy closely an al ogous 
to patent protect i on . a t  l e ast  for secrets t h a t  are m oderately l i k e l y  
to be discovere d .  B o t h  paten t and t r a d e  secret give firms the same 
advantage : lead-t ime.  In  t h e  case  of patents  t h e  lead-t ime is ce rt a i n  
a n d  i i m i t e d ,  w h i l e  i n  the c a s e  of  t r a d e  secret p rotection t h e  lead­
t ime is  uncertain and potential ly u n limited.  
The uncertain n a t ure o f  trade secrecy creates  a two-te rm p l a n ­
ning horizon for the rati onal trade secre t holder-very m u ch a s  i t  
did for t h e  rational  patentee .  T h e  probabil i s t ic  e v e n t  of termina­
t ion should prompt the trade secret  holder to  consider not  o n ly the 
trade secrecy period,  but  a lso t h e  period that  fol l ows,  i n  wh ich 
trademark is the o nly avai l ab le protecti o n .  Thus,  even in the in­
stances in which trade secrecy bestows a monopoly positio n , ' ·'" a ra-
L" The e xpected l i fe is  g iven by [;�orx ( J -A.) ' .  where ), i s  th e constant  probabi l i ty o f 
ci 1scoverv m anv vem <t nd  1 is t h e  n u m b e r  o f  y e a rs s i n ce t h e  secre t o r i g i n a ted . 
'·'" Bcc;tuse t r;Hic secre t l a w  protects  n o n - n.ovel i n formati o n ,  a n d  be�ausc t h e prot ec­
tion accorded bv t ntcic  secrets i s  wea k e r  than t h a t  conferred by paten ts. not �:: very i n ­
s t a n u� o t  trade secret p r o t e c t i o n  ra i ses a m o n o poly problem. At  t h e  same t i m e .  t rade 
secrecv c. i so c x k n cis  t o  i n v e n t ions that  could .  i n  princ ip le .  be p a t e n ted . I n  such c a ses. 
inven :nrs w i ! !  clwosc t rade secret over patent  protect i on only if t heir  ·.:xpect<..: d rev e­
n ues from t r a d e  :)C C recv exceed t h e i r  expected revenues from p a t e n t  protect i o n .  T h i s  
\\ t l l  h appen wh•:: n :  ( ! ) patent  i n l'r i nge m ::: nts  are d i ffi c u l t  to  p rove ( a s  i s  s o m c t : m<:�S t h e  
C <1 S t:  ;,vi l h  proccs:; patents ) :  ( 2 )  t h e  patc n ll:e l �1cks t h e  where w i t h a l  to  a flurd l i t ig: 1 t ion:  
ur (?· )  tr < ldc sc:crecy gra n t s  the i nve n to r  a mon opo l y t h at i s  expec t ed to l chl l onger 
t h a n  t he s t a t u tmy patent  period.  Obvi o us l y .  t h e  lat ter  sce n a ri o  i s  the most t w uh ! i n g 
�i ince it im poses �� pote n t i a l ly gre a t e r  d e a d w e i g h t  l oss t h a n  patent  protec t i ,· l n . �mel no 
2002] Jnregmted Theory of lnrellecwol Property 
tio n a !  trade secret ho lder s h o uld sacrifice some of h e r  moncmo! i st ic ! 
rents dur ing che  secrecy period i n  order t o  e nh a n ce h e r  brand rec­
ognition and oreserve h i ghe r  revenues in the trademark neri ocl .  i::i.s .._.. :. I_.; !_ 
U, i j. ) .c!-1 n :; j- ,• ,; j· n r n i ;c. e ·l .. j. () Jl r [( P rt l P e ([ t O  1'·"' l ' i  ()l',' 1 ;- ·c; r] P j(l '-}rk· o ·r·u� 'LP I'T i () ·r ··t : n. l' ' ... l _.. ·- ,.,.,. .\ � '· r � \.__i l ...... ..... � � - "' -·- ........ • "'-' J ·· ... _..._ · ,_. - - � ...._ ... 1 '-""' · J  " ·· · "" - · 
t 1-t e �' · · r • t r r> - -· t t •· 0 ·c: ·t 11 P r •· ·1de  " f''Te [· b ·ilrl o t· > r1o n e 1·1 :., ·" '  < ,-, ·- ·r· ; , , �, .... . , ..-. " '' --\. _,  ... .., _t l_� ._ , __ c �.,. l, . .... � .' � · - '  � ....... .._ 1  ( u ..- V �  . \... "'·· \....- . -l j:· \._..., ,_ , ,., 1  ._., l l l  L V  t.J .'. '-· '---' ..l c . , l.._ l , .,. �,_ } 
poLstic(1 1 1 > . 
One i rr, ;;::_;rLm t  d i ffere n c e  betwe e n  our <l n Cl lysis of DC.lte n t  ancl ( . ,-
trade secr e cy protecti o n  c once rns t he t iming of the decision to re­
duce price::; ,  Tht: probabi l is t i c  natu re of t rade secrecy i m p l i e s  t h at 
trade secret holders wi l l lower p rices e arlier t h an p a te ntee s  \t-!dl. 
Since patentees  are assured twe n t y  years  of e xclusivity,  t h e y  wi l l  
optimally choose to price mon opolistical l y  i n  the e arly years of the 
patent, and lower prices only as expi ration ne ars. Trade secre t hold­
ers face a different calculus .  
Assume , for example,  that  Energy, Inc.  h o l ds a trade secret for a 
chemical composition used i n  solar panels .  The company estimates 
that  there i s  a substant ia l  probabi l i ty that  i ts  rivals wil l  l e arn t h e  
formu l a  of  i ts  vaunted tra d e  secret i n  t h e  first few years following 
i ts introduction.  Under t h ese circumstances, the company will want 
to ut il ize trademark protection right away in order to offse t  the 
imminent r isk o f  its secret  being revealed .  The n e e d  to  rely o n  
trademark protection e a r l y  i n  the product 's  l ife i ncre ases t h e  pres­
sure on trade secret h olders to i nvest in brand l oyalty from t h e  
start of t h e  product l ife cycl e ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  exploiti ng t h e i r  market 
exclusivity in  the e arly years as patent holders do. The e arlier t im­
i n g  o f  the price red uction in the case of trade secret  p rotection thus 
increases the e fficie ncy gains from trademark leverage . 
B. Copyright 
Copyrigh t protecti o n  extends to any original expressive work 
fixed in a tangible medium of expressi o n .  Like patent protect i o n ,  
copyright protect i on is  l im ited i n  t ime.  The first federal  Copyright 
Act of 1 790 l i mited the statutory subject matt e r  to books.  maps.  
and cbarts . 1 37 Through t ime,  the subj ect matter of  copyright l aw has 
dramatic a l l y expanded, and i t  present ly includes musicai works . ; ';' 
disclosure' i s  nHck to the public .  
'" Sec Joyce e t  a i  . .  supra n o te 6. at 20. 
;;s 17 U . S . C.  0 [ 1 )2 ( a ) ( 2 )  ( 2000) .  
- ·-----------
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l l k 1 30 l .  · l 1 j .; ( ,  1 · l 1 ' ' ' c! e ·  scu ptura wor. s ,  a uc J o v t s u a  wor .-:: s ,  arc 1 1 tectun1 \Vc r ,;: s , ·  · -
. ! -41 j r l -t ;  s 1gns,  - nne c o m p u t e r  sot lw�m ::: .  · 
Th e e xpansion of copyrigh table subj ect matter  has n o t  o n l y  e n -
, 1 l , .  1 .  l 1 • h gen oerec a C e gree OI c;u crJ C:C t  m a t t e r  C\'C !' i a p  oetween cupyng"l 
,-, .. . I . ...  t :::to t 1 ,� ' '1 '� Llt 1"" '1 '' ·1 : . -- ; �" r  · p r, .� ::\ rl -L � � .--. : p-.., ......... o � r � n c o  --. �: .._ 1. f l ,�l - ,  . ..._.., ,:1 l ­, , ;1 C f.J cLC J1 l u '  , U , u :' c. i :, u  ! t i -.. 1 .. · c. :-> <: . .. t l d G l .c i t �l i e e L . · '/ u l. L ,  c. ·-� C l l l e! L·, 
l) iCltectiort fo r copyri gi1 t h �) lct �: r�: .  Lj k e  p a t e n tees  ancl tret cle  S(� c rc: t  
hol ders ,  coovr i gh t h o !c l \� rs cc1 n n� I'v· on t rademark orotecti o n  to 1. ,.1 .._. ... 1 
maintain  a propri e t a ry i nt e rest  i n  t h e i r  \V O r k s  even after t h e  copy-
right protect ion expires .  -rhus,  i t  i s  n o t  surprising t h ;or t D isney 
tradem arked m<:mv of  i t s  f2 m o us animated characters in addition to  
copyrighting t h e n; . � -�� S i m i larly ,  Microsoft can combin e  copyright 
a n d  tradem ark in protecting i ts  s o ftware , and the I ta l ian des igner  
A l essi can e m p l oy the  same combin ation to  protect  his  i n novati ve 
designs .  
,,,, I d .  � l 02 ( a ) ( 5 ) .  
''" l ei . * l 02(a) (6) .  
'" J d .  * J 02(a)(S) .  
' " Copy ri g h t a b le des ign s i n c l ude s t a t u e t t es. sec N/o z er v. Srein . 347 U.S.  20 1 .  2 1 7  
( 1 95 4 )  (holding t hat t he p a te n t a bi l i ty o f  t h e  s ta t ue ttes cl i cl n o t  bar t h e m  from copy­
right p rot ect io n  as works o f  a rt ) .  and b e l t  buck l e s . sec Kieselsrein- Corr/ v. A ccessories 
hv Pearl. 632 F.2cl 989, 993-94 (2cl Ci r. 1 9�0) (conclucl i ng t h a t  be l t  buck l e s  arc copy­
r igh table because t heir primary o rn a m e n t a l  funct ion is conce p t ua l ly sepa rab l e from 
their  subsi d i ary u t i l i tar i a n  fu nct i o n ) .  b u t  m a y  n o t  i nc l ucl e  a n i m a l  nose masks. sec 
Masquerade Novelty, Inc. v. Unique Indus . .  9 1 2  F.2cl 663. 670-7 1 (3cl Ci r .  1 990 ) ( h o l d ­
ing t ha t t h e  art ist ic  e lement  o f  a n i m a l  sh ape s  i s  con ce p t u a l l y i nseparable f r o m  t h e i r 
u t i l i t ar ian p urpose o f  creat i n g  h u mo r ) .  or m an nequ i ns . see Carol Bamlzart, Inc. v. 
Econ. Cover Corp . . 773 F.2d 4 1 L  4 1 8  (2cl Cir.  1 985) ( h o l d i n g  t h a t  m a n n e q u i n s  a re not 
copyrigh t able because t h e i r  the ac�t h c t i c  and a r t i s t i c  fea t ures are insepa rab le from 
t h e i r  use as u t i l i t ari an a r t i c les ) . 
Besides be i ng protect ed t hrough t h e  doct r i n e  o f con cep t u a l separabi l i t y .  fu t ure d e ­
s i g n s  may be p r o t e c t e d  t h ro ugh s u i  gc:ncr is  c o p y r i g h t  regi mes.  or t h rough p a t e n t  or 
t radem ark l aws. See J oyce et a l . .  s u pra note 6 .  at 200-0 1 .  
"' S e e  Sega E nters .  v .  Accol ade .  l n c  . . 977 F.2ci 1 5 1 0 .  1 52 1 -23 (9t h  C i r .  1 993 ) ( C<trv­
i n g  out a subst a n t i a l  fai r  use excep t i on for " re v e rse-e ngineer ing") :  Apple Com p u t e r  v.  
form u l a  1 n t ' L  725 f. 2cl 5 2 ! .  523-24 ( 9 t h  C i r .  1 984 ) ( ho l d i n g  that  objec t code i s  copy­
r ig ht a b le ) : Apple C o m p u t e r  v.  Fr<! n k l i n  Com puter .  7 1 4  f.2d 1 240 . 1 248 (3d Cir .  1 983)  
( s Ltgges t ing  t h a t  com p u te r prugrams arc pmper subject matter  fur co pyright  pro t ec­
t i o n ) .  Besides being protected Lw t rad i t i o n a l  copyr ight  pro t e c t i o n .  c o m p u t e r  soft ware 
d l s o  may be protected by pa tc n t .  �ec Diwno1 uf v. Dielz r .  450 U . S .  1 75 .  1 S7-SS. 1 93 n . 1 5  
( l l,iS l )  ( u pholding t h e  p a t c n l <t h i l i t v  o i  a n  i n vent ion  re la ted to computer soltwan� ) .  or 
bv sta te t rade secret l aw. s t <J l e  c o n t r<lc t  l aw . " s h ri n k -wrap" l i cens ing.  ur " c l i ck - o n "  l i ­
cens i n g . S e e  Joyce ct a l  . . suprd 1 1 0 k  6 .  a t  J 76-77 .  
; , ,  S e e  Jessica L i t m a n ,  Mickey �vl ouse E me ri l us : Character  Protect ion a n cl  t h e:  Publ ic  
i)o m a i n .  ! l U .  M i a m i  Ent .  & Sport� L. l:Zc:v .  L! 29.  -L?.9 ( ! 99 4 ) .  
!nterzrated Th eorv Of1.  ln ie!i!!cJuct! Prou erty (_J ·' • • 
How w i l l  the  tra d e m ark l e ve r a ge :i tlcct  the pri cing decis ions of 
c op1vr igJ; t hol d e rs? 'Ne oredict t h a t  the  c o m b i n a t i on of ccmvri P h l ...__, .._ l ..1 ..._; 
and trademark might mit igate the a n : i -cornpetitive effects of copy­
.,. ;  0 h f nro·tectl" on i '1  S 0 !11 e" ('�1 r: p r  i-l l' ,. \' / L '  . .  , ., .  '_;' (" (' ,l t J·· '" t \I>) J. c ·� J1 e �'I''i rt" •'"' C"\! A 1 � I. !  - I�/ . i � ..... �- , )  ..... . ) � l. t l ' 'I; �-- �-- . � i -' ...... .. l '-' J t (_ ...... l - ..... ....-! 1 ' -·  
n ··· i · ·· -.;  "! ." ·t .... '·' sn1 ') 1 l  T j-] I" TF' �; r eo C" r' "V , ·, .,. , l l , . ,  ; > · ; : ·· · : ,· · I''r • ·, � l ·l e r l J' ffp ;-p l ' ('(' !-' C' ·· �,t: : l J ! .! � o, '.._ / 1':_ L � � [_l , • 1 . ...., _ ..._, 'L � L "--' .._) ..__. ' ,_,. l ( l • -- . { . ..- - ? ! � .._"\ , _ _/ _l ._ _I ..... \._.1 _ _  \./ ..:._ _..? /. 1 .- · / ,_ J _.. 
t \\l C �� n.  tJ8tt: rl t  a 11cl CiJ}.Jyrigh t lc v �-� r� l�C' .  f· t ·i·�-� t �  t r a cl e ri·� a r·k }J rlJtectic,n i �:� 
virtt1 Cl l l \' irre le\,Cli1t tO  111 C)S t  tvo�;s D f  CC) D V r i g_htccl Vv'O r tcs .. S iJCh a s  - - J -' • .._ 
l;ai ntings ,  sculptures. and e v e n  m o v i e s .  O n ce a fi l m  fal l s  into the  
publ ic  Jomain,  few consum ers \v i l!  p� iY  m o re for a copy re l e ased by 
the  origi nal  st ud i o  when i d e nt i c a l  copies  a re avail a b l e  on the m a r­
ket for l ess. 
Second, consum ers buy most copyrighted work for self-consumption 
only once; for most copyrighted works. there is no possib i l i ty of repeat 
sales. O nce Jane owns a CD of Ni rvana's " N e vermind , "  she can l i s ­
ten to the copyrighted m usic as  m uch as she l ikes wi tho ut b uying 
another copy. The l i ke l ihood o f  J ane p urchasing ano ther copy of 
her favorite novel ,  J ames Joyce 's " Ul ysses,"  is even l ower. 
Third,  copyright protection is so lon g as to render the add i t i onal 
protection term afforde d  by tradernark l aw virtual ly m e an ing less. 
The current copyright term is l i fe of author plus seventy years for 
individua l l y  created works. and ninety-five ye ars fro m  publ i cat ion 
or 1 20 ye ars from creation ( whi chever is shorter) for works m ad e  
for h i re. 1 "5 A s  Judge Posner explained,  " as a resu l t  of  d i scounting to 
present value . . .  , the k n mvle dge that you m ay be entitled to a 
royal ty  on your book fi fty to one hundre d years afte r  you publish i t  
is unlikely t o  affect your behavior today. " 1 "6 Therefore , b e fore a 
work is cre ated ,  the effec t  of trad e m ark protection on the incentive 
to ere ate is extre m e ly smal !.  
Moreover,  the commerci al l ife span of copyrighted products for 
which trademark protection is re levant is considerab l y  shorter than 
the copyright term. Consider software : Whi le brandi n g  certainly 
m atiers for software providers ,  copyrighted softvvare becomes o b­
sol ete years b efore the copyrig h t  i n  t h e  software expires. Thus , fu-
Sec 1 7  U . S . C .  � 302 (2000) ( se t t i ng u u i  l i1c d u r c: t ion of copyright  protect i o t l ) .  I n  
t he  case  of  .. works made for hire . · ·  t h '� e m ployer is C( l !l S i ck r c cl t h e  a u t h o r  o f  t h e  wurk 
;md i s  regarclccl as the i n i t i a l  o w n e r  of  t h e  copyr ight  u n less the pmt i c s  h ave agr,:eLi 
o t herwise. See i d .  * 20 1 (b) .  
' "' Posn ·.:: r. �.u pra n o t e  10 .  a t  '-l 6--i7. At  a 5 "/r, <tnn ual  i n terest  ra te .  $ 1  in  1 00 ve<HS is  
'.'iurth unly $0.007--less th <l ll a pt;nn v-· in  present  v a l u e .  
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t u re trad e m ark p ro tect i on gives s o ftwmc prov i d e rs n o  incent ive to 
increase saks a t  present i n  the hope o r  m a k i n g  Cl cl d it i o n a l  s a les af­
te r the co pyright protect i on e n d s .  
c�n c t l!. c l e s s .  t h e re m ay be s o n i c:: i n s t cmcc�; i n  w h i c h  i n tra-brand 
· i c '.l' • · · ·.; rr :c' ' • ; '' rl 1 J (�f' co n ·  r 1·i (> 'l1 't · ·· \N 1 1 ,-' r� t 'l ( ' ;  1 1 ·:: ' " 1. L' " ·o r) 't' C 0 1 l ., rr1· o h t e c-1  � , } , .•. \ � . - J. " t �\ 1. l._ i � � �- _., ...., t· �\ � J \.. ' ..._ '-' . ,_ . \.. - -- . L j . t '-- ,_, '- . _t· -� � 0 i L ., \_ 
., . . ,  .. , (J , . , . .. i ,: i n  r v ·rl c- 1· t n  l. l1C'" P " ' \ t ' 1 'J 1 - �t " Ll 'l u ·· : ' l ,l' t ' :  ',; : , , r c • ' l .J r ' s ·• r - , · ·· • ' \ : ' · ; u l l t e ci 1 . 1  1... , _ t u. 1..  _ _  , • � ,  , . 1 ..... ..... .._ ...  _ .,.., 1 _ cl�. _. l L c 1 1  _'; <- _; • ..  ..� 1 1 1  -� �- 1 .  �J l ._._. \. J 1_.} ./ 1 t 0 1  L .- . t  
wurks  i:\ IT � x n•.: r i e n ce good s . the nurchas i n g  d c :..: i :; i ons o f  c o n s umers t ..:.:J . � � 
v: i l l .  t o  s o m e  e-.:te n t ,  be infl ue n ce d by p a st  c o n su mpti o n  of o t h e r  
moducts of t h e  same brand . In  l iQht  of t h i s  fact . coovright h o l ders i .._, . '- .I  ._.., 
may fi n d  it in their  best in t erest t o  reduce pr ices  of popul ar copy-
righted products t o  att ract consumers t o  try o t h er prod ucts o f  the 
same bra n d .  For example ,  Blue N ot e ,  the fa mous j azz lab e l ,  may 
ra t iona l l y  reduce the price of  copyrighted record ings to entice jazz 
lovers to pu rchase the  labe l 's o t h e r  recordings . Likewise , Penguin, 
the respected publishing h o use, may not e x t ract the ful l  rent af­
forded it by copyright protect ion on i ts  current bestse l l e r  in order 
to convince consumers to  buy i ts  e d i t i on of "Th e D ia logues of 
P l ato" and other public d omain c l assi cs. So, at the margin,  con­
cerns for intra-brand spil lovers may ind uce copyright h o l d e rs t o  . . . 1 1-17 pnce m o r e  competitiVe y. 
V. IMPLI CATIONS FO R LAW AND POLICY 
Patent policy embodi es a trad e o ff between dynami c  and stat i c  
e ffi ciency . O n  t h e  one hand , i f  i nnovati ons can be fre e l y  copi e d ,  
i n n ova t ors wil l  have n o  way o f  appropriati n g  a n y  of t h e  gains t he y  
generate .  nor of recovering the costs t h e y  have i ncurred i n  research 
and development. O n  the  o t he r  han d .  h owever.  the  prices o f  t h e  
i n no vations \Vould be l ow, and e ve ry consumer who values t h e  
product at m or e  t han i ts cost would be able to  purchase i t .  
Tn t h e  absence of pat ents, the n .  t h e re wc)l; l c[ be essential l y  no 
:)t <J t ic d e R c!wei ght loss, b u t  societv \Vo u l cl i n c ur  serious d vnamic in-l_.' ,.) .I 
e ffic iencies  by eliminating much o f  the ince n t i ve to  inn o vat e .  This, 
however.  is not the balance soci e ty h as ch osen between d y n amic 
and st a t i c  effi cie ncy. Instead, v.;e h ave e l e cted to grant the p a t entee 
a l imited durat ion monopoly,  a l l owing her to restrict output  and 
chmge m on op o l ist ic  pri ce s . Th i s  e nabl e s  the  patentee to appropri-
' ·' ' \V,:. di scus�; spi l i ovcrs in the p a t e n t  c o n i <.: :\ t .  Sec s u p r<l t c :\ l  accom p a n y i n g  n o tes 
9)--99. 
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m e  more o f  t h e  benefits o f  her  i n novation, and t h ereby provides  an 
incen tive t o  i nvest  in R& D .  The downside  i s  t h a t  it c o m e s  at t h e  
CLlSt of sta t i c d eadwe ight  l oss .  s i n c e  i n ven t i on prices <rrc n o w s e t  
m cnooo list ical lv , and s o rn c  consume rs \v ho v a l ue t h e:  :xoc! uct at 1_ _, • � 
.,-,. .. ,, ,.,_, : 1 1 :·' 1 ' -�· 1 <.: "� '' '' G l. ll ') l  r··n • "l ·� r '-"  ' l" .' '' ll l ·'  t r ·· '' ' [ l' ( ' h cl" '" 1· ., I : J. '··' ! ....... .._ .• � t . l '� J l l .L C.l.l 0 - ( . �� ,__.. �) � <._l L \_, !_. l l  (l l_ l \....> .... J }_) L • _, • • (_ - -· '·� 1,. ' 
1 ttS , a n y  l e ve l  cJ f p<:.l te d t  prtJ t(� c :. i l>n i n1 p l i cs a c u rr{-.: s ·ptHlci ing 
d c; � ;chvl� ight  loss .  Imp o rt a n tl y .  bGth t h e  ince n t i ve to i n n ovate a n d  
stat ic  deadweight loss  vary d i re c t l y  w i t h  t h e  le n g t h  o r  t h e  p a t e n t  
u:: r m .  increa s i n g  dvnamic incenti ves t h us necessar i l v  i ncreases � J -
s w t ic l os ses,  hence t h e  tradeo ff. 
As we have shown , h owever,  patents arc not the only me ans for 
encouraging i nnovation; trademarks may comple m e n t  pat e n ts i n  
promoting this  goa l .  The ne t effect o f  combined pat e n t  a n d  trade­
mark protect ion is a stronger i ncentive to inn ovate than that  con­
templated by Congress.1 .JK The increased protection,  moreover. comes 
at no cost to  society. In fact,  it i mproves social  welfare .  O u r  ana lysis 
has  demonstrated that leveraged pat e n ts produce three effects .  
First,  l e ve raged patents ind uce patentees to prod uce more,  and 
price more competi t ively  than they wou l d  under  a pat e n t  whose ef­
fe ct ends a t  expi ration, as i s  tradit ion al ly  assumed. Se cond , this  ad­
d i t iona l o u tput leads to  lower static de adwe ight losses while t h e  
patent i s  i n  effect ,  b u t  higher overal l profi ts for the  pat e ntee, a n d ,  
h e nce,  y i e l d s  greater  ex  ante incentives t o  innovate t h an a conven­
t i onal patent. Third,  consumers who remain loyal  to the patent e e 's 
pro duct aft e r  the pat e n t  expires pay more than t h e y  nee d  to ,  s ince 
they could avail themselves of a compe tit ive product at a lower 
price .  This effect, however,  i s  purely  redistr ibutive :  The consumers'  
loss is  exactly equal  to the patent e e ' s  gain,  wi th  no de adweight loss .  
l hese observations have i mportant consequences for innovation 
policy .  They imply ,  for exampl e ,  that  patents may be sho rtened ,  
a n d  their attendant d ea dweight  l oss reduced,  without  d i m inish ing 
the incentive to inn ovate provided by exist ing patent protect ion. 
Conve rse l y ,  i ncentives to i n n ovate may be i ncreased without im­
posing additional  de adweight l oss on society.  
' '·' A  rc:v i e w  of t h e  leg is la t ive  h istorv o f  Ti t le 35 of  the U.S .  Code fa i l s  t o  d isclose anv 
rc; fc:re nce to trademark. N e i t h e r  the Co ngress t h a t  passed t h e  o rigi n8 l P 8 t e n t  A ..ct .  n o-r 
a n v  sub::cq u e n l  Congress t h a t  amended t h e  A c t .  ment ioned t h e  possi b i l i t y  or enh anc­
i n g  the  i n ce n t i ve t o  cre a t e  thro ugh a combinat ion o f  p a t e n t  <l ncl trademark.  
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I n  t h e  remainder  o f  t h i s  Part ,  we a n a l yze the Supreme Court ' s  
approach to  leveraged patents a n d  d e m o n s trate w h y t h e  current 
jud ic ia l  host i l i ty i s  rn isgui d e d .  We then explain  h o w  legal  p o l icy 
s h o u l cl t a k e  aclvant8ge of le veraged pat,� n ts to e n cou rage m nova­
t i n ;c \ '·.· b i L ' �- , ,cl J w i r c• de<' d W"' i o h t  IO'> '; � � _ - t • 1 • .  -.- . ._. •• l - ·- � I ::: " ._ \...- _J � •.. , 
A .  ?irfa!!s in the Suprerne Co urt 's Appro ach to L e verage 
D r iven by strong hosti l i ty to the  pract ice .  t h e  S u prcrne Co urt i n  
Si n ver t\1/anuf'acruring Co. v . .June Mwzuf'a c tu rinr; Co. l .J') a n d  Ke!!cn;f!. 
Co .u " .  Nono;wl Biscuit Co. J :io thwarted · a t t empt� at leve r agin g  p � t � 
e n t s  thro ugh trademarks by dramatical ly  d iminishi n g  t h e  trade­
m ark protection avai lable t o  patented i nve n t i o ns . 1 5 1  I n  b o t h  cases.  
the Court ruled t h a t  the generic  n a m e  by w h i ch a pate n te d  i n ven­
t ion h a s  become k n own fa l ls  i nto  t h e  publ ic  domain at the  expira­
t i o n  of t h e  pate n t . 15? I n  Singer, the Co urt e ve n  permitted c ompeti ­
tors to  affix the name " S inger" to t h e i r  sewing mach i n e s ,  thereby 
completely e l imi n at i n g  the possi b i l i ty of trademark l e verage. 153 
H arken i n g  b ack to this concep t i o n ,  the Court, in TrafFix D evices v. 
i'vlarketing D ispLays, held t h a t  expiration of a ut i l i ty  p a t e n t  on a 
mech anism for keepi ng outdoor signs upright i n  inc leme n t  w e a t h e r  
creates a rebuttable p resump t i o n  t h at t h e  particul a r  des ign i s  i n e l i ­
g i b l e  for trade d ress protecti o n . 1 5.j 
Our ana lysis d e monstrates t h a t  t he Supreme Cour t ' s  h os t i l i t y  t o  
l everaged pate nts is i l l -conceived.  N o t  o n ly d i d  t h e  C o u r t  fai l  to s e e  
the efficiencies gene rated by l everaged patents ,  but i t  a ls o  chose 
t h e  least  desirabl e i ntervent ion method.  B y  restrict ing p a t e ntees '  
abi l i ty  to leverage patents  through trademarks,  t h e  S upre m e  Court  
' ''' 1 63 U . S .  1 69 ( 1 896) .  
' '" 30.:1 U.S .  1 1 1  ( 1 938) .  
' ' ' Sec  supra n o t e s  54-6 1 a n d  accompanyi n g  t e x t .  A poss i b le vari an t  o n  t h e  S upreme 
Court 's  approach i s  to set  a t ime l i m i t  o n  the trademark protect iun a fforded to  pa t ­
en tees. Under  th i s  approach .  the  na mes o f  pre vi o us ly pa ten ted  products wo u l d be e n ­
t i t le d  to f u l l  t rademark protect ion .  b u t  t he protect ion w o u l d  l apse a ft e r  a certa in  p e ­
r iod  o !  t 1 1ne. by  which poi n t  the name would  ra i l  i n to t h e  p u b l i c  cl onw i n .  W h i l e  ht:t.tcr  
t h <1 n  t he  S upreme Court 's  approach .  th i s  sol ution weakens  t h e  v<i l ue o f· trademark  
pro tect ion t o  paten t ees, a n d  t hus.  e l i m i n a tes some ot t he  p<1 l en tcc ·s i n cen t i ve t o  lower 
prices d ur ing the  pa te n t ' s  l i fe .  
' '·' 1\.el!ogg. 305 U . S .  a t  11 8: Singer. 1 63 U . S .  a t  l 9<J . 
" Sin !;Cr. 1 63 U .S .  at L 99-200. 
1' ' :;_-d U . S .  23. 30 (200 1 ) .  
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has e n hanced t h e  incentive for patentees to price m o nopolist ical ly  
d ur i n g  t h e  patent  l i fe .  Any diminution in the scope of trademark 
protect ion av;-\ i ! ::; b l e  to patentees incre ases the re l a t ive value of 
i h e i r  D CJl- ,., 1' 1 n• I "Y' ' I n l v  a n d  !�op·eslJ O P di q al v  Fc )n' C '� • h em t o  re l \· ,_. . _. � J � ..,. v - 1 � ' - .\ , ' t • J _r- - .J " ..t ' -' .1_ t � 1 .. b ,.� . l - .. ._... ·  L .t .o • .!  
CHl 1rl cJ n O J"J !J l i �:. t i c  r ·� rl t S  t o  recc;ver the i r  i n \/e s t rn � n t  in  l< &� r) .  �fh u s .  
\ h e  n e t  e ffe ct tJ f i� hc� (:fJLLC t � S  p o l icy is ·t o  i 1 1Cr C �l ��;� t h e  ci i s t C)rt i o n c:try 
"' I('i'e r c  'rf P 'c1 t P p r  ,-, ,-,�. t <=> r t i o P  cmd cli m 1 n i s h  soc; a ·1 v · e 't f·-C) ·l- '" \..... ._., 1... \_ - J. '· ;,...- ·' ... . !:-' . \._., '· '-' ,..... " 1 ....  - l 1 l ' ........- 1 ( :. '-' • 
I n  fact .. the Supreme Co urt got i t  exactly  backvv arcls-m arks t h a t  
do n o t  designate pate n ted products should  be subj ected to h e i g h t ­
e n e d  scr u t i n y  s i nce t h e y  do not  generate t h e  s a m e  le verage effect  
as marks of patented products .  This point  l eads t o  a more general  
i n s ight .  In rece n t  years,  there h a s  been a spate of cri t i ci s m  of  the 
expansion of trad e mark protection. 155 While we do not seek to  j us­
t ify t h is expansion generally,  we wish to note i ts beneficial e ffect in 
the  con text of  leveraged patents.  To the extent that e n h anced 
trademark protection faci l i tates  brand recognit ion,  i t  is easier for 
patentees to preserve t h e i r  loyal  customer base,  thus increasing the 
value of e ach sale m a d e  during the paten t  term. Therefore,  the 
mor e  trademark law protects branding, t h e  stronger t h e  i ncentive 
for patentees to reduce prices during t h e  patent ' s  l i fe .  
The Court's m i s understanding of leveraged patents  h as l e d  t o  a 
pe rverse resul t :  While trademark protect i o n  general ly  h as dramati­
cally expanded, t he protection afforded to marks of patented prod­
ucts has been set at a m inimal level .  We submit t h a t  it sho uld go 
the other way around. Courts should grant s tronger trademark pro­
tection to m arks designat ing patented innovations t han t h e y  do to 
other marks.  
Trade dress p rotect i o n ,  however, cal l s  for a m o re n uanced analy­
s is .  1 "(, Trade dress protection covers " t h e  appearance or image of 
goods or services as presented t o  prospective p urchasers.  " 157 In  ana­
lyzing trade dress protection for previously patented products , i t  is  
cri t ica l  to d istinguish between the aesthetic  design e le m e n t s  and 
' '' See Le m k y. supra note 1 3 .  at 1 688 (suggest ing that  bv pro t ec t in g t r a d e m a r k  
o w n ns a !.'.a i nst  uses t h <ll ·wou ld  n u t  h a v e  b e e n  i n fr i n Qements  even a l'c w vea rs a go a n d  
pn1 tccting as t r a d e m a r k s  t h i n gs t ha t w o u l d  n o t  hav� ree<� i vcd s u ch prute c t i o n�i n  t he 
past .  courts  " ' ?re wel l  on t h e i r  wav to divorci n g  trad e m a r k s  e n t i r e l y  l'rom t h e  goods 
t h e y  are s u p po�ccl tc represent  . . ) :  see a lso G lynn S. L u n n e y .  Jr . .  Tra d e m a rk M o nopo­
l i<Cs_  -+8 Emory L.J.  367 ( l lJ<J9) ( a t t a c k i ng expansion o f  trademark p rotect i o n ) .  
! .'" VIc ar e  gra t e fu l  t o  M a r k  Lemley for p o i nt i n g  t h i s  ou t to u � .  
' '' R e::;t<: ll:Jw: n t  (Th i r d )  o f  U n fa i r  C u m pc t i t i o n  � 1 6  ( 1 995 ) .  
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t h e  funct ional  con figurat ions for which the util i t y  pate n t  \Vas 
awarded.  \Vh i l e  we s uppo rt extending t rade dress protection tc the  
aest hetic d\::s ign e k: ments o f  p a tt:2 n ted products , w e  oppose i t s  -.: \-· 
; p '1 '' ;  0 !1 t o·· D" , .  r. :· "t r' c1 ·�···c· C1i l l c ·r e n •·· f: U L"•' 'l t l' 0 11 r c• n: e � e ?  .:: o ·:o ; •' " i ;·· ·· . - ,  i -� ' l ..... 1. J ! ,_  1.. .l Cl L '._.. , t  _.. � y 1  J _ .. .... L '-' ! 1 .�. 1 � l_t C l \... _ ;) , 1_ .1 1 ..:.t.. . J J . l l �  ,.J _ ... l ! ;- - -� �  ...... . 
\?Jh ·"' 1'(� ' l " rJr· c ·J ! -'' \ '  :- ; ,., c' "' c·• • · t  h r r i • .. ' ; ._., 'l i' 1 n r·� er tr 1. 1" 'TP ? S f' S f�-, e l r- ·. ·. • · · -1 ,  1 . ..... ..- c� ., r . ... \.- � . l .�. t :_:: ct _.. _., _ _ _  ..., , t • - - ' ,::-� -t - - · � �..,_.., .. 11 - . 1 .) ! ,_, ..._ � c� -- '"" .._ _ ! _ ._. _ . _ , • .  �. 
8. gc c ffect , 1� r( � t e �..: t  i n  g tJCU. ( :  n l �-.: L{ Jl rt;c.l u c t  co11fi gtl ra t io 11s c 1 i rrt ·i r1 C(� t:: ::� 
l e ve rage a l togd h e r. The e ffect  elf c :< tcnding trade dress Drotc ct ion 
........ .__, .._... l 
to  natented orod uct  con fi p unrt i ons \votl l d  be to give oatentees n e r-r 1 ...... ' ......., 1 : 
petuai  exclusivity over those fe a t u res .  Naturally, under a lega l  n:: -
gime i n  which patents do n o t  expire , patentees would n o t  n e e •.i t c• 
rely on brand loyalty, and c o n se q ue ntly ,  would have n o  incent ive 
to reduce the price o f  pate nted products. 15B 
B. Relaxing the Tradeoff Between Dynamic and Static Efficiency 
By conferri ng l i mited exclusivity upon inventors, patents a ffect ef­
fic iency in two ways: They spur i n n ovat ion,  but generate a dead­
weight  loss .  The first effect is pos i t ive and dynamic� the second i s  
negative a n d  static .  This means t h a t  policymakers cannot  simply 
choose the level  of patent protectio n  that maximizes the in centive 
t o  innovate ,  nor can they select a leve l of patent protection that 
m i ni mizes social deadweight loss.  Rather, they must choose a pro­
tection level that  strikes the right b alance betwe e n  the dynamic e f­
ficiency gai n and the s tatic efficiency loss.  The current protection 
term-twenty years from filing-presumably retlects Congress 's  
judgment that any further incentives to innovate would not be 
worthwhile, given the addit ional  static  d e adweight loss e n t ai led by 
a n  extension of the term.  
Conventional  the orizing m istakenly assumes that pate n ts exclu­
sively determine the terms-or the "welfare possibility frontier · '_ 
of the tradeoff between dynam ic and static efficiency. On this view, 
I '' I n fact ,  t h i s  i s  exact ly  what t h e  responden t .  Market ing Displays Inc .  ( ' "MD I " ) .  at­
tempted to d o  in  TrafFix. M D I  sought  to  obtain trade dress protection for i t s  pre vi ­
ously  patented " d u a l  spr ing mecha n i s m · ·  used fo r keeping outdoor signs upright  i n  
i n clement wea ther cond i tions.  Denying M D rs req uest .  t h e  Supreme Court rukc! t h <:!t  
MDT's  expired u t i l i t y  p a t e n t  is  strong evidence t h a t  the d ua l  s p r i n g  mcch<m i sc·l is  
functional .  a n d  t h us,  i ne l i gible for trade dress protection . TrafFix, 532 U . S .  d l  29--30 .  
A l t h o ugh t he Court ' s  analysis  w a s  doctri n a l .  and d e s p i t e  t h e  fact  t h a t  i t  re l i •: d  un lhc  
insular  view o f  i nt e l l e c t u a l  property law t h a t  we cri t ic ized e arl ier ,  i t  reached t h e  cor­
rect  decis ion.  Our <1 n a lvsis provides <:m i ndepe n d e n t .  policy-oriented j ustificat ion for 
the rul ing.  
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cl n v  d e vi ::l.t ion froiTl t h e  current level  of protect i on i s  u n desin-�bk: 
s i n ce i t  e n t a i l s  a s o c i cd c o s L  Speci fi cally, i t  i s  not  poss ib le  t o  furt h e r  
e n h a nce c!yn<1mic e ffici e n cy l;y i n cre a si ng t h e  incentive to i n no v< t t \; 
w i i h :-·· P i �-, j ··· , -1 i ·1 e n' ·< · · i ··1 u S ' Y  .. ; CJ. l  f\ e ;; r! 'vD i o !-· •  l oss 110'' ; s i t  · •1 1 ) . . . .  ; 't·-. i · ·  ; . ,  · • � � � A •_r ._ ;, �  - ·  ,') \_ . !  "- � ·- (t,:) l 1  � � \._ � .t ( l - _, .._ , .. � · • \- • ,:::. l l . � ,  1 i� ._ � '- J.") !  ! . \_. -. \. ,  
L��\\  .. �� -� - : ) \�)c i  cl i tJe a ch.,:,·c i ?. h  t l �J��s by· s h � ;  i·t c  n i ng pc1. ten t :; \Vi t h c� u r� s ·i �-r: u i  -
' : •  • ' ! ' 
;I_ d n ..-� ( : 1. 1_ :; 1 \/ �..i 1 n 1 1  1 1 1 :� n 1 n g 
('• ' ' ; · ,-, -.-, .-, i .  ; c- :  r; ,, f 1 p '  . ,_,- ·0 , , ,. ,1 ._..., ' ] J f '  n r· , . ll • ' ''' ') 'lS t i' ' j lp�- • 1- n ·> ; }· (> ''(•······ ,. ,, L' ._ j .._ t ... -:.•_ ! � (  • .  : _'! - ' 1 .; \. l t _ .  .,.., •.1 1...- !. Cl f::::. "-' ' -1 l .J (_ . .  , ... 1 ! .) ........ ! ! ! \.  1 c . ... ...... J t J l r_t \. J. I ,  ... L - j  I ! 1 .) , , 1  
• h e  trwl e off J-,e iwet� n  dyn a m i c  <mel s tat ic  e ffi c i e ncy are n ;! t  as r e ­
strict ive Z� S previously thought .  A s  we h ave shown,  traclern c nk pro­
tect ion c a n  incre CJ.se the payoff to pate n tees ,  and t h ereby e n h a n ce 
the ince n t i ve to i nn ovate,  wh i le reducing t h e  deadweight l oss ge n ­
erated b y  patents .  B y  relaxing the trCJ.deoff between s t at i c  a n d  dy­
namic effi c i ency, leve raged p atents shift o utwards t h e  possi bi l ity 
frontier  del ineated by patents .  Consequently,  the y  cre ate new 
combinat ions of incenti ves to i n n ovate and de adweight  loss  that  
are unava i lable under  d iscrete patent protect io n .  
F o r  example,  the outward shift o f  the  possibi l i ty fron t i e r  makes 
i t  poss i b le to sh orte n  patent  terms without  any dynamic effi c i e ncy 
s acrifi ces .  S ince leverage d pate nts h av e  higher profi ta b i l i t y  than 
non-leveraged patents ,  the term of protection for leveraged patents  
may be short e n e d  without reducing incentives t o  i n n ovate be l ow 
those contemplated by Congress for a non-leveraged patent .  As 
long as the drop in profits due to the shorter patent  term is lowe r  
than (or eq ual to)  t h e  g3.ins fro m  trademark protect ion,  shorte ning 
p a tents  would n ot adversely affect  dyn a m i c  efficiency;  i t  would at  
the same time lovver the stat ic  de adweight l oss caused by patent  
protection. 
Conversely,  leveraged patents e n ab l e  policymakers to i m prove 
dynam i c efficiency while maint a i n i ng stat ic  deadweight  l oss at the 
level of ordin ary patents .  Given that  the stat ic  deadweight  loss of 
l everaged patents is smaller th a n  that of non-l everaged o n es . poi i ­
cymCJ.kers might 'vv ish to increose t h e  protect i o n  t e r m  for leve raged 
patents .  S ince society is  wi l l ing to put up with deadweight loss of 
non-leveraged patents,  the d uration of leveraged patents  may be 
extend e d  un t i l  the c orresponding de adweight loss equals  that  of 
non- l e verage d p c:rtents .  Exte nding the durat ion would i ncre2se the  
e x :,o r ·t' "� ...-1 r " ! mn on i nnovation . and thereby spur Q.re atc; ·  i n- 'i,. ' C ", t. -. •  r.J �.,....- ..,. .�.,.,.., ·_l - \...- - � ........., ... � - • 
ment i n  i\ &D. 
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Figure 1 i l l u s t ra tes  the argu me n t  gr21 pb ically I t  shows that for a 
st andard p a t e n t  ( n o  l e verage ) there i �; a trad e o ff be t vveen patentee  
p rofi t s  ( incent ives  t o  i nnova te )  a ncl :s t a t i c  de;-1 d vveight  l o s s .  To g ive  
t ll e' p;'' 'L. P ll t e e  1J1 i o h e r  ;-J r c fi t<; ')IP h ;:: \1 • ' ;- n 1 • ' ' P u t 1l ' ' il i l! P  T' 'lt �" 'l t  � !  ' ..._{_ _. • ...... � � i i ...... J. t ..1 .1. - � � ' ._., _, • • • ......... ,_ ""-- ' t ·� . -' .:_::, 1 �- .• � .t �-- .r-' (. ......- l 
\Vl1 ic f1 i ncre (�-t s c �� t �- -l ;_�: d 1J ret t i cJ 11. t h c L e t�; l " s  r. -; e_) q_ rJ T)C) 1 '/ l 
terrn � 
As pre vious  cl i scu :� sc cL h o\V<C::: V t� r .  t h e  C \ i  ; !t.: i! '� t; l e ve rage d 
t h , , , ' f  . , . , . �  ,. t ' " k "  . paten s p u s  . e s  o u c  _ n e  - - we t a re possJ m t lLY :_ r o n  J C L  n1 a , : m g  pos s i -
b l e  a r a n g e  of n e w  a l ternat ives ,  a l l  of w h i c h  offe ;· both l a rger i ncen­
tives to i nn ovate and smal ler  cleadvvc i g h t  l oss t h an a stan dard p at­
e nt .  Hence , any point in the area forme d  by A ,  B ,  ;_md C represe nts 
an u na mbiguous w e l fare i mprove m e n t  over the  in i t ia l  p o i n t  A 
(which represe nts a non- leve rage d twenty-ye ar patent) . For e x a m ­
p l e ,  a 2 1 .5-year leve raged patent h as t h e  s a m e  de adweight  l oss as a 
twenty-year stanclard p a t e n t ,  but  highe r patentee profits .  An e ight­
e e n -year l everaged patent has t h e  same i ncentives to i n n ovate  as a 
twenty-year standard pate n t ,  b u t  smal ler dead-weight  loss.  
2002] fnregrored Theory of lnre!lecwol Property 
H igh 1 
Patentee 
Profi t  
Low 
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P rofiy _ ______ ___ __ _ 
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F I G U R E  1 :  " W ELFA R E  POSS I B I LITY F RONTI E RS "  FO R PATENTS WITH A N D  
WITHOUT L EV E R A G E  
Table  4 provides a numerical example .  I t  shows that  as com­
pared with a convent ional  twen ty-year pate n t .  a leveraged patent  
of  the same length generat e s  2.8% h i gher profi ts and 9.4% less  
de adweight l oss i n  n e t  present  value terms.  To red uce stat ic  i n e ffi­
ciencies whi le  mainta i n i n g  t he origi n a l  leve l  o f  profi tabi l i ty,  poli­
cymake rs could cut the patent  length t o  roughly 18 years,  d i mi nish­
ing de adweight loss by almost 13 % ,  while keepin g  the patentee's  
p rofits the same.  Alte rn a t i v e l y ,  to raise  incentives to i n n ovate 
without i n creasi ng stat ic ineffici ency, the patent term could b e  ex­
ten ded t o  approximately 21.5 years,  thereby i ncreasing i ncentives 
to  i nvest in R&D by 1 0 . 7 % .  v1 h i l e  l e aving deadweight loss s light ly  
below that  of  a conve n ti o n a l  p<ttent .  There i s  s uch a thing as a free 
lu nch ! 
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Tabk .:1- :  Im t 0 1 't![ion lncemive ol l l l  Decullveiglu L oss Un der Con venrionu! (S: 
l . evcroged Patenrs, .Jc 7r A !rerwuivC' Fu rcn r l. cngrl ts ' ''· 
n=-­" 
i i ( � 1 11 "\'CB! i '. l !l « l  
ii -�---,-===--.:=.- -==..::....-...:.==--=-�-=--= 'i [--== - "= ==-c·_. ----+- --- -��-� �_:c_�'_r' _1��-��·��·�L--�� '- ·-· : :�J������·� � i r ·: j 
I I 
- - -· 
N P V  !i''aien kc'�  Pw\its I :?. 1 .28-+ I 2 1 . ��7 1'\ 2 L275 2-+.:'ii J:'i I I I I 
� , . I' 0 _l ---j Pt:rce n t  l n..:���·a�.e - l { l  7 ! 
'� , ,� 
. . .  I vs. Col.  1 ' ----; 
N!PV Deadweight loss 1 0.1142 1 0.452 
Percent Decrease - � -+ �N I 0.02 vs. Col. 1 
C. Tailo ring ond Defoults 
An obvious problem with t h e  foregoing ana lysis i s  that i t  as­
sumes that  pol icymakers can determine which patents are subject 
to  trademark l everage and ta i lor the i r  responses accordingly. In re­
a l i ty ,  po licymakers may often be u nable to do so .  The s ta te  of cur­
rent theorizing i n  th i s  area i s  very unsat isfactory, and as our e ar l ier  
d iscussion makes c l ear, 160 we l ack  the abi l i ty to make accurate pre­
dictions about when  brand loyalty,  and hence trademark leverage , 
are l i kely to be important .  One should be wary of any t heoret ical 
improvement  that requires superhuman pol icymakers or  unfe as ib le  
i nformation to  make i t  more eas i ly  implemented.  
This does not mean that  our findi ngs are of no policy relevance,  
however. We suggest that i n format iona l  constrain ts can to  some 
extent be overcome by a llowing patentees to  ta i lor their own pat­
ent or trademar k  protect ion from a menu proposed by regulators . 
Technical ly ,  we propose a separat ing equi l ibrium,  in  which po l icy­
makers can induce patentees to behave opt imal ly  even when pat-
1'" Based on A ppend i x .  assuming myopic consumers < tncl p ar a me t e r  V<t i ue s  u = l OU . 
/J = I .  S = I 0. r = 0 . 1 .  
' ' " ' See supra tc:-;t  accompanying n o t e s  S5-99 .  
I 
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:.: n tees h a ve p r i v a t e  i n format ion ( about  t h e  e x t e n t  of l cv�.: r::! ge ) t h at 
1 1 j i u l  rcgu <H o rs C.1 0 n o t  <: n ow . 
For '.: -c a m pl c .  suppose t h a t  p o l i cym a i� t':: rs ck· i e r rn i n ·-� t h <:rt t h e y  
l I ! I . 1 I I ' ' l . • \V a n t e ct t o  re c uce c c a c  we t g n t  oss oetow t n �tt c D nlern p : : i �e ;_i u n o e r  
k t: c p  pc t te n tc e · s  i n ce n l i vc s  to i n n o v<l t c  at  c u rr<. :rJ t l e v <..: : :; . · : ·u..: \ cuu ! d  
t h e n  o ffe r p a t e n t e e s  a c h c i cc be t we e n a patent  l z1 s t ing l ·:. _· n t 'i :.n-s 
w i t h  no t radem ar k i e vercwe a n d  a l e vc ra �e d natc n t  :; f c i Q.hteen ._... ..___ 1 ·--· 
ve ars .  As Table 4 cle n w n strcl t e s .  t h e se t w o  sch e rn e s  n ru d u cc t h e  -' ,· ! 
s a m e  pro fi ts for the p a t e n tee when l e ve rage i s  poss i h k .  F u n h c r-
m ore , for those cases in which patentees re cogn ize t h a t  t h c v  8. re 
n o t  in a posit ion to exp l o i t  leve rage , l ( '2 they w i l l  s imply choos� the  
s t an dard patent  term ( w i t h  n o  trademark pro t e c t i o n ,  which w o u l d  
be v a l ue l ess to them in any case ) .  
A comparison o f  co l um n s  1 a n d  3 i n  T a b l e  4 reve a l s  t h a t  this  
' · t a i l o ri n g' '  approach guarantees  that  a l l  pate n tees  wi l l  h ave at least  
t h e  level  o f  protection contemp lated by Congress  ( co m p ar e  col­
umn l,  row 2 with col umn 3 ,  row 2). For those patentees  who ex­
p l o i t  trademark l everage, deadweight loss is reduced by alm ost 
1 3 %  comp ared to conven t i o n a l  patents .  Policymakers do not  have 
t o  know whether patentees p l a n  to  explo i t  trademark leve rage or 
not. By offering a m e n u  of  ch oices,  patentees can b e  i n d u ced to  se­
lect the option that reduces deadweigh t l oss by as m uc h  as possible 
without  sacrificing i n ce ntives t o  i nn o va t e .  
There a r e  t w o  p roblems with  t h is approach t h a t  rnust b e  noted.  
First ,  a l though pol icymakers do n o t  need to know which fi rms or 
i n d ustries wi l l  exploit  trademark l e verage and which wil l  n o t ,  they 
d o  need to k n ow t h e  relevant  p arameter  values underlying the pat-
' " ' P rofessors M ichael  Rothsch i ld a n d  Joseph S t i g l i t z  we re t h e  f irst  to descr ibe a n  
el; ui l i br ium i n  w h i c h  one p a r t y  ( the  ins urer) i n d uces se parat i o n  be tween twu u n ­
k i�own t y p e s  ( o f  insureds ) by o ffer i n g a m e n u  o f  cont racts t h a t  l e a d  e a c h  type t o  
ch oose a d i ffere n t  contract .  See M i c h a e l  R o th sch i l d  & J o s e p h  S t i g l i t z .  E q ui l i b r ium i n  
C o m p et i t ive I nsurance Markets :  A n  Essay o n  t h e  Econom ics o f  I m pe rfect I n forma­
t i on . 90 Q.J .  Econ.  629 (1 976 ) .  Professors I a n  Ayres and Robert  G e rt ne r  i n t rod uced 
i d eas o r  poo l i ng and se parat i ng e q u i l i bri a i n to l cge� l  t h eory .  Sec l <m ,�'. Y!L'S  & Rube rt 
G e rt n er. Fi l l i n g  G aps i n  I ncom p le t e  Con tracts :  A n  Econum i c  T h ,; u ry o r  D c i"a u l t  
Rules .  9 9  Yale  L.J .  8 7  ( 1 989 ) .  
, , ,. As w e  expla i n e d  e a r l i e r. i n  S e c t i o n  I J . B ,  not a l l  p rod ucts arc c q u<l i l v  " " l c vc r<lge­
abk . . . Pres u m a b l y .  pate n tees  h a ve b e t t e r  i n form�i t i o n  t h a n  reg u l a t o rs <i ho u t  whether  
t h e y  p l a n  to expl o i t  brand loyal t y  i n  market ing t he i r  pat c n t c cl i n iHW<i t i o n .  a n d  i f  su .  
h o w  much.  
1 5 1 0  Virgin in Law Rc viel  v 
e n l c .c; · :_; d e c i s i o n  probiem,  i n cluding t h e  s i ze of switching costs ,  i n ­
te n:- ::; c nl t c s .  a n d  t h e  s l o p e  o f  the demand curve . This i n fo r m a t i o n  i s  
i nmcrl :.: :1 t because i t  d e term i ne s  t h e  Dro h tabi l i t v  o f  t h e  ! e ve r C\ Q.e d  •. ._ ..1 ...._,. 
pate \ > \ :_: :-� d h e nce :-;t: t s  the  patent t e r m  that  pro v i d e s  e q u i v a l e n t 
t ]_ ',- ·.< 1 ': ' �  / "l \l (..:• 7""1 t \i -- l -'t ; �  r t (-> ?"l1''[ v r i  l h n (l ! r:• \ I t  l ! " � \ '�} e  _ '- · • , I. � \_- , _t - ' •\ _, � _ -� • > • i . J I � • ""' •  . •  .::-- • 
-r · �·i 1 · :. ·i l e n: i s  n c! t  8S ser ic) Lts as i t  fi i·st s e e n1 � - h c) \Vt� ',./ �.: r .  �� u r' rJc�se 
l > '  1 • .;.. I ' _ .t' t 1 . ] i • t n ::! t  pr: : ; \:y rn : : f� e rs a re compi e l c l y  1 g n c r::m t  0 1  ne u n o ;-� r; ym g  p+ 
raiTl C Y ::: :·:c a n d  offe r p a t e n tees a ch oice betwe e n  ninetef�n ye a rs of 
pate n L  �Yotect ion 'vvi t h  tradem ark protection o n  expiration or twenty 
years ·xi t h  n o  tradem ark protection.  Some pate n tees  who s e l e c t  the 
first opt ion would h ave to be w i l l i n g  t o  give up an addit ional  year 
o f  protection ( as i l l ustrated by Table 4) ,  so the policy does not 
ach i e ve the  m i n i m u m  fe as i b l e  d eadweight loss .  N evert h e less ,  i t  s t i l l  
redu ces cl e <:\dweigh t l oss  as compared with  t h e  status q u o  a n d  
h b .  
. J ()'\  
ence represents an unam tguous I mprove m e n t .  -
A m ore s ign i fi cant  d i ff ic u l t y  i s  t h at t h e  m e n u  approach only 
works i n  o n e  direct i o n .  Suppose t h a t  pol icymakers wish t o  provide 
m o re i ncent ives to innovate t h an c urrent ly  contemplated under a 
n o n-leveraged twen ty-year patent .  Table 4 reveals  t h a t  w i t h  lever­
age,  patent  terms could be extended t o  2 1 .5 years witho u t  i ncreas­
ing deadwe ight  loss over a t we n ty-year convent ional  p a t e n t .  This  
would have the effect o f  i ncreasing patentee profi ts by a l m ost  1 1 % , 
as i n  column 4. There is ,  however, n o  way to offer t h i s  opt ion o n ly 
to  those firms that  wish to exploit  tradem ark leverage .  A l l  f irms 
wil l  prefe r  a 2 1 .5 -year paten t t o  a twenty-year patent ,  regardless of 
whethei' they wil l  u t il ize trade m ark leverage o r  not.  But if the pat­
entee does not  ut i l ize leverage (and, thus, cuts  prices w h i le the pat­
ent  is in effect ) ,  then the l onger patent term unambiguously increases 
- , -
l 
l J (,� 
deaelwerg 1 t  oss .  
VI.  OBJ ECT I ONS A N D  A D D ITIONAL FA CTORS 
In t h i s  Part ,  we discuss three add i t i o n a l  factors that m i gh t  c o m ­
plicate the  s tory we want to t e l l  a b o u t  t h e  importance o f  tradem ark 
' " ' A si m i l a r  � i rgu m e n t  can be made i n  reverse : I f  po l i cy m a k e rs set  the l e v e rage­
i n clus ive  p�i l c ll t  t e r m  l o o  l ow. n o  f irms would pre fe r  th is  a l t e rn a t i ve t o  the s t a t us q u o .  
B u t  t h i :-: :; : m p l y  leaves us where w e  started ancl clocs no harm. 
' "J Tnick m a r k  l eve rage is  thus l ike a s t r ing: I t  can be usecl to  pul l  p a t e n t e es in one 
cl i re c t iun ( s a m e  profi t s  b u t  lower deadweight  l oss ) . but not  t o  push them i n  t h e  o t h e r  
( h igher profi t s .  S<t me de adweight l oss) .  
ievt:rag,�: s n c� ��rc1 n cJ f t,.))/a l ty as �1 Stl iJpler11ent  t o  patctt t  protecti t)Ti . 
D o- c-..:: ; ,  ,�' 'l n ·'-". t 'l-1 ' 1 �  � -j ,--,ll S r ·� n S e '' K  tel , · J e , p l o r�J h ,- . l ll r1 ] (·· ,,r · 1 1 1 " 't)\ __ ' �� � - i.· __ . .._, ._) l .._ l 1 ! L 1... ..._ C J l . ( l 1.- l. '- I 1 .. \., C. .I. 1 l. � l - . .._t Y .,_,. t V 1 ( "'-' -" ) (-�. ! t.} "' -� -
, , ,_, ,-t j ·� i n ct r �l �)' • ' '. i h : : n  b v  i , Y[) (:l iYJ i n a  OUt"O l l t  ch p--; ,.i G t ly' p ;.:> t p n t ·o <" -, '--' >. (,. u � � -:=• , ._ .._ � '--' ·' � • • .._. � -' _,. '- J ' "'- • • •  ::::> .L - ") l � .' . .1. i ::_::. - a "- . t \. ..._, I l \. t """' 
r i u ci ?  1, ) \V >; t � ·1_ t� 1 n t rc)c1 uc t i cn-1 C)f cl iscotln t i n g:  cl n cl rn Ld t i o J. e  r l --·- _;_ 
i r; _1::: t h ; t t ,  ---� -t L.: ;_ts !� fr) r c e r t a i n  lJ h a r rn :: i (>-�- �-� ;_ l �. : � d :- < p r ; r_: ; >�; ! n  
rc� �i .l i tv rl s [���-:: t t h � �- r l- � :\ n LJ 1 1�tJ n t h e  e xpira t i rrn (J f T h t: r,r_t t �_-:- : ·� �- -? 
A .  A d1 'ertisin r;; L 
In the  r e ,: l  wodcL p a t e n tees  cl lways h ave t h e  opti o n  trying tCi 
bui ld brand loya l ty  by advertis ing as well  as ,  or i nste 8d of. cutt i n g  
prices a n d  d e ve l oping a b ase o f  experienced u s e r s .  How does t h e  
oossi bi l i tv  of <:tclvert i s i n g  affect our conclus i ons? 
< � � 
One possibi l i t y  is that  advertising could subs t i t u t e  Co r gre a t e r  
output as a m e t h od of cre a t i n g  brand loyal ty .  I f  pate n t  holders r e ­
spo n d  to t h e  possib i l i ty o f  trad e m ar k  leverage by a t t e m p t i n g  to 
cre ate loyalty t hrough i ncre ased advert is ing,  rather t han through 
i ncrease d sa les,  then the e fficiency gains we described ear l i e r  may 
not be realizecl . 1 r,, \:Vh i l e  t h i s  i s  certainly a possi b i l i ty ,  vve a rgue th z;t 
nei ther  the theor y  n o r  the e m p irical  evide nce support t h i s  view.  
We turn fi rst to conside rat ions of theory.  In a c lassic  artic le  writ­
ten nearly fifty years ago,  Profe ss ors D orfman and Ste i n e r  devised 
a simple formula for the opti m a l  ratio of advert ising expenditures 
to total sales of a product . 1 6r, Their equation says that the opti m a !  
advertis ing/sa les  rat i o  i s  
where Tl" i s  the e l ast ici ty of quan t i ty sold with respect  to advert is ing 
an d 77,, i s  the convent ional  pr ice e l asti city of clemand . 1 b7 
' ''' On t h e  b <1 s i s  o i' t h e i r  asy m m e tr ic  in form at ion model o r  consumer S<.:arch custs.  
Mosh k i n  :mel Shach a r  s uggest t h a t  t h e  growth i n  t h e  total  vol u me of p rod u c t s  ava i l ­
a b l e  i n cr C <ISeS " " i n d iv iduals "  i gn oran ce o f  t h e  a t t ributes of t h e  a l te r n a t i ve [ rmHIUC[ �; 
t h e y  do n o t  consu mo: ] .  The i r �cre asc in ign orance is t he asse t o f  t h e  l arge m;d e sl<1h­
l i s h c d  fi rm�.  1\ d\erlis ing  rather t han p r i ce c u t s  are t h e  pene t ra t i o n  t ool  o f  n e w  ii rm:; 
and t h ose w h i c h  : l rl� grow t h - or i e n ted . . .  Moshkin & S ha c h a r. supr<i nute SiS. e�1  .: �·; _  
These bru<! (l con c l u � i c l l 1S  1 <1Ck  e m p i ri c a l  s u p p or t .  h owe ver .  
,,.,, Dmirn d n  & S t (: i nc r.  supra n o t e  1 8. at 828. 
'"' ! d .  T(: c h n icci l \ y .  iJ., i ,; the percent  ch ange i n  q u a n t i t y  d e m a n cl e d  Cro m a I ' 1� i n ­
cre<ls� i n  a d vertis i ng. w h i l e  7)1, i s  t h �  p e rce n t  c h a nge in  q u a n t i ty cie nw n cl c d  !"rum a 1 'y,, 
dccre<1:;c in pr i c •: .  
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>· !1 ir' t  C� c) l ] (-l i. :� fl C il t )' .  a n c{ l h�� l c ::, � ( ·: iv r: ctrt t l n g  lJrices are ( � .__ l 
< n w l i e r  t i1 e  rn ove m e n t  a lom! th r:: ,._i ;:; nE1nd c u r v e  oer dollar d r o o  i n  .__ 1. .t 
pri::::c ) . the better the a dvert i s i n g  b r:J k s  re l ative t o  cutti n g  prices .  
i o apply the Dortm a n/S tc i ner i ns ight  in om context, we begin 
by noting t h at the case for trade m ar k  leve rage is strongest for ex­
pe rie nce goods. wh ich,  as we s tated e arlier,  are products w h o s e  at­
tributes cannot b e  appreciated e xce pt through actual consumption.  
But the more a product resembles  an experi e nce good , the less 
l i kely i t  would be that  advert i s i n g  could substitute for actu a l  use of 
t h e  orocl uct in cre ati n £  n e w  d e m a n d .  I n  the D orfm an/Steiner ter-" �' 
mi nology, r],-the efficacy of adve rti s i ng-should be l o w  for ex-
peri ence goods. It  fol lows that  patentees would be more l ikely to 
develop brand loyalty by i nducing addit ional  use ( incre asing quan­
tity and decreasing price ) ,  rather than by expanding advertisi n g .  1 0� 
iVIoreover, we would expect to see m ore price-cutting a n d  less 
advertising for those products where leverage is  stronge s t .  Even i f  
w e  assume that  l everage h a s  no effect o n  t h e  e fficacy of  advertis­
ing, the fact of  leverage i ncreases the l ong run price e lasticity of  
demand.  Th at  is ,  a g iven drop in price has a b igger effect o n  total  
q u antity demanded over  the two periods with l everage t han with­
out i t .  Hence, n o t  only does leverage make the numerator of the 
Dorfman/Steiner rat io smal ler, i t  plausibly makes  the denominator  
1 araor·  b\_, . 
In sum, patentees should e ngage in less advertis ing p e r  dol lar  of  
sales  with leverage than without i t .  Regardless of whether  advertis-
; "' The pioneering work of P h i l l ip Nelson demons trates tha t  advert is ing may be a 
cred ible sign a l of prod uct q ua l i t y . even for " e xper ience goods" for w h i c h  i mportant  
q u a i i t ics  are  cl i scernab\e  only by d irect consu mption o f  t h e  go od . See Nelson.  Adver­
l i s ing as I n form a t i on .  s u p ra note 46. <l l 732. Advert is ing e x p e n di t u res are a cred ib le  
�ign a l  of prod uct q u a l i ty bt: cau:'e t h c v  a r e  unlv  profitable i f  t h e  firm i s  in b u si n e s s  f or  
t h e  l o n g  t e rm .  and not a l'ly-by-night  o p e ra t i o n .  
Professor H e n r y  Sm i th pointed t o  a n o t h e r  reason w h y  17" m a y  !'a l l  as the patent 
n�= a rs e x p i ra t i o n :  Advert is ing for t he pC! t c: n t ccl p roduct may spi l l over t o  i ts  gener ic  
compe t i tors. so that  some o f  t he bendi t to t h e  paten tee ' l e a ks ·  away to i ts  r iva ls .  Thi:; 
()\' COL:r�e makes advert is i ng Jess a ttract ive lO t h r; p a t e ntee . .  
2002] lntegrmed Theor_v of ln te!!ectuo! Property 1 5 1 3  
i n g  enhances o r  reduces \ve l fare .  t h e  effects o f  leverage-the fact 
� -� 
t h a t  sel l i n g  rnore n o w  a l l mvs for m ore s a l e s  later as vvel l-wil l .  
o t h e r  things e q u d ,  te nc! t o  re d u ce clcl\rert i s ; n g .  All  this d o e s  not  say 
that the p a t e n tee will  e n gage i n  no acl v e !· t i �; i :lg .  lt m e re ly s uggest; 
that  ac1 v e r t i :; i n g  v"'il l  11 c : t  lJe a n  c� t t ra ( t i \ · ( ;  :< :_(b �-� t i t Lrte fo r c trt ti:n_ g 
prices in the ca�;c n1 ost irc i 1JC)r tan l Lc; () !J r d 1'.�;1_i �Th:: tl ·t .  
There i s  r1 ot rn ucl1 e n1 rJ ir ic2l  C\-'ici c n c c  ern t h e  relalionsl-t irJ tJe -, ' 
tvveen oatents  a n d  advert i s i n g: _  One n:: ct;: n i  �l tl d e x tremelv carefu l  
_!_ ..__..  ..i 
swdy by Pro fessors B e rn d t .  Ling. and Kyl e .  h owever, looked at 
market ing expe n d i t ures for patented cl r ugs J S  the patent lapsed 
and the products were rei ntroduced as ove r-the-counter medi­
cines . 16y They found t h a t  m arke t i ng decl ined s u bstanti ally as patent 
expiration neared.  (The deciine was even more pronounced with 
the onset of generic competit ion after the patent e n d e d . )  This i s  
precisely the time when the patentee wi l l  be i nCfeasin g  output  and 
lowering price to generate new customers and brand l oyalty . 1 71 1  
Hence, the empirical evide nce is at  le ast consistent  with our predic­
tion t h at leverage l e ads to  less advertis ing,  rather t h a n  m ore . Sur­
veying a variety of s t u dies ,  Pro fessor Robinson and h i s  col le agues 
support this  concl usion,  noting that " i ndustry studies  and cross­
sectional evidence consiste nt ly show t h at m arket pioneers spend 
iess as  a percentage of s a l e s  on advertising and promoti o n . "  1 7 1  
B .  D iscountin e and D vnomic Issues u J 
Our simple model  has  on l y  a s i ngle period i n  which t h e  p atent i s  
in e ffect ,  fol lowed by a s i n gle period vvhen the product is  protected,  
if at  a l l ,  only by its  trademark and brand loyalty.  This  Section dem­
onstrates the conditions under which our conclusions are sensitive 
to this assumption. A m ore complex model-in which p atent pro­
tection lasts for twenty years and is followed by trademark protec-
'"'' Ernst R.  Berndt e t  aL The Long S h adow u l  Pate n t  Expirat ion :  Do RX to OTC 
Switches Provide an A fte r l i fe ' )  2 ( N a t ' l  B ur e a u  of Econ.  Research . Con ference on 
Rese arch in Income and Wea l t h .  Symposium on Scanner Data and Price Inde xes. 
S e p t .  15-1 6 ,  2000) .  
11" Icl .  at 20 tbl .  1 .  For T8ga m e t .  t he authors fo uncl that  t o t a l  mark e t i n g  expense:; as a 
percent of sales  fel l  by 43 . 1  '}(, as p a t e n t  expirat ion approache d and by 30 . 1 %  follow­
ing expirat ion.  ( ''To t a l "  here m e a ns pages of j o u rn a l  advertising plus number o f  sales 
visits to doctors . )  For Zantac.  the figures are 5 9 . 8 °/., a s  the patent  n e ared expirat io n .  
w i  tb a n  a deli tiona[ 1 3  °/c, a fter expirat ion . for a t o t a l reel uction o f  72.8 % .  I cl .  
1 7 1  Rob inson e t  a l . .  supra note  1 07 .  at 1 8 . 
1 5 1 4 Virginia L o w  Re vie1v 
t ion e x t e n d i n g  into the i nfin i te fut ure-does not  alter t h e  res u l t s  as 
iong a s  consumers have a short  t ime h o rizon o r  do not  an ticipate 
the future . 
' -;· . '" . I I .  . rl " . . • . • v\ !1 f; r1 c o n s  Lln1e rs are 1 n t1 n1 te y- _ l ve c1 8 r.: l_� I C)r\v8. rei- i O< J J·� rn,g . n o v�'-
t_� \ .. 'S 1" � 'l l1 e 1JCl t f� n t e e ' s  price c :�l n not  devi c1 t C  rrl UCh rrl) lTi t h �: C CJ rl 1 J:I e t i ­
t i ·�/ �� I �: \ft� L s i ne�  C011SLlll1 1:: rs \v i l l  vv· i l i i ngly i ncur :-�.l S \\'' i Lc h i ng c z.-.;�; t to 
' · M l ] ' i .. t jl •" �" l)''"l' t ll nl· t ' 1  to l)l ' l'(' ]-, a sEC �> i t l'> p (' 0 11' pe t ;  t l. -,/ e  'f: l'j. rP r,, ,. '"l 'l�l p '.._J L ) ll V .._ } l r_., U ,.. ) � 1..-l. .L  '-' l t (. -" ... ). -. • ._. ..,.. � l .>. .1 •- ' CJ � v ,_, J.. <_. l ._.-
i nfin i te fu ture u n less the savings from doing so <cne ve ry s m al l .  
Hence,  bra n d  l oya l ty ess e n tial l y  vanishes.  and o u r  s tc1 ry <t bout 
b u i lding brand loya lty by i ncreasing o u t p u t  is  no longe r plcnt :, i b 1 e . 1 72 
The more e l aborate model  generates two i mpor tant  conclusions .  
First ,  the trad e m a rk-leve raged pat e n te e  wil l a l ways pro d u ce mo re 
than the "pure " paten t e e  (one who generates no brand loyalty o r  
h as no trademark protecti o n )  in every period before the  p at e n t  ex­
pires .  Secon d .  t h e  l everaged pate n t e e ' s  optimal output rises o v e r  
t i m e  d u r i n g  the patent period ,  wit h t h e  b u l k  of  t h e  increase as t h e  
p a t e n t  nears expiration .  O u tput t h e n  d rops  once the pat e n t  e xpir e s .  
W e  summarize these conclusions in  Figure 2 ,  which graphs opti­
m a l  output,  assuming that  l everage is poss ible  a n d  t h a t  t h e  a m ou n t  
of  b r a n d  loyalty depends o n  t h e  ave rage vol ume o f  consum ers 
served d u ring t h e  paten t  period . 1 73 It  shows that the pate n t e e ' s  op­
timal output in t h e  first  year of t h e  pat e n t  is infinites i m a l ly above 
the s i ngle-period monopoly l evel. As expirat ion approaches,  how­
eve r, output rise s  to more t h a n  3 0 %  above t h e  s ingle period mo­
nopoly leve l ,  t h e n  fal ls  substantia l l y  once the paten t  expire s .  Our 
the o ry is  thus a t  least  roughly consiste n t  with the d y n a mics dis-
172 'vVc forma l ize th is  insight i n  the Appendix  and demonstrate tha t t he re w i l l  s t i l l  be 
;1 smal l  b r a n d - l o y a l t y  e ffect eve n in t h i s  case. S e e  i n l'ra Appe n d i x .  N o t e  t h a t  t h is prob ­
l e m  is common to .. rat ional  expectations"-type cri t i q ues of m o d e l s  wi t h m y o p i c  be­
h: lv ior .  l t  h as t h e  poten t i a l  t o occur i n  a lmost every m o d e l  o f  swi t c h i n g  cost s .  a l t h o ug h  
i t  d o c s  not a ppear t o  h ave received m uch a tt e n t i on beca use most such mode ls  use 
o n l y  twu per iods .  
Brand loyal ty  i s  bo t h  i n t ui t ively p l aus i b le a n cl o n e  o f  the  best-doc u m e n t e d  facts  in  
t he marke t i n g  l i t e ra t u re .  See Ko t l e r . supra note lJ4 . a t  444-45 . 447.  '-�49 :  i . P. L .  Png & 
D<w i ci R e i t m a n .  Why A rc S o me Prod ucts Branded �l !l d O t h e rs l'-i o t 'l .  38 J . L .  & Eco n .  
207 ( l lJ95 ) .  H i t t u rns o u t  t o  be i ncompat ib le  w i t h t he a � s u m p t i on o t  pcrrcct  fo res igh t .  
sn much t h e  worse for t h a t  as�; um p t ion . 
, - , Sec i n lr<l A ppcncl i :-;  for a n  explanat ion o f  the  teclm icd deta i ls .  The cie nn n d  c u rve 
r s  ass u m e d  lO be l ine a r  w i t h  pa ram e t e rs a =  I OU a n d /; = l .  The swi t c h i ng cost  is  1 0. 
c l l1 cl t h e  i n t e rest  rate i �; 10 °1<, . 'Ne assume t h a t c o n o; u m c rs l oo k  only  a t  t h e  c u rre n t  pe­
r; o d .  ;·�l l her than pre d i c t i n g  th e i r own fu t u re beh a v i or ( mvop i a ) .  
In teg rare(/ Theor_v of ln rel!ecnwl Property 1 5 1 5 
cussed I ll t h e  case s tudies ,  w h e re patentees s e c rn e cl  to reserve t h e  
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! ll r' n " tC 'l t ' c- t."'t. l J. a ], t ve� a ··s '- ! .  '-' .t--" (l ... ,1. ..) vv J .':;) J '- ) - l . 
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F I G U R E  2 :  PATENTEE'S O PTi M A L  OUTPUT O V E R  T I M E  G I V E N  
TRADEMA R K  LEVE R A G E ,  A S  P E RCENT O F  SINGLE- P E R I O D  MONOPOLY 
O PT I M U M  
C. Prices Rise on Expimtion of the Paten t? 
Some t he ories predict that the price of a patented product w i l l  
not  fal l ,  a n d  m a y  i n  fact r i s e ,  i n  response to the e ntry of ge neric 
competitio n ,  when the market i s  d ivisible i nto brand-loyal and 
price-sensi tive consum ers. 1 7� Moreove r,  there is  e m p i rical  evi dence 
1 7.; See R. icharJ G .  Fra n k  �� David S .  S�1 l kcvc r .  (J ener ic  E n t rv and the Pr ic in0: o r  
P h a r maceu tica l s ,  6 J .  Econ . & M gm t .  Stra tegy 7 ) ,  76-7 7 ( J l)lJ7)  [h e re i n a ft e r  Fra nl-:: & 
:;,t ! k cver. G e n e ric E n t ry ] :  Richarc! G .  Fra n k  & D<wicl S .  S a l k evu. P r i c i n g ,  P a t e n t  Loss 
<t n cl  t h e  [\t[ a r k e t  fo r Ph <mmtcc ut i ca ls .  5L) S .  Ecun . . 1 ! 65 .  1 05--66 ( 1 9LJ2 ) .  
1 5 1 6  Virgin io Low Revie l t '  [ Vol .  S 8 :  1 455 
t h a t  t h i s  h a ppens .  <H l e <l S t  in  s o m e  instances. "' f s  t h is d p robl e m  for 
our t hec., rv? 
\;1/P ,. , . � rt hv ,, ,, , ; . H1 t h ·1 t  'Lir ir- i n a -�·n Pe ri od 7 has 11 0 e 1li · · i "' J' l'' ' rcJ J' -,� �· '- {._� - \. __ } ! .t -� Y -.  t ! ' :_:;. � ..o. ..o. l.  -. l _ \_ :::J _..  . _!_ - ._ ._.,  \- ... '·· 1. -.- _\ """ •. .I c· e n l· · · · , .. , ,. ,. ' < .  ;!" • ' ' l l' i ' ': ( ) : i e i  A · c '[ 1)fl 0 <:\ C l 'r1 e J· o  "1 J'c' ft' r Jll '' r ' ]' E I"' l' ; l' O . , .l t l• �· .) � ·- } l t.� . ! "" ' � -- , l • t '- J t..  . . ! , ,  . ._ • .  � t  . . ... . ) '- 0 c t �J \._... (.._ _ .._,. - - ' � J �. - ..... .. 1 1 .::-:-: (.t � .1. \.� 
cc) n-Lrr :.�_� t i 't i \ ·c  }Jr i c z_�· , t �. -� '- � n <: ve ry consLtnter  \vh c) s h c)u l d  !:t� �� c rv c cl i n  
t h_ C  :�� C \J n0 t"J':� ri c_);_l ·.;:__ · i i i  h(' . �frLH:: _ S 0 l11 e \V i l 1 }) Cly I11 ()1"C t � �l.C :.-.: rc� ch.:. (_: 1: 
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pri ce . · 1 n d  t h i s  pr \c t:: d i scrim i nat ion does ,  o f  cour s e ,  h <\Ve dis tri bu­
t i o n <1 l  conseque nces t h�1t we migh t care about indepe n d e n t ly ,  There 
a rc .  h m,�e ver,  no d i s tortions  to worry about in t he po�s t - p a t e nl  pe­
riocL and the fact that  the incumbent firm ch arges a h ig h e r  price to 
i ts brand-loyal cus t o mers is not ,  per se, an e fficiency pro b l e rn . 1 711 
We d o ,  however,  care about leverage-th a t  i s ,  w h e t h e r  t h e  p os­
s ibi l i ty o f  retain i ng some customers in Period 2 induces the p at­
entee to raise output and lower prices in Perio d  1 .  Is t h e  ra is ing of 
prices in Period 2 ( focusing o n l y  on bran d - l o y a l  customers)  incon­
sisten t  with o ur predict ion that  t h e  p a t e n t  h ol der  wi l l  increase o u t ­
pu t  in Period 1 to create addit ional  l oyal users? A l th o ugh our 
m odel  pre d i cts  that t h e  patentee 's  price for t h e  branded product 
will  fal l ,  rat her t han rise , when facing generic compe t i t i o n ,  the an­
swer to th is  q uest ion i s  · ·no . '' 
'vVe need to complicate our story b y  taking account o f  h e teroge­
n eous bran d loyalty by, for example,  a l l owing for ran d o m l y  d is­
tributed switching cos ts in Period 2 among t h ose who bought  t h e  
prod uct i n  Period 1 . 1 77  It  s t i l l  m a k e s  sense for t h e  p a t e n t e e  to  ex­
panel sales in Peri od 1 i n  t h e  h opes of l anding som e o n e  with a 
(rando m l y )  high S\Vit c h i ng cost-someone who can t h e n  be kept  in  
Period 2 ,  even a t  a price t h a t  i s  m u c h  higher than the generic  sub­
s t i tute .  If  o n ly a s m a l l  fract ion of the population has h igh s w i tch ing 
"' Berndt  cm d h i s  col leagues fou n d  t h a t  . .  n e i t h e r  Tagamct R x  n o r  Zan t a c  Rx 
ad opt<:' d  a pol icy of com p e t i ng with generics on price fol lowing pate n t  e x p i r a t i o n .  a n d  
i nste ml i ncre a�;ecl price� .  As a conse q ue nce,  t h e y  l o s t  v e ry substa n t i a l  mMk•: t  s h ar e . 
b u t  re t a ined �;d i e s  t o  a s m a l l . rel a t ive ly  price - i n se n s i t ive segm e n t  of b r<lll d - l ov a l  con­
s u m e r�; . . . Bcm d t  d a l . .  s u p ra note  l 69,  at  23 .  Frank & S a l kever.  Generic  E n t ry .  s u p ra 
nok ! F! . c1l c\:l. prese n t  rurt h e r  empir ica l  e v i d en ce of t h i s  behavior v i s- a -v i s  other 
brcmd mt m e  d r ugs.  
, - . rvl i c h a e l  Pr: I�e ira poi n t e d  out to us that fur t h e r  d is t r i b u t i o n a l  probl e ms m i g h t  ar ise 
i f. for ex<tmp!c .  low- income or poo r l y  i n fo rmed consumers re m a i n  l o y a l  to t h e  pat ­
e n t e e ·::: brand p u re l y he c<lUSe they l a ck i n fo r m a t i o n  a b o u t  t h e  ex is tence or c o m p a ra­
bi ! i t v  o f  t h e  L:e n c r i c  subst i tute .  
· -- ·  ...... 
Fur 21 m o d e l  o l  t h i s  t\·pe , s e c  Ga bsznvicz e t  a l . . s u p ra note  7 1 .  at 39lJ--+O l .  
2002] ln tegrored Th eory of ln tellectunl  Property 
costs ,  i t  may make  sense  to  charge 1 0 %  of the people a high price , 
abandoning the o t h e r  consumers to gen eric compe t i t ion , rat h e r  
than charging_ say,  3 0 %  of  the  consumers a lower price .  
I n  s u m . the fact  t h a t  some se l le rs raise , ra ther  than  lmver,  pr ice:;  
, , , , ''' '·: :• i :· ··, t ·l· ,,; " (' r 1 1�-· · · i r  ll '·\ t e n : ·c r 1 n r:· .;; not fC' 1e l·s·· e ··l "l "  ,y� t l·, ,-, r· n ·• r· l : ; .  \ . .  ' I •  .__., , , t ) ._ l_ ( , _  1.. 1 !  U l. .. t ,_... , 1 . l ·- _ ._ ,) ._ 1 ._ _ .,.. _, \ . ( � ) , ) l - � ·__- ,... , , l l • . !  _, 
< ; t p· ; c n (  f) \ ' '' 1' 1 ' '! '-i " i  ;-} \-' ··· o·· 'Ll 't'S • ' , ;. ! <'' ;c• v le Jlt Ot- 1 "-' " " l' " Gr• ; S  .. s· r ; ] j  : , ., 1 " '1 --__ , � , ,. 1 1 -1 ..__ • ._ \,. .. t l  • .I � \_  ..... ._. • •  .____... ... ·- - ......... � - � '-' '-' .t\. \. \._ \...- V >_.. Li .::--\.....- 1 '- I l l  - l .\ 1  ·- t l ! 
pi ric a \  q u e �; t i o n . but  t he ex i s tence o f  l everage is not at a l l  i n c c m ­
pat ib lc wi th  a n  upward ra ther  than  a clowmvard movemen t o f  price 
' . once tnc patent expnes.  
D.  A !ien wlive ProposaLs 
A fi n a l  obj ect ion one  might raise is that  there are a l terna t ive 
mechanisms for reducing the deadweight loss associated with pat­
ent gra n ts .  The two compet ing  proposals are Professor Tan don · s  
model o f  patents wi th  optimal  compulsory l icens ing 1 'K and  the 
model  of probabi l i s t ic  enforcement created by Professors Ayres 
and Klcmperer. 1 7l) Essen ti al ly ,  both of these p roposals are predi­
cated on the same pr inc ip le :  reducing the patentee ' s  protection 
while extending the patent  term. While considerat ion of these 
competing proposals is certa in ly  i l lumi nat ing, it bears emphasis 
that  ne i ther of  them concerns the problem we analyze-the i nter­
act ion between different  m odes of inte l lectua l  property protect ion.  
Thus,  neither Tanclon 's  nor Ayres and Klemperer 's proposal 
presents a facia l  cha l lenge to our find ings . 1 �° Furthermore,  the com­
peting models are completely t heoretic, whereas leveraged patents 
are a real  world phenomenon.  Notwithstanding these key d iffer­
ences,  we wi l l  show that i nsofar as reducing the deadweight l oss as­
sociated with patent protect ion i s  concerned , l everaged patents 
have both important theoretic and practical advantages over both 
compulsory l icens ing  and probabi l istic enforcement .  
"' Se1: Pa n k aj Tandon . O p t i m a l  PCJ t c n t s  w i t h  Com p u l so ry L i ce nsing. 'J O  .l . Po l .  E c o n .  
-:+70 ( t 9S2 ) .  
' '" Sec Jan Avres & Paul  K l c: m pc:rc r .  L i m i t i ng Paten tees '  Market  Power 'vV i t h o u t 
R <� d u c i n c' I n n o v a t i o n  I n c e n t ives :  The Perverse B e n e fi ts o f  Uncerl cl i n t \  :1 n cl l'·i o n -
l n j u nc t i \� Reme cl ies. l)7 M i c h .  L. Rc\'. 1)85 ( 1 91)9) .  . 
"" To a degree . o u r  proposal  is c o m p a t i b l e  w i t h  e i t h e r  o r  t h e m .  s i nc t: o n e  co u l d  
imagi n e .  fo r e x n m p l e .  leveraged probn b i l is t i c  p a te n ts.  or l e veraged p �1 t c n ts wi t h  c u m ­
pu!sory l i cens ing .  
1 5 1 8  lv',; , .  - o,·,.1 i't I r1· ' v ,q u ' i  itc> ·1 " (_') · �· • L. ,  -' '- ' ·  ..: '\ v t ( � V 
7 .  Comp u lsory L icensing 
I n  an irnpcr t a n t  theore t i ca l  art ic l e ,  Tancl cn s uggests an i d e a l  
patent system w i t h  opti m a l  roya l t y  rates- -ones t h a t  " op tim ally 
trade o ff the n ,;g<H ive incen tive e tTr.: ct·> o f  l icens i n g  with the p o si t i ve 
C OI1S Ll rn e r  r; r i c ··:. (: ffc cts � � t .� :  __  �=t n rJ  �J. n i n fi n i t ;'� t C li t  1 i fe .  f·li s Ll �} S ic  i n -
. .  1· (J]l t �· C' t 'n ''  c (' ,, ,, ; .Y: I '  \''1 •''• I l !  (j ''Jl '') ·�: ; ·:"r "  i 7 f' l ]l r. '.� 'C1 ;  ,., ,  .. r'';· c; rn l) �) t '·' jl t J' j' ( ' t -' 1 ·· -...') b ..) 1 el l .) U - 1 \..- .. .} ' " \�j '- 1 -l £ � c  • .t .. l . .. . L . � - -· .... . .._ -...... ,:::. t.l. 1 1 t .� 1 _ , t d :. ... t L I.....- .. � I_} �-: \_. "'"' 
t l. 0 '1 loy · ·  u'o i  ,-. , .. t -�· 1 1v  ;' 1 1 p · '  ' ·" n I "  r o· ' · o· ' n1 ' "" · ' I. ·o n 1-v i 1. e P r  S l. n "  "1nl-1 c:i r:l t• l t ·;, -J. �") J V V  .... . 0 �t . (t l. V .. - � ..) .._ "-' l <  }J Ll , ).._ ) • .._,. .._.. _ ! 1 ..'::) ( 1 1 U .&..L .i  !. l. l- l  
neously le ngth e n i n g  the l ife of p<tt,:::nts . 1 02 The compulsory rates force 
the patentees  n o t  to nrice m onooolist ical lv .  while the l on2:e r pro-.t J._ ,/ .._., 
tection term preserves the  incentive to inve s t  i n  R & D .  The l ion's  
share  of the gai ns comes from the reduct ion in  the  deadweight loss 
engendered by patents: a considerably s m a l l e r  improvem e n t  results 
from extending the protection term.  
Le veraged patents  h ave several advantages over  compul sory l i ­
censing.  First,  Tandon's apparatus cri t ically depends o n  t h e  set t ing 
of opt imal compulsory l icense rates,  presumably by t h e  courts or  
Congress. This task,  however, is we ll beyond t h e  abi l i ty  of m o s t  
j udges or lawm akers.  In fact ,  courts a n d  Congress face tremendous 
diffi cul ties deciding reasonable royalty rates in intel lect u a l  property 
cases. 1 0.1 These difficulties stem from t h e  unique ness of i nt e l l e ct u a l  
goods a n d  from the r i s k  el ement  inh e rent in the inventive process.  
The royalty rate m ust adequately compensate the p a t e nt e e  n o t  
only for t h e  cost of producing t he patented invent ion,  b u t  also for 
t h e  cost of the m any research proj ects that h ave fai l e d  t o  yield a 
p at e ntable result .  Setting t h e  royalty rate too low w o u l d  h ave a 
chi ll ing effect  on innovation;  sett ing i t  too high would r e introduce 
the proble m  of de adweight loss and might  even aggravate i t .  
A s  Tandon succinctly cautions, " [f] urther work i s  n e e d e d  t o  sug­
gest practical approaches t o  realizing t he potential wel fare gains 
which have been d iscussed . "  
1 04 
An important advantage of our self­
selection scheme l ies  in i ts s i mplici ty.  Leveraged patents  do n o t  re-
" '  Tandon . su pra note 1 70.  a t  47 1 .  
'" I d .  a t  484 . 
' ' ' See Robert P. lV!c rges .  Co n t rac t i ng I n t o  L i a bi l i t y  Rul es :  I n t e l lect u a l  Property 
Rights and Co l lec t ive R i g h ts Orga n izati ons.  84 Ca l .  L Rev. 1 293. 1299 ( 1 996) ( iden t i ­
fy ing p rob l e ms o f  a cumpulsory l icensi ng scheme i n c l u d i ng wasted lobbying costs. 
c h a nged con d i t i o n s .  and t h e  po t e n t i a l  for legi s l a t i ve " lo c k - i n  . .  render ing the roya l t y  
schedu le  i n flexi ble  o v e r  t i me ) .  
' ' '  Tanclon . supra IWtr: 1 7'0. ; ! l  484. 
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q ui re a n y  complicated dete rm i n a t i o n s .  M oreover, because the pat­
entee decides whet h e r  to l e verage , leveraged pa t e n ts are certain 
not  t o  harm the ince n t i ·,::-; to i n n ovate .  
Secon d ,  Tandon's corn p ulsory l i cen :.; i ;·1g  scheme pre s u m a bly re­
r• "' l 1· ··ec ·: 1 �  � "' p t t j �-� o- r) l' -i � C • " fi <:"' (' ·t · 1 ·t ; � ·· f(J :· ...::� -; t :'\ ·� v  � ·-l tC� l11 J· s c q e tl 11v t h e  'i Ll l ..) ... 1 1  t.., .') '-' ·- ;,.. - 1 .l ;:_· \. • ,_ .._ � . � • A ·-' · --' ._ ( ._. ,J . ._ .:. \_.... � t .... l _. t) (_ � . �) L . '-' �-- L ) L !  l 
' e  ' r  1: �...· · - - 0 · - � .. 1 · - - ·- :: l ., . · · -- -\ � ·  ;· . · :� -r -1-·r-.... -_,- \ \ !'tl ; ch.  ·t l.., e ·· ,.-... .; l .  � �  i-·'' [ ·• r·, �;�J. t · 11 L 0 L !. i C C j  1 Ci L i C: � l- �· , 1_ i ;  _ _ .i. �- � i .i _y' . ... .- 1 1 :.. ! \J i  ., � ! 1 A .l  L l l v- � -) I.. L {-' '-) v 1 -
. ; ':1 1  l j. ('P J1 c' C P  .-f hJ' C.: llrJ (' ' ''" '' "' ; ,. i·-,r) t / 1 i" '; i -J i" Jl S !. V 0 '0 ] 1 (\ \V ' 1 c t e f i , J  1' t "["F' -L .�. C.t t '- .... .. .,., �) � ._, . 1 '--' f . .I ...... � .J -..1 1 .. ) l 1.... �,_ ,  ...... : .. !- �-- .. \_. C l '- . C t .J .._. .1_  .... � . .  \....-
q uires e ither a j udic ia l  or a n  adm i n i s trative determinat ion of a 
· 'price " for a n  en orm ous n u m b e r  o f  i n vent ions ,  m an y  of w h i ch turn 
, c l • . , , . t l T 1 , out  to oe 01 negugJDt(::: s u c ; a 1  va u e .  LC ve ragec pate nts ,  noweve r ,  
are self- e ffecting.  Not OI1 l y  does our scheme not  require a n  expen­
sive price se t t i ng mecha n i s m ,  but it  also adopts an ex post ap­
proach t o  the problem, e nsur i ng that o n ly patents of sufficie n t  so­
cial  value will  cont in ue to enj oy i ega l protecti o n .  
Fin a l ly , a n d  most obvi o usly,  Tan d o n ' s  proposal requ ires a legis­
lat ive overhaul of the  patent  system .  Currently,  p a t e n ts are n o t  
subj ect t o  compulsory lice nse s .  G iven the rece nt  tren d  t o  expand 
and sol idify i n te l lectual property protect i o n ,  the i ntroduction of 
compre h ensive compulsory l icensing is u n l i ke ly . Leveraged pat­
ents,  by contrast,  are a n  e x ist i ng phenomenon . 
2. Probabilistic Enforcement 
A different mech anism for reducing the deadweight loss of pat­
ents  h as been proposed by Ayres and Klemperer.  Eschewing the 
drawbacks of compulsory l icensing, their proposal rests o n  the d ual  
principl es of  uncertai nty and delay.  S pecifically, they propose that  
patentees be al lowed t o  bring lawsuits aga i nst i n fringers o n l y  at  the 
end of the patent  term, which would l imit  the remedy to  m o n e tary 
damages.  1 x5 Even then,  however, p atentees would not be able to 
collect the full damage they suffered,  but rather a fracti o n  of that  
amount to be deter m i ned probabi l i stical ly .  As Ayres a n d  Klem­
perer exp l a i n ,  under t h e i r  proposed regin1 e ,  
t h e  paten te e  of a t r u e  inn ovation-t h a t  is ,  an i n novation d eserv­
ing immediate  a n d  certain e nforcement under current law­
would h ave to wait  u n t i l  the d a y  the pate n t  expired to learn i f  a 
court would award d amages for any past infringe ment ;  and the 
1 :-.5 J-\yrcs 8:.. Klcn1perc r. sup r�l rH "I tc  1 79.  a t  9S8 . 99-L 
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court wou ld make th is  determinat ion simply by t1ipping a weighted 
coin  with ,  say, o n ly an 80 % chance of e nforcement ' '"' 
The a irn of  t h e  partial enforcc rnen t i ::;  to encourage a certain 
i p v ;c• )  r ·- � ' ·u� ') t P r, t  infl·l·noem e '·· t ""1 }1 e i n  · ,.., o ; 1 ' '::r D 1' '' rh : e ;· i r) r \V () ' ' i r] " px· -t _.. ·- � ..._ / 1  1 C . .. ..... l _ L  � .l O .l l .t _ .  .! 1  • ..- . 1 1  · · ;::; .:. . l� i _ '--' "-� ......._ ._, .... . ...__ i • � L• . .! U  ..., 
·�1 ··1 r: ( �  i n :··! ;  1 s -; c�1l r) Lri ·p Ll i- '1 1' r1 r�l e ere· ·:1' :� ( )  , �  r:1 ? �-�- .k .,-: t "!J f i �.:r: . .  u i 01 a 11 c l t 1'-l 1  i ': :- '-·- • •  -· -· • - · - . '" . ... - • \.. - .... (. _l - .._t -- 1 . .; ( · -· _.. �- .. .  . \.. '-' r e <l i ' " '"' t l , ,_, , , ·l' e · o c·l n.l "' l. o l• t 'loss Oi' nl c· ·· �� , , -. , l 1-, ,_ - , -. � < ,• n :· c: T�u- C C· " r 1 :"' ;-' n <; ::J t "" .. ,_ _ _ 1 ......  -' L l 1 .....,. \_ Ct. v 1' I,._, b 1 0 V' .._ 1 (._ "' -- ...... ,_ I _: AJ ... ... • -' .!  J ... . ' • ..1. ,_/ l. . ... v .....- ... . o._.J C� -\...-
p a t e n tees  for the drop i n  the i r  re t u r n:� , /\yrcs a n d  Klern pe rcr pro­
pose t h a t  patent  d u rat ion be ex tende d .  Th e y  n o t e d  that the ncccs­
S 8 rv e �..: t e nsion mav be aporo x i m <\ted hv · · f m l u l t ip lvi n g  the d ur ation ..1 J l - l ..J ../ '---· 
by the reciprocal of t h e  prob abi l i ty  of cn forcement . ' ' t x., For exam-
ple,  i f  t h e  probabi l i ty of enforcem e n t  i s  50 % ,  the d uration s h o u l d  . oo o I �  be mcre as e d  by 2 Yo . 
Leveraged patents are s uperior  t o  proba b i l i st ic  enforcement  on 
severa l  grounds .  First, the d e l ay and unce rta i nty  Ayres and Klem­
perer seek to i ntroduce might not only i ncrease the l i k e l i h o o d  that 
v a l i d  patents wil l  not be enforce d ,  but also that invalid patents will  
be.  I nd e e d ,  the passage of time m ight re i n force the tendency of the 
courts to uph o l d  questiona b l e  patents, 1 911 espe cial l y  th ose that  
ach ie ved commerc i a l  success . 1 9 1  Leveraged patents do not  give r ise  
t o  this  risk . Second , A yres and Klemperer seek t o  increase produc­
tion of patented inventi ons by enco uraging infringement s . 1 9� The 
downside of  this  mechanism is  the notor iously high cost  of patent 
l it igat ion. 19" As A yres and Klemperer admit ,  "[  s ]orne forms o f  
uncertainty and delay wou l d  undoubtedly  lead to l i t igat ion costs 
\Sn 
l d .  a t  995. 
'"  ld .  at 993. 
1'' lei .  a t  1 009. 
IS'.' 
Id.  
' ' " '  J cL at  1 020 ( n ot i ng that t he Federal Circu i t ' s  " protect ion o f  patent  q u a  p roperty 
becomes an e n cl in  i tsel L t rump ing a l l  o t h e r  conce p t i o n s  of the goo d " ) .  Th i s  problem 
is co mpounded by t h e  tende ncy o f  patent  exami n e rs to i ssue poor q u a l i t y  p a t e nts be­
c a u s e  o f  t he increase i n  the  volume o f  patent app l i ca tion s . See  Robert P .  Me rges , As 
M any as Six I mposs ib le  Patents B e fore B r e a k fa s t :  Property Rights  to r B usiness Co n­
cepts and Patent  System R e form. 1 4  Berkeley T cch . L.J .  5 7 7  ( 1 999).  
' '' 1  See Robert P.  Merges, Commerci a l  S uccess and Pa ten t S t a nd ards:  Econo mic 
P c r pc.: ct ives o n  I nnova t i o n ,  76 Cal .  L. Rev. i-\03 . S l 6  ( 1 988 ) ( " (T]oday. non i n trinsic 
evic.k: nce . . . r e fe rr e d  to as the ·secon d ary ' or · o b j ect ive'  consicl e r 8 t i o n :o  . . . .  occupies 
an i ncre<JS inglv  i mportant  place in nonobviousness d e t e r m i n a t ions . '' ) .  The most . i m­
p o r l a n t  secondary consideration is t h e  comm e rci a l  :-; uccess o f  the i nven t i o n .  
I ': Ayres & K l e rn pe rer .  supra n o t e  1 79.  a t  C)()_) _ 
1"' Anvone who d o ubts t h e  i mpor tanc t:: o !  l i t ig: tt ion cost s  in pat<� nt  e n fo rce ment 
need o n l y  look at th is advice t o  patentees:  
Prospect ive co u nse l w i l l  genera l l y  request  'm vwl ter,; from one- t h i rd c o  o n e - h a l f  
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•.:e n a i nlv <1n d  del a v  wou l d  undoubte d l v  lead to l i t i 0::: 1t i o n  costs that  
swamo ihe benefits of l i m i ted i n ter im- i n fr ingerne r.� t . . . .  . , t •J� Lever-, � 
c!Qr-� d n c; te n t s .  b v  contrast .  do not e x acerbate l i t i ::u1 t i on costs:  t h e v  ..__, 1 ,J '- • ..1 
(J c. n crt e ve n  n c ce::>s i tate j tlci ici a 1  i11 te rve n t i ()n . -f . h i rcL i� ... yres arlci 
l c �-�-Lperer r•.: l �/ -�Y I� t �1c  avere1ge cle prc ci �l t � c: n r ;_L t c �:. \_) ( t �: tYt �1 frc)n1 
� ; .... 
'-/ ::.1 r1 ous i r1 ci u�_) t r:�es i rt se t t i n g  c n fc)rC\� n1t.:: n t  r(·l t c �� - 1 : :  rn c zi iL-) ·!_ h a t  
• 1 '  
• 1 ' . . l ' ' 1 ' 1 ' • :, o rn e  m o i V l U.l::-t ! nwt:: n t o rs \V O U  ct De u n c e rco m pc n :; :t ;_ ,: u oy t n e  J U-
.r l i c i � l  dPt P rrn i n �<•i o P V-1 h i l P  othPrS \"O td rl b• '  (Y\fr"'e�' rn 1•c n c 8 h---d · - ·  \ _t_ , , ....... • .... . � _ .�. . � , .._ • ._ � • , .• _ ..... .. ....  .._ , • '-· • , ...._ .._ �.., _ l · - � , _ : � r../ • ..__) _ .. ........ . 
Th us, Ayres and Klempcrer man age to preserve t he i n centive to 
in novate only on average , but not i n  e ac h  ind i vi d u a l  c a s e .  Our pro­
posc:d avoids t h i s  pro ble m .  
Finally,  a s  i s  the case w i t h  Tando n ' s  proposa l ,  Ayres a n d  Klem­
perer's  proposal  requi res a com pre hens ive re fo rm of  the patent  
system . To work effective ly ,  i t  would require swe eping changes not  
only in  p a te n t  rem e d i e s ,  but  also in l i t igation process e s .  Such 
changes are h i gh l y  u n l i k e l y .  I n  contrast ,  l e veraged p8tents are pos­
s i b l e  under the exist i n g  patent syste m ,  and firms have been t a k i ng 
advan tage of  t h i s  possi b i l ity .  
CONCLUS ION 
In t h i s  Article,  we h ave sought t o  fi l l  a curious gap between i n ­
tel l ectual property t h e o ry a n d  pract ice . T h e  t h e o ry consistent ly  
treats  pate nts,  copyrights,  a n d  trademarks as separate forms of  pro­
tection,  e a c h  indepen d e n t  of t h e  others .  By con trast ,  real  world 
o f  t h e  tota l  recovc:ry. U n l ess t h i s  n u m be r  is a m u l t i ple of t he typ ica l $ l .5 m i l l ion 
l i t ig a t i o n  cos t ,  i n  a l l  l i ke l i h ood he w i l l  n u t  be i n te re s t e d .  S i m p l e  a ri t h m e t i c  gives 
us $ 1 5  m i l l ion in da mages as a m i n i mum t h reshold to a ro use the curiosi ty of the 
pot e n t i a l  co unse l  to  cont i n u e  to l is t e n  t o  t h e  rest  of  yo ur story. Prac t i ca l ly speak­
i ng. h owe ver, most cou nse l  w i l l  not cons i d e r  a case w h e re pot e n t i al d a m age s ar c  
less t h <l n  $ 1 00 m i l l i o n .  This  a m o un t  of  d amages corre sponds r o u g h l y  to a h a l f  
b i l l i o n  do l i ars i n  a n n ua l  i n fr ingi n g  reve n ue s  . . 
Deci d i n g  When And How To E n force Your Pate n t .  fv! o ndaq ! n t ' l  B ri e fi n g ,  J a n .  1 2 .  
200 1, a t  6 ,  avai l a b l e  a t  200 1 W L  8986875 .  
T h e  s i t u a t i o n  m a y  b e  e v e n  worse i n  t h e  Un i t ed K i ngdo m . S e c .  e.g. ,  Rose m a ry Ben­
ndt & J e an Eagle�ham . Legis l a t io n  to  M a n d ate Greater D amages for Pate n t  Breaches,  
Fi n .  Times ( Lo n d o n ) ,  Nov. I ,  200 L a t  4. ( ' 'The U K  is  k n own t o  o ffe r a d i ffic u l t  com ­
b i n a t i o n  of h i gh costs ancl r e l a t i ve l y  low d a m ::1ges for people try i n g  t o  defend pa t en t 
r igh ts . . J a mes Dvson.  fur exa mp l e , is est i m a t e d  t o  h ave spc n t  mpre t h a n  [$3 m i l ­
l i o n ! on pa i. c n t l i t igat ion ag:1 i n s t  Hoover over h i s  Dyson \·aeuum c lean e rs. " ) . 
' " ' A yres a mi K l e mpercr .  s u pra not e J 79 ,  a t  1 0 1 4. To <l voicl t h i s  p ro b l e m .  Ayres a n cl  
j..:J e m perer c a l l  f o r  a re fo rm i n  t h e  pa t e n t  sys t e m .  
' " '  I d .  at l O l O- l l .  
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b us i n esses have l o n g  combined d i fferent modal i t ies  to i n crez:sc 
t h e i r  c o m oe t i t i v e  advant age over riva l s .  V/hile  th e d i sc!"t..:: tc  a n a l v s i s  I � . 
h a s  s i 1 <.: d  l ight o n  each o f  t h e  s ubfi e l d s  of i n t e l lectua l  prope rt y .  i t  
h ::b  u h l"usc a t c: d  the  i m p o rt a n t  i n te rconnect i o n s  a m u n g  t h c n1 .  < : n d  
c)i-i��! __ : u r!.:cl t 1tc ;2 ffi c i c ncy � ffc c t s  t h e re i n .  B y  �1Cl( )}) t in�� a u n i h �_ p ·: r­
c r� , · c · :  ! ;, · t-' \.\·:-� 11 ' ) \:t-• };i-' r\. 11 ' "1 b J P  tr J  " �1 ( 1 \\/ r 1-( '-"1 t c e r t ; , ; ·l') e r· · rn h ; n � t- ; (-) 11 � [ , 1· .) t .  - .... '" - . -- . . -- l Cl . ,_. - ._. ._ (l - ._.. ..... � ). . . . t . L. -- � 1.. .l J .  1 ..... ... . � .  . ... l ,.._._ ·- ' . , . . I I 
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d c rn onstrated that  the  avai b b i l i ty o f  s u bsequent t raden1ark pro t e c ­
t i o n  m i t i gates t h e  proc livity o t  b o t h  patentees and t r a d e  secre t 
h o l d e rs to price monopol is t ica l ly .  
O ur  an alysis of t he syn e rgist ic  effects a m o ng vmious modes of 
i n t e l l e ctual  property h as yielded i m por tan t descrip t ive.  norma t i v e ,  
a n d  met hodol ogica l impl ica t i o n s .  D escriptively,  w e  h ave s hown 
th at the clead·weight l oss of p a t e n t  and trade secrecy protection is 
l ower t h a n  is comm on l y  bel ieved,  and t h at the i ncentives to i nno­
vate  are  higher. Normat ively ,  we have cal led for a reve rs a l  of t h e  
pre v a i l i n g  j udic ia l  host i l i ty t o  leveraged patents a n d  explai n e d  how 
the law can take advantage o f  l everaged pate nts to  i mp rove the 
tra deoff betwe e n  dynamic and static effic iencies  i n  in nova t i o n  pol­
icy .  Most import a n tl y  perhaps,  methodological ly,  we h ave d e m o n ­
strated the n e e d  f o r  a n  i ntegra ted a n alysis  of i nt e l l e ct u a l  property. 
Whe n synergies exist ,  exclusive focus on the parts o ften leads to 
a distorted percep t i o n  o f  the w h o l e .  While  there are many obvious 
d i ffe rences betwee n  the study of i n te l lectual  property and an e le­
p h a n t  parable,  t h e y  do share a common moral :  Both point t o  t h e  
i m portance of an i ntegrated a na l ys i s .  
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i s  fo l lowed by t rade m a rk prot ect ion  exte n d i n g  i n t o  t h e  i nckfi n i k  
fu t ur e-d ocs  P o t a l ter t h e  re s u i t s ,  as long a s  con s urn e rs h ave a 
s h o rt t i m e  h o r i z o n  o r  do not a n t i c i pate t h e  fut ur c . 1 96 rvioreover .  t h e  
dyn a m i c  m ocl e l  y i e l ds a re s u l t  t h a t  i s  s upported b y  the case s t u d i e s  
vve discussed e ar l ier: Pate n t ees seeking to  b u i ld brand loya l ty w i l l  
not i ncrease o utpu t a n d  c u t  prices u niform ly over  t h e  p a t e n t  pe ­
r iocL Instead,  t h e y  wi l l  cut out pu t m ore heavi l y  as t h e  patent n e ars 
exp i r a t i o n .  
Underst anding the dyn amics  o f  brand loya l t y  a n d  p ate n t pricing 
requires a brief  discussion about  how brand l o y a l ty i s  generated 
a n d  main ta ined over t i me . ' 'n ·w h ile t h ere are many p l a usible for­
mulat ions ,  we adopt  a s im p l e specif icat ion,  in w h ic h  t h e  post­
pate nt  swi tc h i ng cost i s  a one-shot  amount that is  fixed for a l l  con­
sumers for a l l  t im e ; t h e  number of  consumers w i t h  switching costs 
de pen ds on the average n u m be r  served by the patentee over the 
twen ty periods dur ing which the patent is  in e ffect .  This form ula-
'"" Sec discuss ion supra S e c t i o n  !V.B fo r a n  expl anat ion o f  why o u r  t heory about  
b u i l d i n g  brand l o ya l t y  by i n creasing o u t p u t  esse n t i a l l y  v a n ishes w h e n  consumers <ne 
i n fin i tely- l i ved and forward- looki ng. There wi l l ,  h owever, 5' t i l l  be a sma l l  b ra n cl - loya lty 
e ffe ct  even i n  this  case . but  a common problem o f  brand loyalty s tor ies o f  any kind is  
t h a t  they are not truly co m p a t i b l e  with " ' ra ti o n a l  expectations· ·  o n  the p a rt of consum­
e rs .  
'"' Various a l ternat i ves seem be haviora l l y  p l ausi ble. i ncludi ng: 
l .  The si;,e of an i n d i v i d u a l  customer·�, swi tch ing cost. S,. is a posi t i ve fun c t i o n  o f  
t h e  n u mbe r of purchases made b y  t ha t  custome r  d u r ing t h e  patent  pe r iod:  
� - The dur{{[ion o f  t h e  customer 's  switchi ng cost-clcfi necl as t h e n u m b e r  of p u r­
chases of the riva l product t hat  t h e  customer m us t  m a k e  b e fore switch i n g  costs 
a rc c l i m i n a t t: cl-is a p os i t i ve fu n c t i o n  of the n u mbe r of  p u rch ases d u ring the  
p a t e n t  peri o d :  o r  
.3 .  E i t h e r  t he  s i z e  or d ura t i o n  of post-pa t e n t  lm1 n d  ioya i t y  ( o r  b o t h )  d e pe mb on 
b o t h  t h e  nwnba C \ f  previous pur c h ases and th e i r riming. For e xa mp l e .  �; u p ­
pose--��� m i g h t  b e  reasonable--t h a t  brand loya l t y  decays o v e r  l l l1ltc . !-\ cus­
t o m e r  whose on ly  purchase was in  Period 1 would t h e n  have a l owe r swi t c h i n g  
cLJst t h a n  one whose o n l y  purch ase w a s  i n  Period 20.  i m m e d i a t e l y  b c t'ore t i l e  
p a t e: n t  c x p i r c cl .  
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t i o n  i mp l i e s  t h a t  the patentee can a l l ocate i t s  output o v e r  the 
twenty-year patent  per iod in any way i t  wishes ,  but i t  is  only the to­
t a l  output  over the period as a �vvh o l c  t h at determines i t s  loyal  cus­
t o m e r  base after the patent  expires . 1
'" 
As is t ra ditional  i n  these s i t u a t i o n s ,  we s o l ve the model  by work­
ing backwards.  That is ,  we fi rst descri be \Vh <1 t  price the  (form e r )  
patentee c a n  charge its  stock o f  loyCl l  customers once t h e  patent  
has expired,  assuming that  the  n um b e r  of loyal  customers i s  fixed 
and the p atentee can only change the price it  charges .  We t h e n  use 
this information on optimal  pricing i n  the post-patent period t o  
solve for t h e  optimal  quantity o f  loyal  customers created w h i l e  t h e  
patent  i s  in effect .  Simultaneously,  we show h o w  t h e  patentee wil l  
a l locate its  output over the twe nty-year patent  l ife in order to 
achieve t h i s  opt imal  quantity.  
Post- Expiration Dynamics 
Since we are now dealing expl ic i t ly  with t ime,  some addit ional 
notat ion is necessary. We denote by r the ann u a l  interest rate ,  and 
by o ,  t h e  discount factor ,  which i s  s imply  1/(1 +r) . P,,. , denotes  t h e  
price charged by the (former) patentee in  period t ,  and P, d e n o t e s  
the competit ive price.  
If  we al low for an infi nitely-l ived consumer and an indefi n i te 
tradem ark duration; t h e  patent e e ' s  customers face a whole seri e s  
o f  " consumption p l ans"  once t h e  patent  expires in Period 2 1 . The 
first  a lternative i s  t o  buy from the competitor immediately ,  p a y i n g  
p r i c e  P,, p l u s  switching c o s t  S, t h i s  p e r i o d .  S ince t h e  switching c o s t  
is  m o deled a s  a one-time o n l y  payment ,  once a l o y a l  consumer h a s  
t r i e d  the generic product,  s h e  c a n  conti nue to  purchase i t  a t  i t s  
quoted price,  P,, forever aft e r. A second consumption p l an i s  t o  
b u y  from t h e  p atentee at  the price b e i n g  charged t h i s  period,  P
"
· :'/ '  
and switch t o  t h e  competitor, a t  price P, + S ,  next p eriod, paying P, 
forever after .  A third i s  to buy fro m  the p atentee for two per iods  
and then switch,  and so on.  Knowing t h i s ,  the patentee m u s t  set  
current and future prices so that  i ts  loyal  customers are  indifferent 
between swi tching and remai ning loyal  i n  each period,  including 
"'' I n  o t h e r  words, prod u c i n g  fi fty u n i ts e a c h  year  for t we n t y  years y i e l d s  t h e  same 
n umber o f  loyal  customers as pro d u c i n g  twen ty-five u n i ts for t h e  first t e n  y e a rs a n c! 
seve n t y - five u n i t s  for t h e  second t e n  years of t h e  pate n t 's l i fe .  
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the current one .  In o t h e r  words.  t he  customer m ust  expect to pay 
the same amount in present va lue  whether she switches today ,  to­
morrow, or not at a l l .  
Note .  too ,  tha t  t h e  prese n t  v a l u e  o f  P, e ach per iod fro m  time r 
unti l  infi n i ty is j us t  FJr. i "' ' Th i s  a m o u n t  h a s  t o  be d i scounted even 
further ,  howeve r .  tu rdkct  t h t.:  f a c t  th a t  t he c u s t o m e r does  n o t  b e ­
gin pay ing P, i m mc d i cr tc l y . b u t  i n s t e a d  m ust fi rst p a y  P, + S and 
then wai t  a t  leas t  one period before be ing <lb l e  to huy without  any 
switching cost . 201 1 Al l  th i s  means  that  the consumer faces a choice 
among t he fo l lowing :  
Switch Immediate ly :  (P, + S) + oPjr, vs 
Switch Next Per iod :  Pf!. "' + o ( P, + S) + o2 PJr, vs 
Switch in 2 Periods: P[! 2 1  + o P1, 22 + o2( P, + S) + o-'PJr, and so on .  
The former patentee wi l l  choose the  maximum poss ib le P at 
each po int in t ime-the va lue that  keeps the consumer j ust ' i nd if­
ferent between buying from i t  and switching to the competi tor . 
Hence,  sett ing the  first equat ion equa l  to the second and solv ing, 
we have:  
p ' ;:: ( 1 - 0) s + 0 p . 201  fi. _ I  l 
Given P,, 2 1 ,  we can then  so lve for the patentee's  price i n  the sec­
ond per iod,  P,,, -,_2 , by sett ing the second equat ion equal to the th i rd .  
Aga in ,  t he resul t  is tha t  P,, 22 ::: ( 1 - o)S + oF, = P" lr In short ,  the patentee 's  price does not change ove r t ime .  Th is  price i s  j us t  suffi­
c ient to make the patentee 's pr ior c us tomers indifferent between 
switching and remain ing l oyal in  each period-the  present  d is-
''I'' H ow much w o u l cl one h ave t o  p u t  i n t o  a bank acco u n t  t o  y i e l cl P, each year fo r­
ever? A deposit  of P, y i e l d s  P, x r  p e r y e a r  in i nt e re s t  w h e n  t he i n t e re s t  ra te  i s  r. 
H e n c e ,  a d e pos i t  of PJr w i l l  pay P, in i n tere s t .  w h i c h  can be removed each year i n  
perpet u i t y  wi t h o u t  touching t h e  pri n cipa l .  
2''" T o  solve for t h e  t i m e  p a t h  u r  t h e  p a t e n t e e ' s  post-e x p i r u t ion pr ice.  w e  ass u m e  t h a t  
t h e re i s  a fi xeci Stock o f  i n l.i n i t e l y - l i vecl .. e x p e ri e n c e d '' CUSlOll1t:fS. e a c h  o f  w h o m  h< IS  a 
constant  swi t c h i n g  cost .  5. !-knee _  the  clc: m a n cl curve i s  no longer re levant a n cl t h e  
p robl e m  i s  one o f  choosing p r i c e _  r a t h e r  t h a n  q u a n t i ty_  We s o l ve fo r t h e  o p t i m a l  stock 
o f  consumers below. 
2 ' "  Technically, P,, ,, = ( i - i5 )5 + PJ l - i5 + ( i5 - 02)/rj . which is approxi mately ( 1 - iS )5 + oP 
for s m a l l  val ues of the i n t ere s t  rate r. 
.. 
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coun ted value of t h e  consumpt i o n  plan i s  t h e  s a m e  whe t h e r  t h e  
customer switches i n  Period L 2 .  3 .  and s o  o n .  o r  n o t  �i t a l L  
l'-l o te t h a t  the  ana lysis s o  far h <.1 �-; assumed t h a t  t h e  patentee's 
! ' .:'; ' l  c: i 1 rll f"'S 11 '=' \I P DP l·fp c t  1-L,Ol' t' '-' ; c_' !1 t '1 "r ; I" '·' c I { ) n  r• p : f1 c p -� t o  't'l t !' ., " "  _, .._ . .  _, .._ : - 1. l  ....- 1 .  1 C.l V l "-" l _.- l . ·- -.J 1 _::-. ' � -.. . 1 ·..- L l ,) . , � . ....._ .._, '- J- __. . C t. \. V  t l. � ,] 
; :_1 ; 1 s c ::. t That  i s ,  t h e v  co m p a re ·_·: · s  �:\vi t c h i nQ  cost  vv i t h  t h e  b e n e -
� _, - -
r:t o r  b e i n £'  3 b l e  to  buv from t h e:  l owcr- l} J" i c c:: d com oeti tor  ;.!'o r tf zc - . ,___• _, 1 . J . 
rcsr oJF rirnr : : .  This  na t ur a l lv l irn i l s  t h e:·  rn t e n t e e \  a b i l i t v  to m ark u o  ,_, !. _, 1 
h e r  product over t h a t  of  h e r  ri v a ] �) - -t h e  l i rn i t  i :; not t h e  S\Vitch i r. g  
cost per s e ,  b u t  rather the prese n t  di scounte d  value o f  the savi ngs 
from swi tching to the che aper ge n e r i c  product .  G iven t h at t h e  con­
sum e r's  switching cost only has to be paid once, that  cost w i l l  obvi­
ously be less i mportant the greater the number of addit ional p ur­
chases the consumer plans t o  m a k e ,  since the same switching cost  is 
amortized over a l arger number o f  future purch ases .2112 
Vv'h a t  this  means, in short ,  is that  the switching cost s tory breaks 
down almost comp le t e l y  i f  consumers have infinite ly  long time ho­
rizons . This  in t u rn implies that  patentees wil l not  have any reason 
to cult ivate brand l o y a l ty whi l e  the patent  is in e ffec t ,  s i nc e  the 
post- expiration return from doing so i s  only a t iny fraction o f  the 
switching cost instead of the ful l  swi tching cost . 
I n s tead of assuming that  consumers compare the  current switch­
ing cost with the pre sent discounted value of their future s avings 
from svvitching, h owever,  we migh t pl a L�s i b l y  m a k e  the o pposite as­
surnption:  that  consumers are myo pic . 211 ' In th is  case,  the  patent e e 's 
m ax imum post-expira tion price wo u l d  r ise to S + P,, refl e cting t h e  
ful l  v a l u e  o f  t h e  switching cost. In s u m ,  b rand l oy a l t y  i s  o n l y  signifi­
ca nt in an infinite-horizon model if we assume that consume rs are 
not forward - looking. 
Pre-Expirarion Dynamics 
Knowing that  t h e  post-expiration price w i l l  be ( 1 - o)S + oP, i n  
each period, the patentee wil l  be in position t o  plot  h e r  opt i m a l  
quant ity during the patent period .  There are , hmvever, t w o  addi-
. , ,, For an i n t e rest rate of s o;;, _ t h is m e a n s  t h �: l  t h e  p a t e n t e e  can c h arge no m ore t h a n  
8ppwxi m a t e ly 0.055 + .95 ?, . I n  o t h e r  worci�; _  I h e  switching cost loses 95 % o r  i t s  " fr ic­
l i omd "  value  when consumers arc i n fi nitei y - l i ved and fo rward - l o o k ing. 
'"' T h i s  is  a stand ard ass u m p t i o n  i n  the sw i t c h i ng cost l i te ra t ur e .  Sec, e .g . . G �l bsze­
wicz e t  a l . .  supra note  71 .  at 3 99 ( assuming t h a t  con s u m e rs do n o t  take f u t u re switch­
i n g  costs  i n t o  acco u n t  when maki ng dec is ions  a b o u t  p resen t  consumpti on p l a n s ) .  
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t iona\  compl icat ions .  First the fut u re reve n u e  s t re a m  of ( L - 6)S + oP, 
'-� <tch period from the expirat ion of t h e  p a t e n t  o nwards m ust be dis­
cc;un ted t o  i t s  presen t  value as o f  Per iod 2 i .  Th i s  i nvolves d i v id ing 
by t he i n t <:: rest  rate . r, to capture t h e  i n fi n i t e  n a t u r e  of the  reve n u e 
· . t r·.: � t P: . 
�� �.; 
S r: c o n cL c l l1 i ncre<1.Se i n  Peri ocl-r  o u t p u t  \\ i i i  h <n·c :1 d i fi ,_:: re n t  e ffect 
t. m  t he p rese n t  v 8 l ue of  future pro fi ts ck pc: n d i ng u n  \Vhi:'� n  i t  o c c ur s .  
Let Q = ( 1 /20)[�� 1 Qr be the 
ave rage output over t he twenty-year patent l i te . A n  increase of one 
uni t  in any period wi l l  ra ise 0 by 1 /20 of a. uni t ,  but i t s  disco unted 
e ffect  on post-expirat ion profits depends on when during the 
twenty years the i ncrease occurs. Start ing from tbe  m onopoly op­
t imum. a one-unit  i ncrease in  Per iod-20 output lowers p rofits in 
Period 20 ,  but raises profit s  the next period,  after the p atent lapses 
by adding to 1120 of a un i t  to the  stock of loyal customers .  By con­
trast,  an increase i n  Period-1 output lowers profi ts i mm ediately, 
but does not raise p rofi t s  unt i l  the patent expires twenty years 
hence .  Thus, we must d i scount  future profits caused by a Period-t 
increase in output by o2 1 .1 to  bring this future revenue stream to its 
Period-t value (and then  further discount to bring this s t ream to i ts 
Periocl-0 value) .  
Hence.  the patentee's ful l  problem i s :  
� � 1 ( Q� J ( O � + ( l - O )S J � ' I - r i\JI [/)( n =  (0 - bQI ) Q1U + ) - 0 -r=l _Q l 
which i s  solved by set ting 
a n 0 2 1 -1 (8 P + (l - 8 ' S \ 
:_· - = a8 1 - 2b0 8 1  + ( J J = 0. d Q; 
� �  20r 
This impi ies that the optimal quant ity at  t ime r, Qr , solves 
.,,, S e c  supn1 n o t e  1 90.  
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n1a n d  c ur v e ,  and t he o t h e r  parameters are defi n e d  etbcve . 
o t e  t h a t  t h e  fi rst t e rrn i n  t h e  expression for Qr i s  j us t  t he s i ngle­
Deri ocl m o n onolv outnl- u t .  o/2 b ,  w h i c h  i s  not  t irne de p e n d e n t .  Th e 
1 i -' / . � 
second t e rm is str ict l y pos i t ive and a n  i ncreasing fu nct i o n  o f  t i m e ,  
from which w e  easi ly  conclude t h a t :  
1 .  T h e  trademark-leveraged patentee wi l l  a lways produce more 
than the · · pure " patentee in  every period;  and 
2 .  Optim al output rises over t i me during the patent  pe r i od .  
These results are e nt irely consistent with  our two-period m o d e l .  
The chie f d iffe rence i s  t h a t  i f  w e  assume consumers are forward­
looking in the sense descr ibed above, the patentee can o n l y  c harge 
o P, + ( 1 - 6 )S, rath e r  t h an (P, + S), and the leve rage e ffect  is corre­
spondi ngly dimi n i s h e d .  
As t h e  figure i n  the text-which i s  d r a w n  assuming t hat  c o n s um­
ers a re n o t  forward- looking-il lustrates,  opti m a l  o utput in t h e  first 
year of the pate n t ' s  l i fe i s  only i n fi ni tes imal ly  greater t h a n  the s i n ­
gle-period m o n o p o l y  leve l .  A s  exp i rat ion approaches,  h o we ver,  
output r ises to more than 30 % above the s ingle-period m o nopoly 
level .  Our story is  thus at  least  roughly consisten t  with the d y n am­
ics  of the case studies,  i n  which patentees seem to reserve t he bulk 
of  their  price cutt ing and attempts to  bui ld  m arket share fo r the 
patent ' s  twili ght years.  
